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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the nature of State intervention in 
agricultural commodity markets in the Indian province of 
Kerala in the period 1960-80. Attributing the lack of 
dynamism in the agrarian sector to market imperfections, 
the Government of Kerala has intervened both directly 
through departmentally run institutions and indirectly 
through public sector corporations. The failure of both 
these institutional devices encouraged the government to 
adopt marketing co-operatives as the preferred instruments 
of market intervention.
Co-operatives with their decentralised, 
democratic structures are^ in theory, capable of combining 
autonomous decision-making capacity with accountability to 
farmer members. The Government of Kerala believed that this 
institutional mechanism would aggregate the interests of 
peasants and thereby transform them into powerful market 
agents.
We, however, argue that the nature of the 
interest group process, both within the organisation and in 
the larger polity, significantly, distorts policy outcomes. 
First, the nature of the intervention - the deployment of 
massive financial resources, the top-down approach with its 
commitment to the achievement of quantitative targets and 
the capital intensity of many of the projects- afford
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opportunities to powerful groups such as professional 
politicians and State bureaucrats to maximise their own 
interests. Second, groups within the organisation such as 
farmer-politicians with their proximity to decision-makers 
and trade unions with their links to political leaders are 
able to divert an increasing share of the organisation's 
resources to themselves. In the process, farmers, in whose 
name these policies are initiated, experience negative 
consequences.
The above hypothesis is tested by analysing the 
implementation of Operation Flood- India's dairy 
development programme. Operation Flood (OF) was launched by 
the Government of India with the avowed aim of increasing 
farm incomes through an institutional framework( the Anand 
Pattern Co-operative of Gujarat) in which farmers would 
have control over their own resources. This research, 
however, finds that owing to interest group processes, the 
programme has produced sub-optimal results in Kerala. 
Producer prices have remained stagnant, while production 
costs have soared. Farmers have responded by restricting 
supplies, which has led to massive shortages in the market. 
Meanwhile the fiscal foundations of the organisations have 
been undermined, as powerful groups appropriated an 
increasing share of the organisations' resources. An 
intervention intended to optimise benefits for farmers, in 
fact, resulted in the dominant interest groups within the 
polity maximising their benefits.
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The thesis is based primarily on unpublished 
material gathered directly from institutions in charge of 
implementing the programme.The author was associated with 
the implementation of OF in Kerala during the period 1988- 
90.1 had, therefore, access to confidential materials such 
as minutes of Board meetings, internal memos, balance 
sheets and audit reports of OF institutions in Kerala. 
Moreover, as an officer of the Government of Kerala, I also 
had access to government documents and files. Documentary 
evidence was supplemented by interviews with key actors 
such as V.Ramachandran,the former Chief Secretary of 
Kerala, Secretaries to the Government of Kerala and 
officials of the departments of Animal Husbandry, Co­
operatives and Dairy Development. A sample survey was also 
conducted to ascertain the response of farmers to the 
programme.
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INTRODUCTION
A central issue in current debates over 
development policy in India, is the role of the State which 
has intervened massively in the Indian economy with 
disputed consequences. The share of the public sector in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP),increased from only 7.5% in 
1950-51 to 23.5% in 1986-87 (at 1970-71 prices).^ Public 
sector institutions dominate the organised sector both 
nationally and in the provinces. In 1987, 71% of the total 
workforce in the organised sector was employed by the 
government (both federal and state governments) and 77.5% 
of the paid up capital in the corporate sector was invested 
by government companies.  ^Further, through the ownership of 
all the major banks and insurance companies, the government 
is also able to exercise considerable influence over the 
private corporate sector.
Social scientists have advanced a variety of 
arguments to explain the rationale of this intervention.
 ^Agrawal A.N , Varma H.O and Gupta R.C : "India: Economic 
Information Book: 1989-90." New Delhi: National Publishing House. 
1989.
 ^ The relative importance of the public sector has been 
increasing over time. In 1971 only 62% of the workforce in the 
organised sector was employed by the government.ibid.
The dominance of the public sector can also be seen from the 
fact that in the mid eighties only two out of the top twenty five 
industrial firms in India was in the private sector. See Rudolph 
L . I and Rudolph S.H : " In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political 
Economv of the Indian State". Bombay: Orient Longman. 1987.
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Nehru's intellectual fascination with Fabian socialism and 
Soviet Planning is well known.^ He believed that India's 
problems of poverty and inequality could be resolved only 
through the State dominating significant sections of the 
economy. Development economists in India and abroad argued 
that State intervention was required to remove the 
constraints that perpetuated "structural backwardness" in 
the Indian economy.* Highly unequal social and economic 
structures, low levels of capital formation and inadequate 
infrastructure were serious constraints requiring State 
intervention.®
The development experience of India during the 
last four decades does not validate this early optimism in 
the efficacy of State intervention. True, India produces 
enough food grains® to feed its huge population^ and the
 ^ See Nayar B.R : "India's Mixed Economv; The Role of
Ideoloqv and Interest in its Development". London: Sangam Books. 
1989.
* Chakravarty S observes that in the fifties, there was a 
great deal of interaction between Indian planners and a number 
of Western development economists, most of whom supported the 
government's interventionist policy. See Chakravarty S : 
"Development Planning: The Indian Experience". Delhi: OUP. 1987.
 ^ ibid.
® The production of food grains increased from only 50.8 
million in 1950-51 to 165 million tonnes in 1991-92. The figures 
for 1950-51 are derived from Agrawal et al (1989) op cit, while 
the latter figures have been obtained from India Todav, February 
15, 1993.
’ The 1991 census puts the Indian population at 843.93 
million. See: Census of India 1991 - Provisional Population
Totals. Director of Census Operations: Kerala. Government of
India. Trivandrum. 1991.
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country has built a broad-based and diversified industrial 
structure. However, protected behind high tariff walls, the 
industrial structure is high-cost and uncompetitive by 
world standards.® Agricultural policies, while increasing 
food production, have not succeeded in significantly 
reducing absolute poverty levels.* Currently, in the early 
1990's, the Indian economy is passing through a very 
difficult phase. Faced with persistent balance of payment 
problems, India has been forced to implement a Structural 
Adjustment Programme sponsored by the International 
Monetary Fund.
® See Bhagwati J.N and Desai P : " India ; Planning for
Industrialisation; Industrialisation and Trade Policies Since 
1951". London: Oxford University Press. 1970 and Bhagwati J.N and 
Srinivasan T. N "Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development 
;India ". New York: Columbia University Press.1975
* Agriculture growth in India and its impact on poverty 
levels hase been extensively debated. Ahlüwalia.M argues that 
agriculture growth since the late sixties has reduced the 
incidence of rural poverty. See Ahluwalia M "Rural Poverty and 
Agricultural Performance in India". Journal of Development 
Studies. Vol :XIV
No: 3. 1978. For a critique of this argument see Kohli A : The
State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform. Appendix II. 
Bombay : Orient Longman. 1987.
In the last two years, the Government of India has 
initiated a series of measures to open up the economy. Many of 
the restrictive licensing procedures have been abolished and 
trade policies have been liberalised. In this year's budget 
(1993), the Rupee has been made convertible, the maximum customs 
duty has been cut from 110% to 80% and tax rates have been 
reduced to attract foreign capital. The government has made a 
cautious beginning to reduce its direct involvement in industry 
by the public sale of shares in Government companies. The 
Government has also made it clear, that in future, unprofitable 
companies will not be rescued through budgetary support. See :" 
Harvesting India's Reforms".
The Economist. March 6th-12th, 1993.
The reforms are however still largely restricted to the 
Government of India. The governments of the various states have 
yet to initiate any meaningful reform programme.
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Why has State intervention in the Indian economy 
produced sub optimal results ?. Many economists attribute 
the comparatively poor performance of the economy to the 
rent-seeking behaviour of elected officials and the 
bureaucracy.il In this view. State intervention leads to 
inefficiencies, because they create space for rent, the 
enjoyment of which is dependent on access to State power. 
The incentive system, consequently, is biased not towards 
productive activities, but towards the unproductive search 
for political favour. The large regulatory role of the 
Indian State, argues Wade, predisposes the administrative 
and political system in India to high levels of 
corruption.12 Endemic corruption, in his view, accounts for 
the Indian State's poor record in promoting development.
Economic stagnation has also been attributed to 
the rise of various classes. In P.S Jha's thesis, a 
dominant "intermediate class or stratum consisting of 
market oriented peasant proprietors, small manufacturers, 
traders and other self employed groups" have benefited most 
from government controls over economic activity.“ They
11 Bhagwati J.N and Desai P (1970) op cit and Bhagwati J.N 
and Srinivasan T.N (1975). op cit.
12 See Wade R The Market for Public Office: Why the 
Indian State is not Better at Development". World Development. 
Vol: XIII. No: 4. 1985.
12 See Jha P.S: India : A Political Economv of Stagnation.
Bombay : OUP. 1980. P: Preface, VII. Nayar B.R, also traces the 
expansion of the public sector to the influence of the 
intermediate classes. See Nayar B.R( 1989) op cit.
The concept of the intermediate classes capturing State power 
in developing countries was first formulated by the Polish 
economist Michael Kalecki. K.N Raj, without applying the concept 
to the Indian situation popularised it in India in an article in
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have, therefore, a vested interest in perpetuating the 
existing inefficient system. In A. Rudra's formulation, 
"the ruling class" consists of "big industrialists", "the 
class of big landowners" and the "intelligentsia".^ In his 
view, industrial policies have served mainly to increase 
the wealth of the industrial capitalists, while the 
benefits of agrarian policies have been captured by rich 
farmers. In Marxian analysis of the Indian economy, 
therefore. State intervention is unlikely to produce 
optimum results, until social institutions are 
fundamentally transformed.^^
These differing perceptions of the results of 
State intervention brings us back to our initial question. 
What accounts for the State's continued, massive 
intervention in the economy ?.ls it a product of the 
ideological commitment of the Indian elites to socialism ?. 
Is State intervention merely a method for the ruling 
classes to appropriate more of society's resources ?; or
the Economic and Political Weekly in 1973.
See Kalecki M : Selected Essays on the Economic Growth of the
Socialist and the Mixed Economv. London: Csunbridge University 
Press. 1972. and Raj K.N The Politics and Economics of
Intermediate Regimes". Economic and Political Weekly. Vol: Vlll. 
No:27. 1973.
Rudra includes a wide variety of groups under the 
category of intelligentsia. They include: all white collar
workers in the organised private sector; all office workers in 
administrative services from top bureaucrats to clerks; teachers, 
doctors, writers and other professionals; all skilled workers 
engaged in the entertainment and advertisement business; 
politicians and trade union leaders. See Rudra A :" Emergence of 
the Intelligentsia as a Ruling Class in India." Economic and 
Political Weekly. Vol: XXIV No: 3. 1989.
See: Prasad P.H : Lopsided Growth: Political Economv of
Indian Development. Bombay : OUP. 1989.
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are State functionaries autonomous agents motivated to 
expand the State sector by considerations of self interest 
only ?.
Explanations of the behaviour of State elites( by 
State elites we mean elected political leaders such as 
ministers and the members of the Indian parliament and the 
various state legislatures, the leaders of the various 
political parties and the top bureaucrats) need not 
necessarily be mutually exclusive. While Marxian analysis 
of State policies have a tendency towards "economic 
reductionism", their emphasis on social and economic 
processes as determinants of political behaviour is 
legitimate. Similarly, State elites may be motivated by 
both self-interest and by what R Miliband calls the 
"conception of the national i n t e r e s t " . H e  observes that 
just as it is wrong to affirm that those in power have no 
motives other than maintaining themselves in power, it is 
equally naive to believe that State elites are not moved by 
self-interest. He concludes,therefore, that " Self-interest 
and a conception of the national interest have been and are 
powerful influences in shaping the policies and actions of 
people in control of State power".
Our attempt here is to explore the nature of 
State intervention in agricultural markets in the South 
Indian province of Kerala. Essentially, the thesis asks "
Miliband R : " State Power and Class Interests". New Left 
Review. No: 138. March- April.1983.
ibid. P:64
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how and why government interventions in agricultural 
markets have become so pervasive, why do they assume the 
form they do and with what results and consequences " • " 
Through an analysis of the dynsimic interplay between the 
State and the institutions it creates to promote 
development, we hope to provide an explanation for the 
indifferent performance of so many State sponsored agrarian 
progrcimmes in India.
The thesis analyzes the efforts made by the 
Government of Kerala to promote agricultural development 
through marketing co-operatives. The development experience 
of Kerala has often been cited as a model for developing 
countries." Despite low levels of per capita income, the 
majority of the population has access to basic needs such 
as primary education, health care and food security. Less 
well known is the comparative failure of successive 
governments to stimulate the commodity producing sectors of 
the economy. This thesis, through a detailed examination of 
one commodity, milk, offers an explanation for this 
failure. It argues that the interest group process in the 
polity biases resource allocation towards dominant groups 
that have access to State power and away from peasants.
See Doornbos M and Nair K.N ed : Resources, Institutions
and Strategies; Operation Flood and Indian Dairying. Indo-Dutch 
Studies on Development Alternatives -4. New Delhi: Sage
Publications.1990. P: 10.
" See Franke R W and Chasin B H : Kerala: Radical Reform
as Development in an Indian State . The Institute for Food and 
Development Policy. ( Food First Development Report ; No: 6) San 
Francisco: 1989; and Jeffrey R : Politics, Women and Well-Being:
How Kerala Beccune * a Model * . Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1992.
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Consequently, even programmes such as Operation Flood, 
which are designed to aggregate their interests, produce 
sub optimal results. This argument is illustrated though an 
examination of Operation Flood, the national dairy 
development programme.
Operation Flood (OF) is an ambitious programme 
of the Government of India, to optimise the interests of 
dairy farmers through an integrated, co-operative, 
procurement,processing and marketing system (See below). In 
its first phase, OF-I (1970-77), the programme covered only 
ten states and aimed at linking dairy co-operatives in 
these states with the markets in the four major cities- 
Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras.^ OF-II (1978-86) 
extended the programme to nearly all the states and union 
territories. The main thrust of OF-III (1987-94) is to 
consolidate the gains already made by the previous phases 
of the prograunme.^^ The National Dairy Development 
Board(NDDB) oversees the implementation of the programme 
and it is financed mainly by commodity aid and loans 
provided by the World Food Programme, the EEC and the World 
Bank.
OF aimed to stimulate milk production and 
increase farm incomes through the creation of an
The ten states are: Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Gujarat.See : "Report of the Evaluation Committee 
on Operation Flood-II ". Ministrv of Agriculture. Government of 
India. New Delhi. 1985.
See : "India: Second National Dairy Project". Staff
Appraisal Report. No: 6897 IN. World Bank. Washington. 1987.
23
institutional framework, in which farmers could maximize 
their interests. The inability of small farmers to organise 
themselves for collective action was diagnosed by the 
Government of India, as the major institutional constraint 
in promoting agricultural development.^^ Marketing co­
operatives, on the lines of the successful milk co­
operatives of Gujarat, offered an attractive institutional 
format for promoting the interests of the unorganised 
peasantry. OF was,therefore, launched by the Government of 
India with the avowed objective of replicating the Gujarat 
model all over India.
The Model
OF is consciously modelled on the organisational 
pattern of the dairy co-operatives of the Kheda district of 
Gujarat. Beginning as a small rural co-operative, the Kheda 
District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union ( KDCMPU, 
better known as "Amul") developed spectacularly over the 
last forty years to become the premier dairy co-operative 
in I n d i a . I t s  success contributed to the popularity of 
what is known as the "Anand Pattern Co-operative"(APCO) ,
See : " Report of the National Commission on
Agriculture". Ministry of Agriculture. Government of India. New 
Delhi.1976.
R.C Mascarenhas points out that what began as a small 
primary society in 1946, collecting about 200 LPD, had by the mid 
eighties, become a huge organisation with 800 affiliated 
societies, collecting on an average 800,000 LPD. Its sales 
turnover had increased from Rs 7. 43 million in 1955-56 to Rs 
1000.48 million in 1983-84. See: Mascarenhas R.C: A Strateav for 
Rural Development : Dairy Co-operatives in India. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 1988.
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(The name "Anand " is derived from the town Anand in which 
"Amul" is located) • The "Anand Pattern" consists of a three 
tiered co-operative structure: primary co-operatives
procuring milk at the village level are integrated with 
processing and marketing co-operatives at the district 
level. The district co-operatives are federated to an apex 
co-operative at the provincial level. The latter
coordinates policy and looks after inter province trade.
In Gujarat, the model is claimed to have overcome 
many of the problems associated with rural development 
programmes. U Lele points out that to prevent co-operative
institutions from being captured by local elites, it is
necessary for the organisers to exercise a degree of
paternalism. Such paternalism is, however, incompatible
with the requirement of grass roots participation, so 
essential for any successful co-operative effort.2* The
APCO system has successfully overcome this dilemma,-the 
"decentralization-equity dilemma"- as Lele characterises 
it by ensuring that while farmers are the owners of the 
enterprise, the actual management of the organisation is in 
the hands of technically qualified managers.
It is this system that the Government of India 
sought to replicate all over India. During the eighties.
Operation Flood and programmes modelled on it became the
preferred instrument of State intervention in many
See Lele U : " Co-operatives and the Poor: A Comparative 
Perspective". World Development. Vol: IX. No: 1. 1981.
ibid.
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agricultural markets in India. The programme has generated 
a great deal of controversy in India. While the NDDB and 
the multilateral financing institutions have claimed the 
programme to be a s u c c e s s , ^  a number of social scientists 
have been highly critical of the prograunme.^^ Critics of 
the progreunme identify design flaws as factors primarily 
responsible for the programme's indifferent performance. In 
this thesis, however, an attempt is made to show that while 
design flaws are a contributory factor, the role of the 
State has been decisive in determining programme outcomes.
The Debate Over Operation Flood
Operation Flood has been extensively debated in 
India. The passions unleashed by the debate have often 
pushed the rival protagonists to rigid, inflexible 
p o s i t i o n s . T h e  debate over the efficacy of the APCO 
model, as an appropriate development tool for India,covers 
a wide variety of issues. These include, the
See Kurien V: " Opposition to Change; The Anand Pattern. 
A Case Study." (Pamphlet). Indo-Canadian Institute. New Delhi. 
1988; and Staff Appraisal Report. World Bank.1987. op cit.
^^Among others, Alvares C. 1985, George S .1985, Doornbos M. 
1990 and Nair K.N. 1990.
George.S. " cannot find one single policy decision taken 
by Operation Flood to be valid and justifiable". See George S 
Operation Flood. An Appraisal of Current Indian Dairv Policv. 
Delhi: OUP. 1985. Page:275.
The NDDB on the other hand does not entertain even the 
mildest criticism of Operation Flood. For a critique of NDDB's 
reaction to the attempts made by social scientists to evaluate 
OF, See Baviskar B.S. and George S: "Development and Controversy: 
The National Dairy Development Board". Economic and Political 
Weeklv. Review of Agriculture. Vol: XXIII No: 13. 1988.
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appropriateness of a Western model of dairy development for 
India, OF's claim to poverty alleviation, the bureaucratic 
structure of NDDB and its relations with external 
institutions, the supremacy of the technocracy in OF 
institutions and the consequent marginalisation of farmer's 
representatives and above all the replaceability of the 
" Anand Pattern" in different socio-economic environments. 
Only the more salient issues raised in the debates are 
discussed here.
A major objective of OF is to increase milk 
production in the country through the creation of a 
National Milch Herd of cross-bred cows and upgraded 
buffaloes." However, the progreunme to increase the cross­
bred cattle population has been criticised on the ground 
that farmers in India do not maintain cattle exclusively 
for milk production. S.George argues that the progeny of 
cross bred cattle have lesser draught power capability." 
Consequently, a programme that relies exclusively on cross­
breeding to increase milk production in the country will 
break the symbiotic relationship between crop and animal 
husbandry. K.N Nair argues that the success of the cross­
breeding programme in Kerala was due to factors unique to 
the state, such as the food habits of Keralites and shifts
A specific objective of OF-II was to " enable the milk 
producers to rear a National Milch Herd of some 15 million cross­
bred cows and upgraded buffaloes by mid-1985." See: " Report of 
the Evaluation Committee on Operation Flood-II". 1985. op cit.
30 See George S. : 1985. op cit.
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in the cropping pattern." These cannot be easily 
replicated in other regions. However, as A.C Dhas's study 
of Tamilnadu shows, changes in the agrarian economy such as 
shifts in the cropping pattern, fragmentation of holdings 
and mechanisation of agricultural operations are reducing 
the farmer's incentive for holding draught animals in other 
states also." Both Nair's analysis of the Kerala situation 
and Dhas's study of Tamilnadu indicate that, while 
governments have been active in making the technology 
available, it is market forces, rather than the Government, 
that dictating the pace at which farmers are switching 
from draught animals to milch animals."
The unique factors included shifts in the cropping 
pattern from paddy to non cereal crops which increased the 
attractiveness of holding milch stock as against work animals and 
the food habits of Keralites, who generally are not averse to 
consuming beef. The latter greatly facilitates cross-breeding as 
there is a market for low or unproductive milch stock.
See Nair K. N. " Technological Change in Milk Production: A 
Review of Some Critical Issues in Milk Production with Reference 
to South Asia." Economic and Political Weeklv. Review of 
Agriculture.
Vol: XVII.No: 13. 1982.
" Dhas. A. C. "Structure of Milk Production in Tamilnadu: 
An Analysis of Trends and Sources of Growth" in Doornbos M and 
Nair K.N. 1990. op cit.
One of the most powerfully articulated criticism of OF is 
that it attempts to impose one model-the Anand pattern and one 
technology- the cross - breeding technology, on the entire 
country. This, argues George, is a reflection of the centralising 
nature of dairy policy under OF and as such, it constitutes an 
unhealthy approach to development in a country as diverse as 
India. But George's remedial measures give more arbitrary powers 
to the State.
Proceeding from a legitimate argument that dairy policy 
should reflect local agro-economic conditions, she goes on to 
argue that " within each region, distinctions should be made as 
to the milch stock appropriate for each agrarian class, since any 
milch animal that a landless labourer can maintain will differ 
from those feasible for a small holder and again from those
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Second, there is a consensus among most analysts 
of OF that the limits to the programme would be set by the 
availability of feed and fodder in the country. Surendar 
Singh argues that the paucity of feed and fodder would act 
as a on the success of OF.^* K.N Nair argues that
following the Green Revolution, the availability of bovine 
feed has been increasing rapidly in recent years. However, 
since cross-bred cattle require more feed and fodder, the 
rapid expansion of the cross-bred population under OF is 
likely to put pressure on feed resources.
In fact, very little hard data exists to 
indicate whether OF has adversely affected the availability 
of feed and fodder resources in the country. However, our 
studies in Kerala will indicate that towards the second 
half of the eighties, feed prices have been increasing at 
a faster rate than milk prices. A series of "quick studies" 
initiated by the NDDB in 1990-91, also indicate that in 
various parts of the country, feed prices are rising faster
suited to medium or large cultivators". George. S.: "Operation 
Flood and Centralised Dairy Development in India", in Doornbos 
M and Nair K.N. 1990. op cit. page ; 79.
This suggestion would be to vest bureaucrats with the 
authority to decide what type of animal should be kept by 
different classes of farmers. This is far more centralising than 
anything suggested by the NDDB.
Singh S :" Operation Flood II; Some Constraints and 
Implications". Economic and Political Weeklv. Vol: XIV. No: 42 
& 43. 1979.
Nair K.N. "White Revolution in India: Some Facts and
Issues". Economic and Political Weeklv. Review of Agriculture, 
Vol: XX. No: 25 & 26. 1985.
29
han milk prices/** The rapid growth of the cross-breeding 
programme, the increasing commercialisation of the dairy 
economy*® and the spurt in the export of feed from India 
(while India exported only 164,000 tonnes of oil cake to 
the EEC in 1969, exports in 1982, totalled 920,000), *®are 
all likely to exacerbate the situation in the future.
One of the most controversial and widely debated 
aspects of OF is commodity aid. Part of the resources for 
OF is generated by the sale in India of donated 
commodities. It was envisaged that 49% of the total outlay
** See:l) ” A Rapid Study on Declining Milk Procurement in 
Bulandsher Union";2) " A Rapid Survey on Declining Milk
Procurement in the South" and 3) " A  Quick Survey of Declining 
Milk Procurement in Madhya Pradesh". NDDB, Anand. 1991.
Between 1984-85 and 1987, the cross-bred population in 
India is estimated to have increased from about 5 million to 
about 12 million. On an average about 3.4 million artificial 
inseminations(AI) with exotic semen are performed around the 
country. See Nair K.N and Dhas A.C: "Cattle Breeding Technology 
and Draught Power Availability: An Unresolved Contradiction", in 
Doornbos M and Nair K.N. 1990. op cit.
While the success rate of A I , obviously varies from state 
to state, the sheer volume of the effort would result in a 
significant addition to the cross-bred population every year. 
Since cross-bred cattle are more resource demanding, the demand 
for feed and fodder is bound to escalate rapidly with the growth 
of the cross-bred population.
*® OF has contributed significantly to the commercialisation 
of the dairy economy. Estimates show that 65% of the milk 
produced in OF areas is traded. See " Base Line Study of 
Operation Flood 1988-89 ". National Council of Applied Economic 
Research. New Delhi.1990
As OF expands its coverage, the process of commercialisation 
is bound to increase, putting upward pressure in the demand for 
and price of feed and fodder.
See Doornbos et al: Dairv Aid and Development. India's
Operation Flood. Indo-Dutch Studies on Development Alternatives- 
3. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 1990.
In the context of the current crisis in India's Balance 
of Payments, and the consequent encouragement given to exports, 
we can anticipate an increasing quantity of oil cake, rice bran 
and other feed stuffs finding their way to export markets.
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for OF II would be raised by the recombination and sale of
186,000 tonnes of skimmed milk powder(SMP) and 76,000 
tonnes of butter oil, supplied by the EEC to the Indian 
Dairy Corporation.** As part funding for OF III, the EEC 
proposed to allocate 75,000 tonnes of SMP and 25,000 tonnes 
of butter oil/"
Critics have argued that this funding pattern 
increased India's dependence on the West." Donated powder 
"artificially" expands the market for milk. OF institutions 
quickly secure a dominant share of the urban market by 
recombining donated commodities. This strategy is based on 
the premise that once markets are assured, farmers can be 
encouraged to produce milk. The market can then be 
gradually weaned from imported powder.
The obvious danger of this strategy is that the 
availability of cheap milk powder discourages local 
production. When there are shortages in the market, 
rational dairy managers are more likely to clamour for more 
cheap powder from abroad, rather than raise prices to 
stimulate increased supply from local sources. This will 
lead to stagnant local milk prices. According to one 
Western estimate, imported milk products have depressed the
** ibid.
See Baviskar.S and Terhal.P : "Internal Constraints and 
External Dependence: The EEC and Operation Flood", in Doornbos. 
M. and Nair.K.N. 1990. op cit.
George S. 1985 and Doornbos M. et al. 1990
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domestic price by 10%.^^ It is further argued that since 
markets have expanded so fast, to maintain supplies, India 
would have to be continually dependent on external 
markets."
There is, however, little firm evidence to 
substantiate the claim that OF has increased India's 
dependence on imported milk products. The NDDB argues that 
the volume of imported milk powder, which averaged about
37,000 tonnes per annum during 1960- 1970, had dropped to 
about 28,000 tonnes during the period 1970-1988. Moreover, 
the throughput of the dairy industry had risen from 132,000 
tonnes per annum to 654,000 tonnes between 1970 and 1988.^® 
The Jha Committee also found that, as a percentage of the 
throughput of the dairy industry, the use of imported 
powder has fallen from nearly 40% in the mid sixties to 
less than 8% in the mid eighties."
The differential distributional impact of OF is 
another issue which has evoked a great deal of debate. OF- 
I had been presented, not only as a programme to increase
See Lipton.M.: "Operation Flood and Other EEC Aid to
India", in Caliewaert (ed) : " India and the EEC". Quoted in Liana 
Gertsch: "The National Dairy Development Board of India and
Corporatism: The Politics of Public Policy Making". Working
Paper. Series No: 71. Institute of Social Studies. The
Hague.1990.
** George. S. 1985. op cit.
" See Bardhan. P: "Operation Flood. Its Evolution, the
Strategy Followed and Progress Achieved". Unpublished paper. 
NDDB. Anand. No date.
See " Report of the Evaluation Committee on Operation 
Flood II". 1985. OP cit.
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urban milk supplies, but also as a poverty alleviation 
programme. The Terminal Evaluation report on OF-I, claimed 
that OF is a powerful developmental tool which has proved 
that it can make a dent in rural poverty.
This claim of poverty alleviation has been
subjected to a great deal of critical scrutiny. OF has
certainly enabled individual dairy farmers in Gujarat to
gain better remuneration for their produce.** But, even V
Kurien, the Chairman of NDDB, was keen to emphasise that " 
Operation Flood is not an all purpose poverty removal
programme  (It) is not an all purpose development
programme aimed at removing economic and social 
inequalities existing in rural India for centuries at one 
stroke". ** This realisation of the limited efficacy of OF
in transforming rural power relations is reflected in the
de-emphasis of the poverty alleviation aspect in the
subsequent phases of the programme. Neither OF-II nor OF-
III, raises any claim to poverty alleviation. They merely
emphasise that the programme will help dairy farmers to
build a viable self-sustaining dairy industry.
World Food Programme Terminal Evaluation Report on
project India 618 (Operation Flood I), FAO, Rome.1981. Quoted
in "Report of the Evaluation Committee on Operation Flood II". 
1985. OP cit.
** Even critics of Operation Flood admit that "Amul" has had 
a positive impact on the dairy farmers of Gujarat. Baviskar B.S 
writes : " The dairy co-operatives in Sanjaya and Amul have 
brought many benefits to the milk producers in the village. They 
provide a guaranteed market at a fixed price, supply cattle feed 
at a reasonable price and promote a regular and efficient 
veterinary service at the village itself. No private or 
government enterprise will provide all these services with equal 
efficiency at such a low cost to the producer". See Baviskar. 
B.S. "Dairy Co-operatives and Rural Development in Gujarat", in 
Doornbos M and Nair K.N. 1990. op cit.
**Kurien V: "From a drop to a Flood". 1987 .Quoted by Verhagen 
M ; " Operation Flood and Rural Poor" in Doornbos M and Nair 
K.N. 1990. OP cit. P: 253.
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This takes us to the question whether the context 
and the environment in which these programmes are planned 
and implemented have any implications for their eventual 
success or failure. In short, can the Anand pattern, which 
evolved in Gujarat in a particular socio-historical context, 
be replicated in such a diverse country as India?.The 
replaceability of the model is at the heart of the debate 
over OF.
Critics contend that the model cannot be 
replicated effectively for a number of reasons.®® First, 
Amul, the role model for OF, evolved in the Kheda district, 
which historically is one of the most productive milch 
tracts in the country. This area was already the centre of 
a prosperous and well established dairy industry by the 
time Amul came to be established in the late forties. It is 
therefore argued that the " organisational model has been 
the result of the growth of milk production in Kheda 
district and not vice versa as the myth s u g g e s t s " . I t  
follows / therefore, that in regions which are less well 
endowed, this model may prove unviable.
Second, the proximity of Bombay, with its huge 
urban market, was a major factor in the success of Amul.The 
Bombay milk supply scheme was dependent on Kheda district 
for a major part of its supplies. Supplies were initially
Among others, George S. 1983 and 1985, Attwood D.M. and 
Baviskar B.S. 1988, Doornbos M. et al. 1990 and Doornbos M. and 
Hair K.N. 1990.
Patel S. "The Anand Pattern: A Socio- Historical Analysis 
of its Origin and Growth" in Doornbos.M and Nair K.N. 1990. op 
cit. P: 54.
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organised through a private dairy. But the involvement of 
political heavy-weights such as Sardar Patel and Morarji 
Desai, considerably enhanced Amul's bargaining power. In 
1952, Amul was given the monopoly right to distribute milk 
in Bombay city.” These favourable market conditions,argues 
S. George, gave Amul a stability which is seldom available 
to dairy organisations.” Since such favourable market 
situations cannot be easily replicated, any strategy based 
on the success of Amul, could run into severe problems.
The critics of Operation Flood have thus 
attributed the success of Amul to exogenous factors such as 
its location in a productive milch tract, its proximity to 
the Bombay market and the involvement of powerful national 
leaders who could channel vast quantities of resources to 
Amul. This would imply that the model by itself has little 
relevance to the outcome of the progreunme.
Exponents and admirers of OF, however, identify 
institutional factors as primarily responsible for the 
success of Amul. V.Kurien attributes the success of Amul to 
its farmer owned technocrat managed institutional 
structure.” R.C.Mascrenhas argues that it is the inspired 
leadership of Tribhuvandas Patel, a former Chairman of 
"Amul", and V.Kurien, working in tandem with committed
” ibid.
George S. " Co-operatives and Indian Dairy Policy: More 
Anand than Pattern", in Attwood D.W. and Baviskar B.S. Who 
Shares? Co-operatives and Rural Development. Delhi: OUP. 1988.
Kurien V : "Opposition to Change. The Anand Pattern: A 
Case Study". 1988. op cit.
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professionals that contributed to the success of Amul.^s 
A.H.Somjee attributes the success of Amul to the 
willingness of its political leadership to give operational 
autonomy to its professional managers.^ The World Bank 
claims that key institutional features such as democratic 
control, professional management and autonomy in decision 
making have enabled Amul to function as a successful 
business enterprise.®^
The identification of institutional factors as 
the critical determinants of Amul's success implies that 
the model could be abstracted from its native environment 
and successfully replicated elsewhere. Operation Flood was 
therefore launched by the Government of India to replicate 
the success of Amul all over India.
Objectives of the Study
The brief summary of the debates over OF 
indicates that critical attention has been focused almost 
exclusively on Amul and the role of NDDB in replicating 
this model. However, in India, dairy development is within 
the purview of state governments.®* The Government of India
®® Mascarenhas R C. 1988. op cit
®* Somjee A.H." The Techno-Managerial and PolitJco-Managerial 
Classes in a Milk Co-operative of India ". Journal of Asian and 
African Studies. XVIII,1-2. 1982.
®^ Staff Appraisal Report. World Bank. 1987. op cit.
®* In India's federal system, the federal and state 
governments have jurisdiction over different subjects. 
Agriculture and dairy are state subjects.In these subjects, while 
the Government of India can recommend and suggest progrzimmes, 
state governments have the real control and responsibility over
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and the NDDB have neither the authority nor the personnel 
to mount a programme of the magnitude of OF without the 
active collaboration of the state governments.
OF is, in fact, a joint venture of the NDDB and 
the governments of the various provinces. Before a project 
under OF is introduced into a province, the NDDB does the 
initial planning and the detailed project preparation. It 
also provides the necessary financial resources. The NDDB 
is also actively involved in the project implementation 
phase. Its technical experts supervise the construction of 
dairies and cattle feed plants and provide support for 
marketing activities. The State provides the legal 
framework within which OF institutions function and helps 
in the organisation of co-operatives.It also provides at no 
cost, land and infrastructure facilities such as assured 
water supply and electricity at site. It also guarantees 
the loans made to OF institutions by the NDDB. The 
government also has the power to appoint the first board of 
OF institutions at the apex federation and district union 
levels. Even when elected boards replace the nominated 
boards, the government continues to exercise considerable 
influence through its nominees on the board.
The role of the State and its interaction with 
the organisations it creates to implement the programme, is 
thus crucial to its success or failure. But in the debates 
over OF, this aspect is relatively under emphasised. This 
is surprising, given that, in many development programmes,
them.
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it is in the implementation stage that the sharpest 
conflicts occur. Grindle points out that in many developing 
countries, pressure groups are most active in the 
implementation phase of a project, rather than in its 
policy formulation s t a g e . P o l i c y  is usually formulated in 
close elite groups, to which demand groups may not have 
adequate access. Consequently, the process of 
implementation becomes the focus of intense competition 
between different groups.
In most development programmes, there are several 
actors who have goals, which may be in conflict. Conflict 
resolution occurs either by compromise and bargains struck 
between competing groups or by one dominant group imposing 
its priorities over all other groups.In this process, the 
direction and content of the programme may be profoundly 
altered. It is thus important to analyze not merely the 
bundle of policies that make up a programme, but the actual 
exchanges between the participants in the process of its 
implementation.
An attempt in this direction is made in this 
thesis. We will show that in the process of implementing OF 
in Kerala, its goals have been fundamentally altered. From 
a programme designed to benefit small peasants through the 
aggregation of their interests in a co-operative, OF has 
been transformed into a mechanism for aggregating the 
political and economic interests of the dominant groups in
See Grindle M.S ed : Politics and Policv Implementation
in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.1980.
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the polity. These groups which include professional 
politicians, the bureaucracy and trade unions dominate the 
decision making process both within the OF organisations in 
Kerala and in the larger polity.
Our study indicates that OF institutions in 
Kerala are organisations incapable of autonomous choice. 
They are, in fact, creatures of the State. Consequently, 
the success or failure of the progreunme is crucially 
dependent on the choices made by State elites and these are 
determined by the interest group process within the polity. 
These choices are inimical to the progreunme ' s stated 
objectives. State control over crucial organisational 
processes such as pricing, staffing and investment 
decisions erode the organisation's capacity to function as 
an effective market agent. Equally significant, is the 
endogenous interest group process within the organisation 
which weakens its capacity to combat the State. By focusing 
on the interest group process both within and outside the 
organisation, the thesis attempts to offer an explanation 
for the indifferent outcomes of so many State sponsored 
development programmes in India.
The Theoretical Framework
In studying the interaction between the State and 
the organisation, we have adopted a political economy
See Chapter II for a discussion on the dominant groups in 
Kerala. We have not identified industrialists as a major dominant 
group in Kerala, since apart from the contractors who supply 
country liquor( the so called "liquor barons"), big business is 
not a major force in Kerala.
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approach. "Political economy" observes Zald "is the study 
of the interplay of power, the goals of power wielders and 
the productive exchange system"." In this model, resource 
allocation does not occur through the frictionless 
functioning of the "invisible hand". Rather it views 
institutions as political entities in which groups compete 
for resources and power. It is therefore, useful to view 
organisations, as Cyert and March do, as "a coalition of 
interacting groups."" In this view, an organisation is " 
a political as well as a resource allocating system", in 
which each group has particular interests which it seeks to 
maximise."
Group competition is resolved either through 
bargaining between groups or by one group imposing its own 
agenda. Bargaining occurs most frequently when power is 
diffused between groups and no single group has an 
overwhelming advantage. In State sponsored institutions, 
such as co-operatives, access to State elites becomes the 
key variable that determines the outcome of group 
competition. The State ^ with its monopoly over coercive 
authority^can manipulate outcomes favourable to it.
We distinguish five key groups involved in the 
implementation of OF in Kerala. They are: the national
"See Zald M N "Power in Organisations".Quoted in Jackson P 
M: The Political Economy of Bureaucracv. Deddington: Philip
Allan Publishers Ltd. 1982, P: 74.
See Cyert R.M and March J.G: A Behavioural Theory of
the Firm. Englewood: Prentice Hall Inc. 1963.
See Jackson P. M. 1982. op cit.
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technocracy- represented by the NDDB, the dairy bureaucracy 
in Kerala, organised labour. Co-operative elites and State 
elites. By Co-operative elites we mean the 
elected/nominated decision makers in OF institutions and 
their key allies. By State elites we refer to elected 
political officials such as ministers and members of the 
legislative assembly(MLAs) , senior party leaders and
senior civil servants.
We will argue that the sub optimal results of OF 
in Kerala is due to the interest group process which 
subordinates the interests of dairy farmers to that of the 
dominant groups within the polity. Professional politicians 
dominate the decision making process within OF institutions 
in Kerala. Their interests are best maximised by acceding 
to the wishes of State elites such as ministers and party 
leaders. The latter nominate the first board of the co­
operatives, extend resources of the party for subsequent 
elections and reward pliant co-operators by sponsoring them 
as candidates in the assembly elections.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
policy decisions on such key areas as product pricing tend 
to reflect the interests of the State elites rather than 
that of dairy farmers. Further, organisational resources 
gqt diverted from the nominal target groups to groups that 
have access to State elites. Overambitious projects, excess 
staff and the sale of goods at below market prices to 
favoured customers, are some of the more common 
manifestations of this diversion. Group conflicts within OF
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institutions in Kerala are therefore resolved in favour of 
groups that are allied to or subordinate to State elites. 
Since the role of the State is crucial to programme 
outcomes, the motives and priorities of State elites need 
to be understood.
State and Development in the Third World
The comparative failure of Third World States to 
promote sustainable development has been intensely debated. 
T.N Srinivasan argues that in the early development 
literature, the State was conceived as a benevolent, 
disinterested actor, capable of intervening ” in an optimal 
way to correct any market failure".** But economic 
policies, as Coleman argues, represent conscious political 
choices.*5 Consequently, the political process by which 
economic policies are initiated and determined is of 
crucial significance.
Several competing paradigms of political economy 
can be distinguished. In his analysis of the contemporary 
Indian scene, Toye identifies three distinctive approaches: 
The first is a neo- classical paradigm, the second posits 
a conflict between town and country - the urban bias model 
and the third is " a political economy of class 
opposition among dominant social classes in the Marxist
** See Srinivasan T N. " Neoclassical Political Economy, 
the State and Economic Development". Asian Development Review. 
Studies of Asian and Pacific Economic Issues. Vol:3, No:2. 1985.
** See Coleman J S. " The Resurrection of Political Economy 
" in Uphoff N.T and Ilchman W.F ed: The Political Economy of 
Development. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1972.
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tradition".** Pedersen's recent analysis identifies the 
neo classical and Marxian approaches as the two dominant 
analytical frameworks for studying the development process 
in India. *^ A brief review of some of the major 
contributions in the competing approaches will clarify our 
argument.
A great deal of the neo - classical critique of 
India's development process centres on trade and industrial 
policy. The physical controls over foreign trade and the 
elaborate industrial licensing procedures are said to have 
spawned a bloated,inefficient and corrupt system that 
effectively retards development.*® State officials were 
said to be engaged in activities variously described as 
"rent seeking"*® and " Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking 
(DUP)" activities.^® From these concepts was developed the 
theory that India is a rent seeking society; ie a Society, 
in which, the incentive system is biased, not towards 
productive individuals, but towards those who seek to 
manipulate the State and its agencies. Such economists
** See Toye J " Political Economy and the Analysis of Indian 
Development ". Modern Asian Studies. Vol 22.1. 1988 .P:98.
*^ See Pedersen J D " State, Bureaucracy and Change in 
India". The Journal of Development Studies. Vol 28 No 4, July 
1992 .
*® Bhagwati J.N and Desai P. 1970. op cit.
*® See Krueger A O .  " The Political Economy of the Rent 
Seeking Society". The American Economic Review. 64.2. 1974.
See Bhagwati J N ,Breecher R A and Srinivasan T N " DUP 
Activities and Economic Theory " in Colander D.C ed: Neo
Classical Political Economv: The Analysis of Rent-Seekina and DUP 
Activities. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1984.
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believe that the State, far from being " an exogenous
force, trying to do good  is at least partially
endogenous and the policies it institutes will reflect 
vested interests in society
Neo-classical political economy has been greatly 
influenced by the theories of Olson, TullÛck and other 
theorists associated with the Collective and Public Choice 
schools.72 Using concepts derived from neo classical 
economics, theorists of these schools have built elaborate 
models of " non market decision making".^ in these models. 
State intervention leads to inefficiencies,because. State 
elites being rational actors pursue policies,which, while 
maximising individual benefits,impose collective costs.
Olson argues that due to the free rider problem, 
individuals organise themselves for collective action most 
successfully in small groups, or when they can impose 
selective incentives on group members.^ However, such
7^ See Colander D.C: "Introduction" in Colander D.C. ed:
1984. OP cit. P:2.
72 See 1) Olson M: The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups Cambridge, Massa: Harvard
University Press, 1965. and The Rise and Decline of Nations: 
Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1982.
2) Tullock G: The Politics of Bureaucracv . Lanham:
University Press of America. 1987. and The Economics of Special 
Privilege and Rent Seeking. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
1989.
3) Rowley C.K, Tollison R.D and Tullock G : The Political 
Economv of Rent-seeking. Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
1988.
7^ See McLean I : Public Choice: An Introduction. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell. 1987.
7^ See Olson M .1965. op cit.
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groups of self interested individuals are more likely to 
redistribute resources to themselves rather than work 
towards the common good of increasing the national income. 
Economic growth or increased economic efficiency is a 
public good, the benefits of which do not accrue 
exclusively to those who bear the transaction costs in 
providing it. Such individual optimising behaviour, argues 
Olson, will in stable societies lead to the creation of 
what he calls " distributional coalitions” .^ ® These 
coalitions, it is argued, being primarily interested in 
redistribution, slow down a society's capacity to introduce 
technical change and thus contracts the production 
potential of the economy.
The negative effects of an expanding State are 
explored in detail by Tullock.^* He argues that since the 
expansion of the State's activities opens up space for 
rent, rational individuals will prefer to engage in such 
activities rather than compete in the market. Time and 
resources will be expended in either lobbying the 
government or individuals may be encouraged to bid directly 
for decision making power so as to enjoy the rents that an 
expanding State sector provides.
This very brief outline of the Collective 
Choice/Public Choice critique of State intervention reveals 
that theorists belonging to the school share certain common 
assumptions of State-Society relations. The State, far from
See Olson M. 1982. op cit.
See Tullock G. 1987, 1988 and 1989. op cit.
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being a benign and disinterested maximiser of the public
good, is seen as ” pushed and pulled by lobbies and
interest groups that are mostly interested in
redistribution rather than growth and development".^^
This view has been criticised as too
monochromatic by other social scientists. Shapiro and 
Taylor argue that " in attacking the government, 
neoclassical political economy, posits an idealized market
in its stead......The political arena is depicted as full
of lobbyists and cartel builders, while the economy is 
presented as being more or less subject to competition". 
Dearlove also attacks the normative assumptions of the
Public Choice theorists, which idealizes the virtues of a
free market against a coercive and inefficient State.
Even sympathetic observers agree that quite often. Public
Choice models tend to identify congenial factors while
ignoring contrary ones.®°
A more fundamental critique of the Public Choice
school is its understatement of the serious pitfalls
inherent in the " transfer of analytical tools and modes of
reasoning developed within one discipline to another".
The concept of individual rationality, while valid for
analysing behaviour at the micro level,becomes problematic
77 Srinivasan T N. 1985. op cit. P:45.
See Shapiro H and Taylor L " The State and Industrial 
Strategy". World Development. Vol; 18, No; 6. 1990.P: 866 & 867
See Dearlove J " Economists on the State". IDS Bulletin. 
Vol 18, No 3. 1987
®° See Wade L L " Political Economy : Problems and 
Paradigms", in Wade L ed: Political Economy: Recent Views.
Boston:Kluwer- Nijhoff Publishing. 1883.
®^ See Hirschman A 0: A Bias for Hope. Essavs on
Development and Latin America. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1971.P:4.
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when " transported into macro-social contexts, and huge 
classes are treated as if they were rational calculating 
individuals".*2 Staniland argues that the Public Choice 
assumption of unbounded rationality is a negation of 
reality as all individuals are not equally well informed 
and are thus not well placed to realize their 
preferences." Further, the emphasis on the optimizing 
individual, tends to underplay the explanatory power of 
social institutions such as classes in determining 
outcomes.
In contrast to the neo-classical preoccupation 
with the individual utility maximizer and the conventional 
Marxian class categorisation, the "urban bias school" 
adopts the concept of economic sectors to analyze resource 
allocation patterns. Positing a fundamental conflict 
between the rural/agricultural sector and the urban/ 
industrial sector, Lipton suggests that State action in 
favour of urban groups is responsible for the retarded 
development process in Third World countries." In India, 
which is the focus of Lipton's study, a coalition of urban 
interest groups is identified as the chief beneficiary of 
development. These groups, through their access to policy 
makers are able to influence policy in their favour. The
See Toye J " Political Economy and the Analysis of 
Indian Development". 1988. op cit. P:117.
See Staniland M: What is Political Economv?. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1985
®^ See Lipton M: Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of
Urban Bias in World Deyelopment. London: Maurice Temple Smith. 
1977.
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resultant pattern of resource allocation is said to be 
detrimental to the interests of the majority of the 
population.
The existence of negative agricultural policies, 
such as monopoly procurement and price controls, indicate 
that the urban bias school is highlighting a well 
documented phenomenon. Further, in contrast to the 
dependency theorists,®^ they locate the phenomenon of 
underdevelopment within the economy of individual 
countries. Finally, by identifying an urban class that 
controls and shapes policy, this school makes it explicit 
that it is socio- political forces that determine economic 
outcomes.
The Urban Bias thesis, as expounded by Lipton, 
suffers from some infirmities. The lack of clarity in 
identifying the groups that constitute the urban class 
reduces its explanatory power. The bureaucracy and the 
rural elites are sometimes identified as part of the group 
and sometimes outside it.®* Such imprecision may lead to 
very contradictory conclusions. M. Moore points out that 
while Lipton attributes India's slow growth rate to the 
distorting influence of the urban interest groups, A. Mitra, 
working within a similar framework, comes to the conclusion
®^ See Frank A G ; Dependent Accumulation and Under 
Development. London; Macmillan. 1978.
®* See Toye J. 1988. op cit.
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that it is the power of the rural rich that retards the 
development process in India.
A significant lacuna in the urban bias thesis is 
its implicit assumption of the homogeneity of the rural 
sector. Rich and poor farmers have opposing interests, as 
is the case with producers of food and cash crops. 
Similarly, small holders who are net purchasers of food and 
large holders who are net sellers have different 
priorities. The former desires lower food prices, while the 
latter would attempt to obtain maximum prices for food 
crops. Further, as Moore observes, patterns of peasant 
mobilisation are more often based on collective identities 
such as religion and caste than on functional lines such as 
occupation.®®
Bardhan's paradigm of the dominant propertied 
classes and Bates' concept of the "price setting coalition" 
are two well known attempts to integrate the insights 
derived from the public choice school and the urban bias 
thesis.®* Bardhan argues that society centred theories of
®’ See Moore M " Political Economy and the Rural Urban 
Divide: 1767-1981". The Journal of Development Studies. Special 
Issue on "Development and the Rural Urban Divide". Vol: XX, No 
3. 1984.
®® See Moore M : The State and Peasant Politics in Sri 
Lanka. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 1985.
®* Bardhan P The Political Economy of Development in India. 
Oxford: Blackwell.1984.
Bates R H:
1 ) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political 
Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1981.
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policies and governments tend to ignore the role of States 
as "potent and autonomous actors". He rejects both the 
public choice argument that State elites are driven only by 
motives of self interest and the "vulgar" Marxian concept 
of the State as a mere instrument of the dominant class. In 
many instances of State policy, elites are seen to be 
genuinely concerned to promote the public good. However, 
over time, the Indian State's capacity for autonomous 
choice has been constrained by the pressure of newly 
emergent societal forces.
Bardhan identifies the bureaucracy, the class of 
rich farmers and the class of indigenous industrialists as 
the new dominant proprietary classes that determine policy 
outcomes. The members of this coalition have diverse 
economic and political interests.Bardhan argues, that as no 
one group is able to impose its own agenda on the others, 
the collective interests of this group are best served by
2) Essavs on the Political Economv of Rural Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1983.
3) Bevond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economv 
of Agrarian Development in Kenva. Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press.1989.
Bates R H ed: Towards a Political Economv of Development:
A Rational Choice Perspective. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1988.
The inability of the Indian State to withstand societal 
pressures is the focus of a great deal of critical attention in 
recent years. See Rudolph L I and Rudolph S H. 1987. op cit. and 
Kohli A : Democracv and Disorder: India's Growing Crisis of
Governabilitv. Cambridge University Press. 1990.
For an alternative viewpoint See Mitra S K " Democracy and 
Political Change in India", The Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics. Special Issue on " Democracy in South 
Asia".
Vol: XXX No 1. March 1992 and Mitra S K ed The Post Colonial 
State in Asia . Harvester Wheatshef. 1990.
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an expanding State sector. So, the phenomenal expansion of 
the public sector, the proliferation of subsidies and 
grants and the reliance on licensing procedure are all 
manifestations of the pressure brought by the dominant 
classes on a debilitated State.
Bates' study of States and markets in Africa, is 
a major contribution to the study of the politics of policy 
formulation in developing countries. Based on the 
experience of several sub- Saharan countries, his analysis 
of agrarian policies casts serious doubts on the efficacy 
of State intervention in agriculture. Though working in the 
Collective Choice tradition, he avoids, according to 
Staniland, many of its defects, as " he is less insistent
on asserting the universal triumph of self...... over
collective interest or at least making the two mutually 
e x c l u s i v e " . H e  does not share the easy optimism that 
individual optimizing behaviour will result in optimum 
collective interests. Instead, he recognizes that in the 
pursuit of self-interest, individuals may turn to political 
institutions for securing advantages that they are unable 
to secure in the market. This process, however, while
maximizing the self interest of a small elite, is likely to
impose collective costs.
Bates' study reveals that governments in Africa 
intervene in agricultural markets in ways that are
detrimental to the interests of the majority of the 
population. They tend to adopt low price policies for farm
See Staniland M. 1985. op cit. P: 58.
51
products and increase the prices fanners must pay for the 
goods they consume. While they subsidize inputs, the 
benefits of these subsidies are appropriated by the richer 
few. Further, despite the poor performance of most 
agricultural programmes, governments continue to formulate 
and launch new programmes on similar lines.
Exploring the rationale for such behaviour. Bates 
identifies three approaches for the study of State 
intervention in the economy: 1) Governments as agents of 
the public interest.2) Governments as agents of private 
interests and 3) Governments as agencies that seek to 
retain power.
The stated objective of most State interventions 
in developing countries is the rapid transformation of a 
peasant economy through industrialisation. Towards that 
end, governments attempt to shift resources away from 
agriculture towards industry through a variety of means. 
These include the maintenance of an overvalued exchange 
rate, quantitative and tariff restrictions on the import of 
industrial goods and controls over agricultural prices.
Bates, however, is sceptical of this social 
welfare maximizing interpretation of government. He argues 
that if agrarian policies, such as price controls, are 
designed with the disinterested objective of providing 
cheap food, a more efficient policy would be to offer 
higher product prices. The current policy merely encourages 
farmers to shift away from food production to cash crops 
and thus defeat the government's stated objective. The
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concept of the State as a disinterested maximiser of the 
public good,therefore, does not provide an adequate 
explanation for the policy choices made by most Third World 
States.
The second approach is an interest group model, 
which views government policy as the result of pressures 
exerted by organised private interests. This model offers 
an explanation for several distinctive sets of State policy 
towards agriculture: monopoly procurement, price controls 
and the reliance on subsidies and projects rather than on 
prices to increase agricultural production.
These policies,argues Bates, reflect the 
interests of what he calls the " policy making, price 
setting coalition". The members of the coalition include 
labour, industry. State officials and politicians. This 
coalition is interested in cheap food, as in underdeveloped 
countries a large percentage of the consumer budget is 
spent on it. High food prices are a source of social 
unrest, which threaten the stability of fragile political 
regimes. Hence, monopoly procurement and price controls are 
initiated to keep down the price of food. Agricultural 
policy is seen as" a by product of governmental efforts to 
maintain peaceful political relations with urban political 
forces%^
The interest group model, observes Bates, does 
not fully explain the State's ability to initiate and 
maintain policies that are inimical to the interests of the
See Bates R H. 1983. op cit. P:122.
53
vast majority of agricultural producers. In nations, where 
the majority of the population are farmers, the 
government's ability to get away with policies that violate 
their interests, cannot be explained solely by the interest 
group model. The concept of governments as agencies that 
seek to retain power is, therefore, advanced to build on 
the interest group model.
State elites, argues Bates, have no incentive to
offer high product prices, since this is a collective good
enjoyable by all farmers. Project based programmes,however,
offer opportunities for State elites to build a political
constituency through selective incentives. State officials
have a great deal of discretion in deciding where to locate
projects, who should staff them, and which group of farmers
should be given subsidized inputs. Further, State
intervention creates space for rents, which can be consumed
by the State elites themselves or they can be utilised for
political patronage.This political utility of rents
explains why, despite the inefficiency of many projects,
governments continue to sponsor and implement similar
projects. Bates contends, that "if a project fails to 
generate an adequate return on the public investment, but 
nonetheless is privately rewarding for those who build it, 
provision it and staff it, or hold tenancies in it, then 
political officials may support it, for the project will 
serve as a source of rewards for their followers and as an 
instrument for building a rural political organization".®^
Bates' analysis of agrarian policies in Africa, 
thus indicates that they are the product of autonomous
See Bates R H: "Governments and Agricultural Markets in 
Africa" in Bates R.H ed: 1988. op cit. P:352.
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choices made by State elites. While he recognises the 
pressures brought on the State by well organised interest 
groups, policy outcomes are not determined solely by 
societal forces. Political forces, he argues " may be fully 
autonomous and, as a consequence, may act at the cost of 
economic rationality and solely in service of 
themselves.".**
In this thesis, we have utilised some of the 
insights derived from Bates' study of states and markets in 
Africa.There are, however, constraints in applying Bates' 
concepts to the study of State policies in Kerala. In the 
state, unlike in the countries studied by Bates, the rural- 
urban divide in not very salient. Owing to Kerala's high 
density of population *® and its dispersed settlement 
pattern -with villages running seamless into towns- much of 
the state, especially along the coast, exhibits semi-urban 
characteristics.*® Moreover, industries in Kerala are not 
located in urban centres alone. Almost all the cashew 
factories, for instance, are located in the outlying rural 
panchayats of Quilon district, rather than in Quilon 
town. *^ Therefore, arguments which seek to explain the
94 Bates R H. 1983. op cit. P;147.
*® The density of population in Kerala is 747 persons per 
sq.Km, as against the All-India average of 267 persons.
See : Census Results at a Glance. Census of India.1991. op cit.
*® For a discussion on the unique settlement pattern of 
Kerala, See Sreekumar T.T ; " Neither Rural nor Urban: Spatial 
Formation and Development Process". Economic and Political 
Weeklv. Vol: XXV. Nos: 35 & 36. 1990.
*’ Field Visit. June-July. 1991.
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rationale of State policies in Kerala, in terms of a 
dichotomy between town and country,are unlikely to yield 
much explanatory power.
Bates' interest group model, however, can be 
applied to Kerala. This model views " public policy as the 
outcome of political pressures exerted by groups that seek 
satisfaction of their private interests from political 
action " Group competition in Kerala tends to produce 
sub-optimal results for food producers. This is a product 
of both ideology ” and the increasing political prominence 
of non-food producers in the state. Ideologically
See Bates R.H: " Governments and Agricultural Markets in 
Africa", in Bates R.H ed: 1988. op cit. P: 345.
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), had serious 
reservations about offering higher agricultural prices to all 
farmers. P Sunderayya, one of the prominent leaders of the party, 
wrote in 1973 that the demand for "fair price" for agricultural 
commodities does not mean that all peasants are entitled to it.
He wrote : " When we demand fair p rices ----------it does not mean
that these minimum prices should be assured even to ------
landlords. We can certainly demand that the whole of the produce 
of these landlords be completely procured by the government for 
meeting the needs of the people". P. Sunderayya. Explanatory note 
to the Central Committee Resolution adopted at the party congress 
in 1973 at Muzaffapur. Quoted by : Krishnaji N in : " Agrarian 
Relations and the Left Movement in Kerala: A Note on Recent 
Trends". Economic and Political Weeklv. Vol:XIV. No:9. 1979.
Kerala is a food-deficit state. In 1989-90, it produced 
only about 23% of the rice required for its consumption. The 
production of rice has declined from a high of 1.38 million 
tonnes in 1972-73 to only 1.14 million in 1989-90, while during 
the same period, population increased from 21.97 to 29.01 
million. We have no precise information on the number of rice 
producers in the state. However, cultivators, as a percentage of 
the working population of Kerala, declined from 21% in 1961 to 
only 12% in 1991.
See: 1) "Statistics for Planning.1982 ". The Bureau of Economics 
and Statistics. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 1982.
2) " Economic Review". 1990. State Planning Board.
Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 1990.
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committed, left of centre parties have held power for long 
periods in K e r a l a . T h e y  have followed a modernisation 
progrêunme, the chief elements of which are : redistributive 
measures such as land reforms, food security and pension 
schemes; and an industrialisation strategy largely premised 
on the public ownership of the means of production.
The thesis suggests that past interventions have 
contributed to the creation of a vast, expanded State 
sector ( See Chapter II). The beneficiaries of this 
expansion, who include professional politicians, the 
bureaucracy and organised labour, seek policies that 
perpetuate and enhance their relative political and 
economic positions. Labour in Kerala, both industrial and 
non-industrial, is organised by political parties. Labour 
unions are of great strategic value to political leaders, 
as individual careers can be furthered by the control of 
unions. Further, at the time of elections, rival parties 
deploy their affiliated unions to canvass votes and collect 
money. The bureaucracy is also vital to political parties.
3)"Census Results at a Glance ". 1991. op cit.
4)Suseelan P Problems and Prospects of Rice in Kerala".
Paper presented at the Workshop on Agricultural
Development. Trivandrum. 6/10/1988.
For an analysis of the role played by communist parties 
in the transformation of Kerala's social and political 
institutions, see Nossiter T.J : Communism in Kerala : A Studv 
in Political Adaptation. London: C.Hurst for the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs.1982.
Bates observes that in Africa, it is the "radical" 
governments that most often impose lower food prices on the 
peasantry. The major reason for this behaviour is that it is 
these governments that are most committed to industrialisation 
and they have deep institutional ties to organized labour. See 
Bates R.H :" Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa", in 
Bates R.H ed: 1988. op cit.
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as the resources of a vast State sector can be deployed for 
political patronage. Both these groups, being consumers, 
are interested in the availability of cheap food. Since 
both are of strategic value to political leaders, and since 
the State itself is the largest employer of organised 
labour in K e r a l a , S t a t e  elites also favour policies that 
lower the price of food. In these circumstances, farmers 
producing commodities required for the consumption of these 
groups are adversely affected through price controls, 
monopoly procurement and other negative policies.
The rationale for inefficient institutions and 
ruinous policies can also be traced to the benefits such 
policies confer on political leaders. Programmes such as 
OF, while allowing the State to provide consumption goods 
at below market prices, afford opportunities for building 
and nurturing a political constituency. Political allies 
and followers can be accommodated in OF institutions, 
organisational resources can be diverted to reward key 
lieutenants and rural co-operatives facilitate the 
political mobilisation of the peasantry. In the process, 
the goals of the programme are fundamentally altered; OF 
institutions, instead of aggregating the interests of milk 
producers, are instead transformed into a mechanism for the 
extraction of resources.
In 1989, 56% of the workforce in the organised sector 
in Kerala was employed by the State. "Economic Review". 1990. 
OP cit. See Chapter II for a discussion on the role of the State 
in Kerala's economy.
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Data Source
Our primary source of data is the confidential records of 
the various OF institutions in Kerala. They are The Kerala 
Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation (KCMMF), the 
Trivandrum Regional Co-operative Milk Producers' 
Union(TRCMPU), the Ernakulam Regional Milk Producers' Union 
and the Malabar Regional Milk Producers' Union (MRCMPU). In 
addition, confidential records of non OF institutions such 
as the Calicut Milk Supplies Union(CMS) and the Malappurum 
District Co-operative Milk Supplies Union (MDCMSU) were 
studied. These records include internal memos, balance 
sheets, cost calculations, internal evaluation studies and 
minutes of the Board of Directors.
A scimple survey was undertaken to ascertain the views 
of the farmers about the programme.The survey was conducted 
during the months of June and July 1991 and covered 456 
farmers from four districts of Kerala. A stratified random 
sampling method was used to identify the farmers. The state 
was first divided into two regions —  the south/central 
region where OF had been in progress for nearly a decade 
and North Kerala (Malabar) where OF was introduced formally 
only in 1989. The two regions were then subdivided into two 
districts each to correspond to the four institutions we 
proposed to study in depth. These four institutions were: 
TRCMPU and ERCMPU, both OF institutions; CMS and MDCMSU, 
both non- OF institutions. Five societies affiliated to 
each union were selected for intense study
See Appendix I for a list of the societies.
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Once the societies were selected, information on land 
holding patterns was collected from a randomly selected 
population of some 1300 farmers who were supplying milk to 
the society. Based on the amount of land held by each 
individual, the population was then subdivided into six 
categories: 1) Less than 10 cents 2)11 to 50 cents. 3)
51 to 100 cents. 4) 101 to 200 cents. 5) 201 to 500 cents. 
6) above 500 cents. From this list a Scimple of 456 farmers 
was randomly selected and interviewed.
In addition, the Presidents of each of the twenty 
societies were interviewed personally by the author. 
Detailed, confidential information was also collected from 
these societies so as to get an accurate picture of the 
impact of the programme on the ground. Interviews were also 
conducted with key actors involved in the programme. They 
included the Chairman of the NDDB, the former Chief 
Secretary of Kerala who was instrumental in introducing the 
programme to Kerala and co-operative leaders of OF and non 
OF institutions.^*
Primary data on the economy of Kerala was 
collected from a large number of Government publications 
including. Statistics for Planning, the Plan documents and 
various issues of the Economic Review (Kerala State). 
Secondary data included the Working Papers of the Centre
100 cents make an acre.
See Appendix II for the Questionnaire,
See Appendix III for list of individuals interviewed.
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For Development Studies, Trivandrum, various periodicals 
and books.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. 
Chapter I has briefly reviewed the current debate on 
Operation Flood and provides the theoretical frsunework of 
the study. Chapter II highlights the contradictory impulses 
in Kerala's political economy: exceptional performances in 
the social indices of development coexisting with poor 
performance of the commodity producing sectors of the 
economy. The chapter also identifies the dominant interest 
groups in the polity and illustrates their functioning with 
a review of agrarian polices.
Chapter III discusses the nature of State 
intervention in dairy markets prior to 1980. This 
intervention has had sub-optimal results. The institutions 
created by the State - State owned dairy plants and 
Government sponsored milk supply unions- were financially 
fragile structures, unable to provide assured markets and 
remunerative prices to dairy farmers.
The design of OF structures in Kerala and their 
implication for the programme are discussed in Chapter IV. 
It suggests that conflicts between the key actors 
profoundly influenced the direction in which the programme 
evolved in Kerala.
Chapters V and VI analyze the success of OF on 
the basis of four criteria :1)increase in milk production;
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2) ability to manage seasonal variations; 3) financial 
viability and 4) Milk prices. The analysis suggests that 
while OF had some success in stabilising dairy markets, it 
failed to provide financially viable, producer friendly 
institutions. This failure is traced both to market forces 
and the interest group process within the organisation.
The performance of OF outside Kerala is examined 
in Chapter VII. The progreunme increased milk production in 
specific regions of the country. But the majority of OF 
institutions are financially weak, unable to offer 
producers remunerative prices or even pay them on time. 
Analysis of similar programmes in the coconut and fisheries 
sectors in Kerala, revealed that they too, produced sub- 
optimal results.
The indifferent outcomes of so many agrarian 
policies in Kerala, we conclude, is a product of the 
interest group process both within the organisations 
created to implement them and in the larger polity outside. 
Farmers producing goods required for the consumption of the 
dominant groups are adversely affected despite the creation 
of institutions designed to protect their interests.In such 
institutions, groups having access to State power are able 
to corner the bulk of the organisation's resources. As a 
consequence, the ability of these institutions to aggregate 
the interests of peasants is severely impaired.
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The Development Paradox of Kerala
INTRODUCTION
The development paradox of Kerala is a recurring 
theme in the literature on the province. Remarkable results 
in the fields of literacy, health care and public 
distribution of food have been achieved despite low levels 
of per capita income. This success has encouraged scholars 
to speculate about a " Kerala model of development" which 
can be replicated elsewhere.^ The commodity producing 
sectors of the economy, however, has performed poorly, 
leading to stagnant incomes and rising unemployment. In 
this Chapter we analyze the nature of Kerala's development 
experience during the last three decades.
We first examine the dominant trends in Kerala's 
economy. In several social indicators of development, 
including literacy, infant mortality rates and access to 
subsidized food, Kerala's performance was remarkable.( See 
below). The industrial structure, however, is both 
inefficient and technologically obsolete. Further, State 
initiative in industrial development has largely been 
confined to the direct ownership of industrial concerns. 
This industrial structure- labour intensive, low technology
 ^ See Jeffrey R. 1992 and Franke R.W and Chasin B.H. 1989. 
OP cit.
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based and State owned- has significant implications for 
agricultural policy.
The nature of party politics in Kerala has 
significantly influenced policy outcomes both in industry 
and agriculture. Two features of Kerala's polity are 
particularly significant for our analysis - the presence of 
two radical Communist parties with mass following and the 
instability of Kerala's political coalitions. It is 
undeniable that initially, the ideological commitment of 
the Communist parties in Kerala has been responsible for 
the effective implementation of several redistributive 
measures, such as land reforms, old age and destitute 
pensions, and an effective public distribution system.^ But 
the record of both the Communist and Congress governments 
is poor with respect to industrial and agricultural 
development.3
This poor record is partly due to the exigencies 
of coalition politics, which devolves on well organised 
interest groups,a highly disproportionate access to policy 
formulation. The dominant groups in the polity, which 
include full time politicians, the higher bureaucracy( the 
All India Services- the IAS, IPS and the IFS) and trade 
unions are able to generate policies that enhance their
 ^ See Nossiter T.J .1982. op cit. 
 ^ ibid.
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relative position in the economy. Industrial strategy has 
been primarily oriented towards increasing the share of the 
public sector, while simultaneously maintaining its 
traditional, labour intensive character(See below).
The agrarian policies of the State are more 
complex and harder to decipher. In the case of a number of 
commodities, including paddy and milk, we observe policies 
which at first sight appear contradictory- for instance 
policies, that offer cheap credit and subsidy coexisting 
with controlled prices and monopoly procurement. These 
contradictions are easier to understand if we interpret 
them as the result of the dynamics of the interest group 
process within the polity. The ideological bias of the 
leftist parties as well as the interests of the dominant 
groups in Kerala, favour policies that subordinate 
agriculture to industry. This conclusion however, has to be 
modified with the qualification that when the vital 
interests of the dominant groups are not involved, agrarian 
policies appear to be very positive, as in the case of 
rubber.
SECTION I 
The Development Paradox.
Kerala exhibits what has been called "a paradox 
of social development and economic backwardness".* The
* This is the subtitle of a book by Panikar and Soman. See 
Panikar P.G.K and Soman C.R; Health Status of Kerala: Paradox of 
Social Development and Economic Backwardness Centre for
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paradox can best be illustrated by juxtaposing the 
following tables: (Commentary follows after the tables).
TABLE II.1
Selected Indices of Social Development: Kerala and India. 
1951-88
Literacy Rate 
%
Infant
Mortality Rate 
(per 000)
Birth Rate 
(per 000)
1961 1981 1951-60 1988 1951-60 1988
Kerala 46.8 91.00 120 24 39.9 19.9
India 24.2 52.00 146 94 41.7 31.3
Sources; (1) Census of India. 1991. Government of India. 
(2) Economic Review - various issues. State Planning Board. 
Government of Kerala. (3) Approach to the Eighth Five Year 
Plan. 1989. State Planning Board. Government of Kerala.
Development Studies. Trivandrum.1985.
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TABLE II.2
Growth Rates of Population, Aggregate and Sectoral Incomes 
in Kerala: 1962-86.
Average for the period.
1962-63 to 
1974-75
1975-76 to 
1985-86
1962-63 to 
1985-86
I Aggregate 3.21 1.76 2.40
A) Primary 2.23 -0.70 1.05
B) Secondary 4.71 2.15 3.68
C) Tertiary 4.24 5.32 4.67
II Population 2.10 1.55 1.93
III Net 
Growth Rate
1.11 0.21 0.47
Source: K.P Kannan and K Pushpangadan: "Agricultural
Stagnation and Economic Growth in Kerala : An Exploratory 
Analysis." Working Paper No; 227. Centre for Development 
Studies. Trivandrum. 1989.
TABLE II.3
Comparative Statement of Per Capita Incomes: Kerala and
India. 1960-85.
Rs per annum (1970-71 prices)
Year Kerala India Index*
1960-61 to 64-65 510 573 0.90
1970-71 to 75-76 603 620 0.97
1975-76 to 79-80 599 678 0.88
1980-81 to 84-85 615 735 0.83
* Per capita income of Kerala as a percentage of the 
national average.
Source: Eighth Five Year Plan Document. State Planning
Board. 1989. Government of Kerala.
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Table II.1 shows how far Kerala is ahead of 
the rest of India in social development. The historical 
legacy of some of the enlightened rulers of Travancore, as 
well as conscious policy choices in the post- independence 
period were equally responsible for this achievement®. 
Observers have also noted that the health care system in 
Kerala is more accessible than most other provinces, even 
though the per capita expenditure may be less in Kerala.® 
This is because the delivery system is not confined to 
cities, but spread more evenly across the province. A 
public distribution system which covers a significant 
section of the population, special programmes such as 
supplementary feeding for pregnant mothers and children 
below the age of five, free noon meal schemes for school 
going children, and a host of other progrcunmes have enabled 
the more vulnerable sections of the population to meet 
their calorific requirements. These welfare programmes were 
buttressed by an elaborate social security system that 
included various types of pensions, including pensions for 
agricultural workers, unemployment assistance and grants to 
poor widows. These measures coupled with substantial 
investment in primary education account for the success 
noted above.
Tables II. 2 and II. 3 however point to the 
contradictions of Kerala's development experience
® See Jeffrey R. 1992. op cit.
® See, T N Krishnan; " Demographic Transition in Kerala: 
Facts and Factors". Economic and Political Weeklv. Special 
Number, Vol: XI. Nos: 31,32 & 33. 1976 .
68
outstanding achievements in minimum needs juxtaposed 
against dismal performance in economic growth. The 
performance of the agricultural sector especially, has been 
very poor. Table II.4 shows the average annual production 
of some of the principal crops during the Plan periods 
since 1961.
TABLE II.4
Average Annual Production of Principal Crops in Kerala. 
1961-1990.
(unit:000 tonnes,* million nuts)
Period Rice Tapioca Coconut* Cashewnut Rubber
1961-66 1058.7 2295.42 3277 92.08 34.69
1969-74 1301.92 5212.82 3923 113.77 90.91
1974-79 1296.94 4874.69 3354 98.75 129.36
1980-85 1276.38 3961.30 3043 78.07 153.35
1985-90 1085.44 2972.81 3408 89.33 210.45
Note: The unit for all the commodities other than coconut 
is: 000 tonnes.
Source: same as for table II.3
Only rubber has consistently performed well. A 
number of explanations have been offered for the 
indifferent performance of the agricultural sector. Some 
observers point to the State's failure to invest adequately 
in collective goods such as irrigation and land
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development;’ others however, deny that there has been any 
sustained negative growth and attribute the lower figures 
to the cyclical nature of production in plantation crops.® 
In section 3 , we shall show that market forces and State 
policy have equally contributed to the decline of some 
commodities and the growth of others.
Table II.2 reveals that though industrial growth 
rates are substantially higher than agriculture, they have 
halved since the mid seventies. It is, however, very 
debatable whether these growth rates can be taken at their 
face value. Detailed analysis within the secondary sector 
shows that much of the growth rates are accounted for by 
State investment in electricity generation and water 
supply.* The manufacturing sector has shown little 
dynamism. During the period 1969-79, the growth rate in 
value-added in the factory sector in Kerala was only 2.12 
% as against the national average of 6.07 %.^°
Kerala's industrial base is small. The province 
accounted for only 3.4 % of the national industrial output
’ K P Kannan and K Pushpangadan; "Agricultural Stagnation 
and Economic Growth: An Exploratory Analysis". Working paper 
No:227. Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1989.
® D Narayana : "Agricultural Economy of Kerala in the Post 
Seventies: Stagnation or Cycles ? ". Working Paper No: 235.
Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1990
* "Economic Review". Various Issues. State Planning Board. 
Government of Kerala. Trivandrum.
See Subrahmanian K.K and Pillai M.P : " Kerala’s
Industrial Backwardness: An Exploration of Alternative
Hypotheses." Working Paper No: 210. Centre for Development
Studies. Trivandrum. 1985.
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from factories in 1980-81.^ In recent years, the relative 
importance of industry has declined further.The share of 
the secondary sector in the net state domestic product has 
declined from 24.6 % in 1980-81 to 22.7 % in 1989-90." 
This is not surprising, considering the nature of the 
industrial structure in Kerala.
Traditional, labour intensive industries such as 
cashew, handloom, coir and beedi dominate the industrial 
scene in Kerala. Within the factory sector itself, they 
account for over 51% of the employment." Besides this, 
millions are employed in the co-operative and unorganised 
sectors. Industrial labour is highly unionised both within 
and outside the factory sector. Due to a variety of 
factors, the technological base of Kerala's industrial 
structure has become increasingly obsolete.
First, traditional industries are increasingly 
shifting their activities from the organised to the 
unorganised sector." Between 1950 and 1981, the number of 
workers directly employed in the factory sector in the coir
" ibid.
" "Economic Review". 1990. op cit. 
ibid.
Between 1970 and 1985, factories employing 10 or more 
persons and using power increased from 1785 to 2725. However, 
those with less than 10 increased enormously from 724 to 7043. 
The significance of these numbers lies in the fact that 
organisations with less than 10 employees do not come under the 
purview of the Factories Act. Since workers in these 
organisations are not entitled to many of the statutory benefits 
given in the factory sector, employers prefer to keep their 
operation as small as possible. "Economic Review". Various 
Issues. OP cit.
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industry, fell from 18,500 to just 2200." A similar 
phenomenon was observed by the author in the handloom 
industry of Cannanore." Second, entrepreneurs have 
increasingly tended to shift their operation from Kerala to 
the neighbouring provinces of Tamilnadu and Karnataka. 
Cheap labour and better industrial relations in these 
provinces are apparently responsible for this shift." 
Third, there has been little private investment in Kerala 
in recent years. The Government itself concedes that 
private investment today amounts to less than 40% of the 
total investment in the modern organised sector." Very 
little of the remittances from the Gulf has been invested 
productively; the bulk of it has been spent on the purchase 
of land and the construction of houses These three
" Isaac T.M.T: " Class Struggle and Structural Changes:
Coir Mat and Matting Industry in Kerala: 1950-1980". Economic and 
Political Weeklv, Review of Political Economy.Vol: XVII. No:31. 
1982.
" Rajagopalan V: " Handloom Industry in North and South
Kerala: A Study of Production and Marketing Structures." 
Unpublished M Phil thesis. Jawharlal Nehru Universitv .1986.
" In a study in 1981, Oommen M. A, found that the major 
reason for Kerala entrepreneurs starting industries in Tamilnadu 
and Karnataka was that labour was not only cheap , but that 
labour relations were far more harmonious . See Oommen M.A 
"Mobility of Small Scale Entrepreneurs: a Kerala Experience." 
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations. Volume : XVII. No: 1.
1981.
A study by the government also found that the paucity of 
private investment in Kerala can be traced to the negative 
impressions about the industrial climate in Kerala. See "Report 
of the High Level Committee on Industry, Trade and Power." Vol: 
I to Vol III. State Planning Board. Government of Kerala. 1984.
18 "Towards an Approach to Kerala's Eighth Five Year Plan." 
State Planning Board. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 1989.
The economic boom in the Persian Gulf following the sharp 
rise in oil prices, induced Keralites to migrate to the region 
in search of work.By 1987, over 0.30 million Keralites were
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factors together have contributed to the perpetuation of an 
inefficient, technologically backward industrial structure.
A further characteristic is the heavy 
involvement of the State in industrial development. The 
State appears to be the principal generator of market 
demand. We have already noted that over 60% of the 
investment in the modern organised sector is being made by 
the State. Further, it is also the main employer in the 
organised sector as the following table shows:
TABLE II.5
Growth of Employment in the Organised Sector in Kerala.1970 
89.
Year Public Sector Index Private
Sector
Index Organised
Sector
Total
1970 293,318 (42%) 100 409,562 100 702,880
1980 496,659 (49%) 169 526,459 129 1,023,118
1989 620,254 (56%) 212 486,354 119 1,106,608
Source: "Economic Review". Various issues. 
Figures in brackets denote percentage to totals.
estimated to be working in the Gulf. The quantum of annual 
remittances from these workers has been variously estimated to 
be between Rs 3150 and Rs 8000 million. Analysis of utilization 
patterns indicate that in 1986, only 1.6 % of these remittances 
was invested in business. As against this, 61 % was spent on land 
and residential buildings.
See " Report of the Survey on the Utilization of Gulf Remittances 
in Kerala". Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Government of 
Kerala. Trivandrum. 1987 and Economic Review. 1987. op cit.
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The above figures indicate that the private 
sector has lost over 40,000 jobs in the period 1980-1989• 
The State has more than compensated for this by creating 
over 123,500 new jobs. This was achieved both by 
nationalisation of sick and closed factories and by 
creation of new public sector companies. In fact,in Kerala, 
the characteristic form of State intervention in industry 
has been the formation of State-owned corporations. Kerala, 
which had only six such corporations in 1960, had by 1990 
over hundred such enterprises. This expansion of the State 
sector, is the result of the interest group process, as we 
shall show in the following sections.
Given the stagnation in agricultural and 
industrial growth rates, it is surprising that the tertiary 
sector has exhibited such dynamism. A more detailed 
analysis, however, reveals that this can be traced to 
increased State investment. An intra-sectoral analysis of 
the tertiary sector given in Table II.6, shows that during 
the last decade. State investment has contributed 
substantially to the growth of the sector.
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TABLE II.6
Growth Rates in the Tertiary Sector: Kerala. 1980-90
Sector 1980-81 1989-90 Percentage
Point
Change
Transport, Storage 
& Communication
10.1 14.2 +4.1
Trade, Hotels & 
Restaurants
39.4 31.1 -8.3
Banking & 
Insurance
8.5 15.1 +6.6
Real Estate & 
Dwellings
9.0 2.8 -6.2
Public
Administration
11.2 17.1 +5.9
Other Services 21.8 19.9 -1.9
Total 100.0 100.0
We note from the above figures that growth rates 
have been highest in banking & insurance and in public 
administration, both sectors controlled by the State.
Our analysis so far indicates that the commodity 
producing sectors of the economy have recorded poor growth
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rates. What little growth there has been in the secondary 
and tertiary sector is largely accounted for by State 
investment.
The lack of growth in the commodity producing 
sectors of the economy has eroded incomes. A crude 
indicator is the stagnation in per capita incomes that we 
observed in Table II.3. Incomes have increased from an 
average of Rs 603 per annum in the early seventies to only 
Rs 615 in the mid eighties;^® population meanwhile has 
increased from 21.35 million in 1971 ^^to 29.03 million in 
1991."
An equally grave problem is that the economy's 
failure to grow has resulted in high and rising rates of 
unemployment. A survey conducted in 1987, indicates that 
out of a total workforce of 10.75 million only 6.44 million 
had full time e m p l o y m e n t O f  the remaining, about 26% 
were fully unemployed and the rest had work only 
occasionally." A comparative analysis of figures for 1961 
and 1981 indicates that this is a recent phenomenon. In
2 0  IIEconomic Review". Various Issues, op cit.
see " Statistics for Planning: 1982". Bureau of Economics 
and Statistics. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 1982.
22 Census of India.1991. op cit.
See: " Report of the Survey on Unemployment in Kerala. 
Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Government of Kerala. 
Trivandrum. 1987.
ibid.
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1961, only 3% of the Workforce was totally unemployed;by 
1981 this had increased to 13.5%.*®
From the foregoing analysis, we observe that 
despite the impressive performance in the social indices of 
development, the economy as a whole has performed poorly. 
This has negative implications for the continuation of 
redistributive policies.Already*the State finds it hard to 
maintain the fairly equitable delivery systems it has 
created. Crumbling infrastructure, lack of adequate 
equipments and medical supplies in government hospitals, 
poorly maintained schools and an increasingly obsolete 
University system attest to this fact.*®
The State, as we have noted earlier, is the 
prime agent in stimulating social and economic growth. But 
the continued ability of the State to sustain this policy 
is in doubt. During the period 1975-76 to 1990-91, the 
revenue account of the government was in surplus in five 
years only. From 1983-84 onwards, the government accounts
*® Prakash B.A: "Unemployment in Kerala. An Analysis of
Economic Causes". Working Paper No:231. Centre for Development 
Studies. Trivandrum. 1989.
*® M.S Valiathan, a prominent cardiologist and health 
administrator, highlights the current, pitiful status of the 
health care system in kerala when he observes : " Hospital 
conditions in terms of sanitation, drug supply, equipment 
function and availability of services are a source of daily and
serious complaints -----------  Even as our health indices sparkle
against a grey national background and Kerala's annual 
expenditure climbs to Rs 130 crores; public dissatisfaction with 
health services seems to rise to disturbing levels." Quoted in 
Oommen M.A Development Experience, Development Priorities and 
Fiscal Resources of Kerala". People and Development. Supplement. 
No:3. April-May 1992. P: 14 & 15.
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have not been in surplus in any year Even more 
disturbing is the fact that there are indications that the 
government has been dipping into its capital resources to 
finance its current expenditure.^® The deficit on the 
current account and the diversion of funds from the capital 
account, indicates that State policy is still oriented 
towards current consumption rather than investment for the 
future. This orientation is, in part, a product of the 
State's vulnerability to pressure exerted by interest 
groups within the polity, as will be discussed below.
Successive governments in Kerala have 
followed largely redistributive policies. This strategy 
paid rich dividends by way of granting the majority of the 
population access to basic needs such as food, subsidized 
housing, primary education and health care.The physical 
quality of life in Kerala is, as many scholars have noted, 
far higher than the rest of I n d i a . T h e s e  achievements, 
however, have to be viewed in the context of a stagnant 
economy, which faces grave problems of eroding real incomes
" Kerala Budget in Brief ". Issues : 1978-79 and 1990-91. 
Finance Department. Government of Kerala .Trivandrum.
®^ George k: "Kerala's Fiscal Crisis: A Diagnosis." Economic 
and Political Weekly. VolrXXV. No: 37. 1990.
In the mid Seventies, Morris.D.Morris, developed the 
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) to measure the physical 
well-being of people in different countries. Three indicators- 
infant mortality, life expectancy and basic literacy-, were 
identified as the indices that reveal most about a people's well­
being. On this index, Sweden had the highest rank with 97 points. 
India was ranked 87th( out of 140 countries) with 43 points. 
Kerala had 68 points and ranked with such middle income countries 
as Brazil; and ahead of Turkey and Vietnam. See Jeffrey R. 1992. 
OP cit.
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and mounting unemployment. While in the past, the State 
could ensure income redistribution through transfer 
payments and public spending, in recent years this ability 
is increasingly under question.
SECTION II
Political Coalitions and Interest Groups.
In Section I we had outlined the paradoxical 
nature of Kerala's development experience which is unique 
among Indian provinces.^ In this section we provide some 
very tentative hypotheses to explain the strategic policy 
choices of the State. The presence of ideologically 
committed left of centre parties account,in part, for many 
of the redistributive policies of the State. Equally 
important, due to the exigencies of coalition politics.
Kerala's comparatively high quality of life is mainly a 
function of its exceptional performance in social development. 
A comparison with other Indian states makes this clear. In 1991, 
Shiv Kumar using data relating to 1987, attempted to construct 
a Human Development Index for 17 states in India. The index was 
based on the Human Development Report of the United Nations 
Development Programme(UNDP), 1990 and was constructed out of
three indices: longevity, literacy and per capita GDP.
The study found that of the 17 states, only four can 
be categorised as having a medium HDI ( ie having an index of more 
than .5) and they are: Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab and Kerala, 
with Kerala having the first rank. A comparative analysis of 
these states, indicate that whereas Kerala had a per capita 
income of only Rs 639(1970-71 prices) in 1987, the other three 
states had incomes averaging over Rs 1000. The study establishes 
that Kerala's performance is primarily due to its good record in 
literacy and health care.
See Shiv Kumar A.K: "UNDP's Human Development Index: A
Computation for Indian States". Economic and Political Weeklv. 
Vol: XXVI. No:41. 1991.
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well organised powerful interest groups have significantly 
influenced policy outcomes.
The role of the Communist party in Kerala's 
political economy has been extensively discussed." Here, 
we shall merely note that the radical policies espoused and 
implemented by the party resulted in the political 
mobilisation of many underprivileged groups. Consequently, 
non- communist parties were forced to follow their lead and 
initiate similar redistributive policies. Land reforms, 
minimum wages legislation,social security measures such as 
pensions and unemployment assistance were implemented by 
both Communist and Congress led governments. Political 
mobilisation was also facilitated by the activities of 
communal political parties such as the Indian Union Muslim 
League and the Christian dominated Kerala Congress and 
caste based organisations such as the Nair Service Society( 
NSS) and the Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP) . 
The latter run educational institutions, hospitals and 
charitable organisations. In recent years the two 
organisations have attempted to increase their political 
influence more directly by launching their own parties- the 
National Democratic Party by the NSS and the Socialist
See among others :(1) Nampoodiripad EMS : Kerala Yesterday, 
Today and Tomorrow. Calcutta: National Book Agency. 1968.
(2) Menon A: What happened in Kerala : Review of 30 Months of 
Nampoodiripad Government. New Delhi: CPI. 1969.(3) Nossiter T.J. 
1982 OP cit and Marxist State Governments in India: Politics, 
Economics and society. London: Pinter. 1988.
For an exposition on the ability of left of centre regimes to 
assure basic minimum needs even at very low per capita incomes. 
See Kohli A . 1987. op cit.
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Republican Party by the SNDP.” Ideological biases, the
demands of organised groups and the awareness of a highly
literate populace, have all contributed to increased 
demands on the State for more welfare and redistributive 
measures. In the context of Kerala's coalition politics,it 
has become difficult for the State or rather the rival 
centre-right/centre-left political elites to withstand 
these demands.
Coalition Politics in Kerala.
Kerala has often been affected by political
instability. Between 1956, when the state of Kerala came
into being and 1991, there were sixteen elected governments 
and eight spells of direct rule by the federal 
government.” The instability was especially acute in the 
Sixties, when between 1960 and 1970 there were four general 
elections and seven changes of government.
It will take us too far afield to offer any 
detailed analysis for Kerala’s unstable politics.” The 
destruction of the party system is a major factor. Since 
1957, when the Communists came to power, no party has been
For an analysis of the role of caste and religion based 
political parties in Kerala, see Tharakan M.P.K ; " Behaviour of 
Communal Votes in Kerala Assembly Elections 1987". Religion and 
Societv. Vol; XXXV. No: 4. 1988.
"Assembly Elections Since 1951". Department of Public 
Relations. Government of Kerala.No Date.
ibid.
See Nossiter: T.J .1982 and 1988 op cit, for a detailed 
analysis of the coalition politics of Kerala.
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able to form a government on its own.The two major parties 
in Kerala- the Communist Party of India and the Indian 
National Congress, had split in the Sixties. The split in 
the Communist party resulted in the formation of two 
parties- the Communist party ( Marxist) (CPM) and the 
Communist Party of India(CPI).The Congress party suffered 
a series of splits in Kerala during the last three decades. 
The splits within the major parties eroded their ability to 
come to power on their own.Henceforth, politics in Kerala 
revolved round rival coalitions. These coalitions, however 
were not ideologically cohesive, nor did the partners in 
the coalition remain constant as the following table 
reveals:.
TABLE II.7
Elections and Political Coalitions in Kerala. 1960-82.
Year Composition of Rival 
Fronts
Remarks
1960 Congress, PSP, ML 
Versus Undivided 
Communist Party
Congress front won
1965 Congress Versus 
CPM,SSP,ML Versus 
CPI,RSP,KC
No front could win 
majority.Congress 
reduced from 63 in 
1960 to 36.
1967 CPM,CPI,ML,RSP,SSP,KSP 
,KTP Versus Congress
CPM front
won.Congress seats 
further reduced to 9
1970 CPI,Congress,ML,KC and 
other small parties 
Versus CPM and SSP
CPI headed front won
1977 CPI,ML,KC and Congress 
Versus CPM and Janatha
CPI headed front won
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Year Composition of Rival 
Fronts
Remarks
1980 Congress(I),lUML,KC(J ) 
and others Versus 
CPM,CPI,RSP,KC(M),AIML 
and Congress(U)
CPM front won
1982 Congress(I),IUML,KC(M),
KC(J) and others 
Versus
CPM,CPI,RSP,AIML, 
Congress(S)
Congress front won
Note: Since 1982, the composition of the rival fronts has 
not altered significantly.
Note: (1):PSP:Praja Socialist Party. (2) ML: Muslim League.
(3) lUML: Indian Union Muslim League. (4)AIML: All India 
Muslim League. (5)SSP:Samyuktha Socialist Party. 
(6)RSP:Revolutionary Socialist Party. (7) KC: Kerala
Congress. (8)KC(J): Kerala Congress- Joseph Group.
(9)KC(M): Kerala Congress- Mani Group.(10) Congress (U) : 
Congress- Urs group. (11) Congress(I ):Congress-Indira. 
(12)Congress(S): Congress- socialist.
Source: "Assembly Elections Since 1951". Department of
Public Relations. Government of Kerala. No Date.
The above table gives a number of clues to 
the nature of the polity in Kerala. First, as we have 
indicated above, political parties in Kerala appear to be 
constantly splitting. The Congress first split in the mid 
sixties, giving birth to the Kerala Congress. Then, 
reflecting national trends, it split again into the
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Congress(I), Congress(U) and the Congress(S). The Kerala 
Congress split into the KC(J)and KC(M);and the Muslim 
League into AIML and lUML.^*
Second, we note that the constituent units 
of the rival fronts, were constantly changing. The Muslim 
League was allied with the CPM in 1967, but switched sides 
in 1970. The CPI was allied with the CPM in 1967, with the 
Congress in 1970 and 77 and again with the CPM from 1980 
onwards. The different factions of the Kerala Congress, as 
we can observe from the table, constantly shifted their 
allegiances. A third point of interest is that various 
political groups bear their leader's name- Joseph group, 
Mani group, Urs group and so on. This would indicate that 
parties often disintegrate not on ideological grounds, but 
due to the personal compulsions of individual leaders. This 
has significant implications for policy formulation as 
small groups often decide the fate of governments.
Fourth, we observe that whenever the major 
parties have fought alone, they have lost heavily. The CPM 
which won 52 seats in 1967 when it was at the head of a 
formidable coalition was reduced to just 17 seats in 1977 
when it was allied only to the Janatha. Similarly, 
Congress, which secured only 9 seats in 1967 when it stood
On the eve of the 1987 elections, the AIML, ended its 
association with the Left Democratic Front and merged with the 
lUML. The united party, also known as the Indian Union Muslim 
League,is mainly concentrated in the Muslim dominated Malappurum 
district.Since the party invariably wins the majority of the 
seats from the district, it plays a pivotal role in making or 
unmaking governments in Kerala.
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alone, won 38 seats in 1977 when it was associated with a 
strong coalition.
Fifth, rival coalitions are evenly matched 
electorally. Both in the 1982 and 1987 elections, the 
difference between the rival fronts was about 1%,^^ though 
in 1982, the Congress-led front and in 1987, the CPM-led 
front formed the government respectively.
To summarize; the disintegration of parties 
has ushered in an era of coalition politics in Kerala. The 
rival fronts are composed of small parties who constantly 
switch sides. Since the fronts are evenly matched, shifts 
in political alliances can be electorally significant.
These observations imply that in the context 
of Kerala's fractured polity, even the major parties need 
to court small ideologically uncommitted parties for 
gaining and maintaining power. This makes the major 
parties very vulnerable to political blackmail by parties 
with small, but significant captive vote banks. The run up 
to the general elections are often characterised by intense 
bargaining for seats; and parties do not hesitate to switch 
sides to enhance their prospects.
This "bazaar approach to p o l i t i c s " , a s  Nossiter 
characterises it, has obvious policy implications. When 
both small and large parties are subject to shifting
" Assembly Elections Since 1951". op cit. 
See Nossiter T.J. 1982. op cit.
” ibid 
ibid.
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political alliances, and when the difference between defeat 
and victory is so tenuous, organised and politically well 
connected groups can successfully influence policy 
outcomes.
Interest Groups and State Policy.
Three interest groups are significant for 
our analysis- trade unions. Government employees and 
Commercial farmers. The significance of trade unions in 
Kerala's polity and society cannot be overemphasised. Trade 
unions in industries such as cashew and coir were in 
existence prior to independence. Agricultural labour was 
organised as early as 1 9 3 9 The extent of trade union 
penetration of industry can be judged by the fact that by 
1958, about 81% of the workforce in the organised sector 
belonged to a trade union. Paralleling the growth in 
membership is the increase in the number of trade unions 
which increased from 1213 in 1956 to a current figure of 
over 7800 unions/" Trade unions are not confined to 
agriculture and industry. The service sector is also highly 
organised with unions for NCOS, (non gazetted officers of
Alexander K.C : " Emergence of Peasant Organisations in 
South India ". Economic and Political Weeklv. Review of 
Agriculture. Vol:XV. No: 26. 1980.
Thampy M.M : "Wage-Cost and Kerala's Industrial
Stagnation: Study of Organised Small-Scale Sector". Economic and 
Political Weeklv. Vol: XXV. No:37.1990.
ibid.
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the government) bank employees,and school and university 
teachers.
The explosion in the number and variety of 
unions can be partly explained by the symbiotic 
relationship between political parties and trade unions. 
Trade unions in kerala, as in the rest of India, are 
organised by political parties. CITU (Centre for Indian 
Trade Unions) is controlled by the CPM, the INTUC (Indian 
National Trade Union Congress) by the Congress, the AITUC 
(All India Trade Union Congress) by the CPI and so on. 
These unions are of enormous political value to political 
parties. First, they assist in the mobilisation of 
unorganised groups which are otherwise difficult to reach. 
The successful organisation of agricultural workers in 
Alleppey district is a case in point. The undivided 
Communist party organised the Travancore Agricultural 
Labourers' Union in 1939. In Alleppey district, the Union 
secured for agricultural workers several privileges, 
including minimum hours of work and higher wages. Scholars 
have observed that the growth of the Communist party in 
Alleppey district owes a great deal to the activities of 
the Travancore Agricultural Labourers' Union.**
Second, trade unions are often employed as 
shock troops to harass the government. Unions are often 
instigated to make extravagant wage demands, declare 
strikes and generally create industrial unrest with a view 
to embarrassing the government. Since the State is the main
** Alexander. K.C. 1980. op cit.
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employer of organised labour, these activities are in 
effect a form of economic warfare on the government. 
Further, at election time each party employs its activists 
for fund raising and canvassing votes.
Third, trade unions are powerful instruments 
for enhancing the power and prestige of individual 
politicians. Few politicians in Kerala have succeeded 
without being associated with a number of unions. The more 
unions that an individual has under his control, the 
greater is his bargaining power within his p a r t y . T h e  
Unions, in fact, are of such vital importance that 
politicians continue to hold office in them, even while 
they serve as ministers in the State cabinet.**
Organised labour benefits equally from this 
arrangement. State machinery is often used to further the 
interests of the unions associated with the ruling parties. 
State intervention ranges from sweetheart deals with 
friendly unions in State owned corporations to police 
harassment of rival unions. Individual union leaders also 
benefit by the association with political parties. First, 
it is an avenue to elective office. Second, leaders are 
able to dispense patronage by virtue of their proximity to 
ministers and legislators.
** Nossiter cites the example of a RSP legislator- R S Unni, 
who held office simultaneously in about 21 trade unions. See 
Nossiter T J : 1982. op cit.
** In one celebrated case, the Minister was holding the 
portfolio of Transport, while he continued to be the President 
of the driver's union in the State owned Kerala State Road 
Transport Corporation. The potential for conflict of interest is 
obvious.
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The confluence of interests between trade 
union leaders and politicians endow unions with enormous 
strategic power. Every political party is susceptible to 
the pressure exerted by the unions. This pressure is 
translated into favourable policies to preserve and further 
the special interests of the unions within the economy and 
the polity.
The second major interest group is the 
officers of the provincial and All India services. The 
former generally occupies the lower and middle tiers of 
administration. The career prospects of the provincial 
civil servants are closely tied with the growth of their 
department, as there is very little lateral movement 
between departments. There is intense competition between 
departments for increased pay and promotion opportunities 
and for the creation of new posts. In these conflicts rival 
officer's associations enlist the assistance of powerful 
political leaders to present their case to the ministers 
concerned. The ministers are often compelled to submit to 
the twin pressures of officers' associations and party 
leaders, as the reputation of individual ministers can be 
undermined by a hostile bureaucracy.
The State, as we have noted in Section I, 
intervenes massively in the economy. State agencies 
distribute subsidies, agricultural inputs at below market 
rates, issues licences for scarce industrial raw materials, 
sanction credit on easy terms, and oversee a massive public 
works programme. In addition, the State directly owns a
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large number of companies. State officials, especially at 
the district and sub-district levels, have a pivotal role 
in the allocation of the States' resources. These resources 
can be deployed by the government in power for generating 
political capital. This entails the acquiescence, if not 
the active collaboration of State officials. As in the case 
of trade unions, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
politicians and State officials; the former trading 
patronage in return for channelling State resources to 
followers and allies. This, as can be expected leads to 
charges and counter charges of favouritism and political 
corruption.^
The All-India officers (The Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS), The Indian Police 
Service(IPS) and the Indian Forest Service(IPS)) are 
distinct from the provincial service in that their terms of 
employment and salary structures are determined by the 
federal government, though they serve under the provincial 
governments. So theoretically, they have considerable 
autonomy vis a vis political leaders. While these officers 
have their own associations, the influence they wield has
The press in Kerala regularly exposes the nexus between 
State officials and political parties, and how this nexus has 
operated to the detriment of the State's larger interests. The 
Malaysia Manorama recently carried a series of articles on the 
activities of the Co-operative department . ( The Malaysia
Manorama, 3rd and 5th, October 1991.) The paper alleges that 
officials of the department were used by the Government to take 
over by fraud and force the organisations controlled by rival 
parties. Identification of beneficiaries in poverty alleviation 
programmes, granting of pensions to agricultural workers and 
allocation of funds for rural road works are a few of the 
instances in which officials are alleged to have acted in a very 
partisan manner.
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less to do with their capacity for joint action and more to 
do with their strategic roles. The IAS for instance, occupy 
key positions in the administration as District Collectors 
and Secretaries to the Government. In such posts they are 
in a position to significantly influence policy outcomes.
The career pattern and ethos of the All 
India Services, however do have some negative implications 
for State policy. First, the average tenure of an officer 
in each post is less than two years.** Second, postings are 
seldom related to their area of expertise or experience. A 
typical IAS officer in the course of his career may occupy 
such varied and totally unrelated posts, as District 
Magistrate, Director of Survey and Land Records, Director 
of Agriculture, Managing Director of a cement corporation. 
Chairman of the electricity board and Secretary to the 
Government in the taxes department. The briefness of each 
tenure implies that officers can seldom be evaluated by any 
objective criteria. More often than not, the reputation of 
an individual officer is made by his ability to market 
himself successfully. This would entail programmes and 
projects that yield quick results and maximum publicity. 
Political leaders are under a similar time constraint. 
Given the mutuality of interests between political leaders 
and senior bureaucrats, public policy tends to generate 
high profile, resource demanding and State controlled
** Nossiter T.J notes that the average IAS officer in Kerala 
spent only 14 months in each posting during the period 1957-1974. 
See Nossiter T.J. 1982. op cit.
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projects that may yield immediate political gains, but 
could have long term negative economic implications.
A number of observers have commented on the 
existence of a rich farmer's lobby in Kerala. ^It is 
argued that this lobby has successfully penetrated even the 
CPM and consequentially agrarian policy in Kerala is said 
to be biased heavily in favour of rich peasants to the 
detriment of the agrarian poor. We feel however that a 
distinction merely between rich and poor peasants does not 
fully explain the complexity of policy formulation in 
agriculture. We shall argue below that characteristics of 
the peasantry unique to Kerala have differentially effected 
the ability of various sections of the peasantry to 
influence policy outcomes.
First, we observe that even among 
agrarian households, actual cultivators formed only a 
minority. Out of the 2.83 million agrarian households in 
Kerala in 1966-67 only 0.90 million (32%) had cultivation 
as their primary activity. Of the rest, about 1 million 
were agricultural labourer households and the rest were 
engaged in other activities.^ Nearly 70% of the agrarian 
households in Kerala in the late sixties, did not have 
cultivation as their major source of income. With further 
fragmentation of existing holdings rapidly taking place.
Krishnaji N, Mencher J, Nossiter T. J, Raj K.N among
others.
See Chapter III, "Land Reforms Survey;Kerala.1966-67 : 
Report." Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Government of 
Kerala. Quoted in " Poverty Unemployment and Development policy". 
Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1975.
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the dependence of agrarian households on non- farm incomes 
has increased in recent years. This non dependence on 
agricultural incomes reduces farmers' incentives to 
organise themselves for collective action.
Second, the average size of holdings in 
Kerala is very small. In 1985-86, nearly 97% of the 
operational holdings were below one hectare.^ The small 
size of the holdings and its geographical dispersal all 
over the province reduces the ability of the farmers in 
general to organise themselves into a powerful lobby.
Here, however, we must make a distinction 
between producers of food crops and producers of non-food 
crops. The former in Kerala produce largely for home 
consumption, while the latter produces for the market. 
Farmers with marketable surplus have more to gain and lose 
from favourable or unfavourable policies. Hence, they have 
greater incentive to organise themselves with a view to 
influence policy outcomes. But incentive, though a 
necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition for 
collective action by farmers. For successful collective 
action to emerge among latent groups such as farmers, there
See "Statistics for Planning ". State Planning Board. 
Government of kerala. 1988.
In a study of market participation by small farmers, 
Ninan found that while small rice farmers, marketed less than 7% 
of their paddy production, producers of commercial crops such as 
pepper, arecnut etc marketed almost their entire production. See 
Ninan K N :"Small Farmers and Commodity Market. An Analysis of 
Market Participation and Price Discrimination." Economic and 
Political Weeklv. Review of Agriculture. Vol: XXIII. Nos:52 & 53. 
1988.
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should be individuals or organisations capable of absorbing 
the costs involved in mobilising them.
It is more rational to expect such an 
organisation or individual emerging in the commercial crop 
sector rather than among food producers. The production 
structure of some of the more important commercial crops 
facilitates the emergence of producer lobbies. We shall see 
in the next section that the existence of large rubber 
plantations and the geographical concentration of rubber 
producers have enabled them to successfully lobby both the 
federal and provincial governments.
The favourable policy outcomes observed by 
many scholars - the exemption of rubber plantations from 
the purview of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the low and 
declining rates of agricultural income tax, the generous 
price support and subsidized input supply systems - have 
largely benefited the producers of commercial crops. Food 
producers on the other hand, as we shall see in the next 
section , are vulnerable to adverse policies from the 
State.
In this section, we have argued that in the 
context of Kerala's unstable coalition politics, well 
organised groups significantly influence policy outcomes. 
We would argue that the traditional,labour intensive 
character of Kerala's industrial structure is the result of 
trade union opposition to any form of mechanisation in the 
traditional industries. Further, trade unions have created 
an unfavourable industrial profile for Kerala with militant
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tactics , that involve not only legal instruments such as 
strikes, but also actions such as "gherao"( illegal 
confinement) of management, and "ghost money" (demand for 
wages even when no work has been done) .These tactics and 
the passive acquiesence of the State to them, have 
contributed to the flight of industries from Kerala."
We had observed earlier that despite the 
shrinking revenues, the State has continued to expand its 
intervention in the economy.In 1989 for instance, it 
nationalised a large number of cashew factories, largely on 
the grounds that the private owners were not providing 
adequate work to workers in Kerala and were diverting their 
activities to factories outside the province. We shall see 
in the next section that such interventions despite the 
social costs involved are dictated by political 
compulsions.
Pressure from government employees has 
resulted in the State itself consuming an increasing share 
of the resources it generates. Extension of federal pay 
scales to government employees and university teachers, 
payment of bonus to State employees and increased pension 
benefits are some of the concessions, that associations of 
teachers and State employees, have wrested from the State 
in recent years. To pay for this, the State has had to cut 
its expenditure on investment and has had to borrow 
heavily. While the revenue expenditure on agriculture 
increased only from 4.63% in 1960-61 to 5.68% in 1990-91,
See Oommen M.A .1981. op cit.
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expenditure on pensions shot up from 2.8% to 10.13%. Debt 
servicing during the same period more than doubled from 6% 
to 12.20%,54 indicating that the government's increased 
current consumption was being financed not through 
increased revenues, but through borrowing.
SECTION III 
Interest Groups and Agrarian Policy.
The central argument that we advance in this 
section is that farmers in Kerala, experience negative or 
positive polices depending upon their location within the 
political economy of the province. Farmers producing
commodities consumed within Kerala, generally tend to
experience greater negative policies than farmers producing 
for export and upcountry markets. The former produce 
staples such as paddy while the latter produce commodities 
such as pepper, tea, coffee, cardamom and rubber which are 
exported out of the province.
The dominant interest groups within the 
polity, such as the trade unions and government employees, 
are, as consumers, interested in keeping down the price of 
wage goods. The State being the largest employer in the 
province has a similar aim. Moreover, in a food deficit
province, the success of a government would be largely
judged by its ability to ensure supplies of essential 
articles at reasonable prices.
54 " Kerala Budget in Brief ". Various Issues, o p  cit. 
Government of Kerala.
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A comparison with other Indian provinces will 
better illustrate our argument. In Punjab, Harayana and 
Western Utter Pradesh, farmers produce wheat, rice and 
other food crops mainly for the market. The politics in 
these surplus provinces therefore revolve around issues 
such as the support price for wheat, subsidies for 
irrigation and fertiliser and the procurement policy of the 
Food Corporation of India. It is also no accident that some 
of the most powerful farmers organisations in India have 
emerged in these states. While in these provinces the 
producers are well organised, in Kerala, consumers through 
the interest groups we have identified, are better able to 
influence policy. Consequentially, producers of wage goods 
in Kerala often experience adverse policies such as price 
controls and monopoly procurement. However, State policy 
towards wage goods such as paddy and milk often appear 
contradictory: positive policies such as subsidies and
investment to increase productivity, coexisting with 
disincentives such as price controls. The rationality of 
such policies for the State becomes apparent when we view 
these policies as attempts by the State to maximise 
supplies rather than as efforts to increase farm incomes.
Non food-producers experience negative or 
positive policies depending upon whether the produce is 
required for domestic industry or not. Raw cashew nuts, for 
instance, are consumed by both private and State factories 
in Kerala. Rubber, on the other hand, does not have a 
significant market within the province. The different 
market profiles of these two commodities, we shall show.
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translates into negative policies for one and positive
policies for the other.
Policy outcomes are also determined by the
degree of organisation among the primary producers. We had 
argued that commercial producers have greater incentive to 
organise themselves. Further, the production of crops such as 
rubber is concentrated in a geographically compact area. This 
facilitates the mobilisation of producers by political
parties. Food producers, be it paddy or milk, however suffer 
from the double handicap of producing commodities required for 
consumption by the dominant interest groups and being
scattered and unorganised.
We shall illustrate the above arguments through 
an analysis of State policy in respect of paddy, milk, cashew 
and rubber.
Paddy
Since the mid seventies paddy production in 
Kerala has been steadily declining. Table II.8 shows that the 
decline is primarily due to the fall in the area under paddy.
Table II.8
Trends in Paddy Production in Kerala: 1960-90.
Year Area 
(000 hectares)
Production 
(000 tonnes)
Productivity
KEG/hectares
1960-61 779 1068 1371
1970-71 875 1298 1483
1974-75 881 1334 1513
1980-81 802 1274 1589
1989-90 583 1141 1956
Source: (1) Suseelan P:" Problems and prospects of Rice 
in Kerala". Paper presented in the Workshop on Agricultural 
Development on 6/10/1988 at Trivandrum. (2) "Economic Review". 
Various Issues. State Planning Board. Government of Kerala.
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The sharp drop in area and production has 
been extensively d e b a t e d . H i g h  wage rates and relatively 
low prices for paddy, have substantially contributed to a 
shift away from paddy to more remunerative crops such as 
coconuts. Between 1970-71 and 1989-90, wage costs in the 
paddy sector increased by 56% at constant prices whereas 
paddy prices decreased by 28% during the same period.®* The 
increase in wage costs was the result of collective 
bargaining by agricultural workers' unions especially in 
the chief paddy producing areas of Kuttanad and Palghat. 
The double impact of high wage costs and low paddy prices, 
coupled with relatively better price realisation from 
commercial crops, resulted in the shift away from paddy.
These market forces have been assisted by 
the policies of the State. It is true that the State has 
invested considerable resources to increase paddy 
production in various special programmes such as the 
Intensive Paddy Development Programme, Intensive 
Agricultural Development Programme and the High Yielding 
Varieties Programme. Also, the bulk of the resources 
invested in irrigation seems to have been targeted at 
paddy. However it is doubtful whether these policies have 
had any substantial impact.A critical analysis of the 
irrigation projects reveals that despite the vast sums of
®® See Kannan K P and Pushpangadan K (1989). o p  cit; and
George P S and Mukherjee C : "Rice Economy of Kerala: A
Disaggregate Analysis of Performance". Working Paper No: 213. 
Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1986.
®* See " Statistics for Planning". 1988. op cit and
"Economic Review". Various Issues, op cit.
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money expended on irrigation, only about 23%*^ of the 
irrigation potential of Kerala has been tapped. Further the 
majority of these projects are marked by cost overruns and 
delays/"' There has been many allegations in the press that 
these projects benefit government officials and contractors 
more than farmers. The continued preference of the State 
for major irrigation projects despite the cost 
effectiveness of minor irrigation lends credibility to 
these allegations.”
The inefficiency of the positive policies were 
compounded by negative policies of price restrictions and 
monopoly procurement. In 1966, the State issued the Kerala 
Rice and Paddy(Procurement by Levy) Order (RPC), under the 
Essential Commodities Act. The aim of this order was to 
coerce rice farmers to sell their produce to the State at 
a price determined by it. The levy rates were fixed very 
high, ranging from 80% in the highest to 10% in the lowest
See Prakash B A : "  Agricultural Development of Kerala: 
From 1800 to 1980 AD. A Survey of Studies.” Working Paper No: 
220. Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1987.
Cost escalation in irrigation projects is reported to be 
the highest in Kerala among all the Indian provinces. In the case 
of many schemes, the original estimate has gone up by more than 
twenty times. For instance, the Kallada project's estimate has 
gone up from Rs 13.21 million when it was started in 1961 to Rs 
260 million in 1988. Kallada, incidentally is under construction 
even after thirty years. In fact out of the 28 major irrigation 
systems in Kerala, only 10 have been commissioned. The remaining 
are still in various stages of construction for periods varying 
from 12 to 30 years. See Salim A M and Nair Gopinathan: 
"Irrigation and Water Management in Kerala". Paper presented in 
the Workshop on Agricultural Development on 6/10/1988 at 
Trivandrum.
For a discussion on the comparative advantages of major 
and minor irrigation. See Kannan K P and Pushpangadan K .1989. 
OP cit.
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size classes.*® These estimates were further revised upward 
in 1969 with the result that for a number of farmers the 
amount of levy exceeded their marketable surplus." Along 
with the RPO, the State also enacted the Kerala Land 
Utilisation Order in 1967,(KLU) which forbade farmers to 
cultivate with cash crops any land that had been cultivated 
with food crops. Taken together, the RPO and the KLU reveal 
the bias and intentions of the State very clearly. The 
State was primarily interested in securing food supplies; 
therefore it passed the RPO. When farmers shifted their 
cropping pattern, the State countered this move through the 
KLU order, forcing the farmers in effect, through
legislation, to continue uneconomic farming operations.
The Kerala Agricultural Worker's Bill of
1972, was another piece of legislation, which, if 
implemented in its entirety, would have had grave
implications for cultivators. According to the provisions
of the Bill, all farmers having holdings above one hectare, 
would have to pay a "prescribed wage". This wage would be 
above the minimum wage and could be well above the 
prevailing market rates." Other provisions of the bill 
included a welfare fund for workers, a commitment by the 
farmers to give preference to workers who had earlier 
worked on the farm and a formal mechanism for settling
*® See Panikulangara V : "Paddy Procurement Through Producer 
Levy: A Case Study of Kerala". Social Scientist. VolrlV. No: 8. 
1976.
*' ibid
*^ See Alexander. K.C .1980. o p  cit.
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labour disputes. These provisions were designed to provide 
seasonal agricultural workers, the same protection that 
industrial labour enjoyed. The bill was only partially 
implemented as the inherent difficulty of extending 
industrial labour legislation to agriculture soon became 
apparent."
State policies towards paddy cultivation 
therefore reveals a blend of positive policies designed to 
increase production and negative policies that destroy the 
incentive for production. These apparently contradictory 
policies are however rational for the dominant groups which 
dictate State policy. They were primarily interested in 
maximising supplies to the consumer at the minimum price. 
Hence the simultaneous attempts to increase production and 
secure it for public distribution.
MILK
OF was launched in Kerala to stimulate the 
dairy economy. However, even in the pre-OF period, the 
livestock sector in Kerala has shown considerable dynamism. 
The growth in milk production has been very remarkable as 
the following table shows:
Discussions with officials of the Department of 
Agriculture, Government of Kerala. June. 1991.
102
TABLE II.9
Trends in Milk Production in Kerala: 1964-90
In millions of tonnes.
Year Production Index
1964-65 0.221 100
1977-78 0.778 352
1980-81 0.908 411
1984-85 1.220 552
1989-90 1.600 724
Source: "Livestock Census”. 1987 and "Economic Review”.
1990.
The dynamism of this sector has been due to a 
fortuitous mix of favourable market trends and positive 
State policies. The bovine economy of Kerala has undergone 
significant structural change during the period 1964-90.A 
number of studies have documented the increased preference 
for milch c a t t l e . B e t w e e n  1966 and 1987 the percentage of 
milch cattle in the cattle population increased from 68% to 
8 5 % . This shift has been attributed to: (1) decline in
the cropped area under paddy, (2) increased demand for milk
Nair N K: "Bovine Holdings in Kerala: An Analysis of
Factors Governing Demand and Supply." Phd Thesis. University of 
Kerala. Trivandrum. 1981.
ibid and "Report on Fourteenth Quinquennial Livestock 
Census-1987 ". Issued by the State Livestock Census Officer. 
Department of Animal Husbandry. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum.
1987.
103
and (3) State policies that increased the productivity of 
milch cattle.
The decline in the area under paddy and the 
extensive subdivision of existing holdings have both 
contributed to the reduced preference for holding work 
bullocks.** Farmers find it uneconomical to keep bullocks 
in these circumstances. Demand factors have also influenced 
the change in the composition of the cattle population. 
Several estimates have shown that during the last two 
decades, the demand for milk and milk products has been 
outstripping supply.*^ This demand gap is attributed both 
to increased purchasing power, following the Gulf boom and 
the relative increase in the price of milk substitutes(sic) 
such as meat and fish.**
Supply factors have also contributed to the 
increased preference of farmers for holding milch cattle. 
For most of the seventies and early eighties, the movement 
of relative prices was favourable to milk. K.N Nair and T.S 
Nair have indicated that relative to milk prices, feed 
prices have been increasing at a slower pace during the
66 Nair K.N .1981. op cit.
*^ See Nair T.S : "Cross Breeding Technology and Dairy
Development. The Kerala Experience." Unpublished M Phil Thesis. 
Jawharlal Nehru University. New Delhi. 1988.
** Nair K.N argues that for most of the seventies, the price 
of milk substitutes was accelerating faster than that of milk. 
Consequentially, the transfer of expenditure from milk 
substitutes has contributed to the increased demand for milk. See 
Nair K N, 1981. op cit.
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seventies.** Since feed costs constitute more than 70% of 
the cost of production of milk, low feed prices have 
contributed to make dairying profitable.
A more significant factor is the increased 
productivity of milch cattle. Though milk yields are still 
poor by international standards, productivity has been 
substantially increased during the last two decades. Data 
collected through the integrated sample surveys indicate 
that the average yield of a cow in milk has nearly trebled 
from 1.11 litres in 1964-65 to 2.968 in 1 9 8 4 - 8 5 . Taken in 
conjunction with increased demand and relatively lower feed 
costs, productivity increases have substantially increased 
the profitability of the dairy industry.
The jump in productivity can be traced 
directly to the policies initiated by the State over the 
last three decades. For analytical purposes State policies 
in the dairy sector can be broadly divided into: policies 
designed to increase productivity of cattle through 
application of better technology; and State intervention in 
marketing the milk produced by the farmers. Here, we shall 
discuss the former, reserving the latter for discussion in 
the next chapter.
The primary focus of State policy was cross­
breeding technology. Kerala does not possess any indigenous 
high quality milch cattle. Hence, the Government sought to
69 See Nair K.N 1981 and Nair T.S, 1988. op cit.
"Report on Fourteenth Quinquennial Livestock Census-1987 
". 1987. OP cit.
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increase the genetic potential of cattle through cross­
breeding with exotic stock. Initially, the Government 
merely adopted the federal government's policies such as 
the Key Village Scheme and the Integrated Cattle 
Development Project(ICDP). Through the Key Village Scheme, 
the government attempted to increase the productivity of 
both draught and milch cattle in selected villages. ICDP, 
however, was qualitatively different. It sought to develop 
dairying in the hinterlands of urban centres through an 
integrated package of incentives and technical assistance. 
As such, it was a replication of the Green Revolution 
strategy?! and the forerunner of Operation Flood.
Along with ICDP, Kerala initiated an 
ambitious programme to evolve a new breed of milch cattle 
to suit Kerala's agro- economic conditions. This was the 
Indo-Swiss Project- a joint effort of the Government of 
Switzerland and the Government of Kerala. The programme 
involved the setting up of bull stations for production of 
frozen semen and Artificial Insemination (AI) centres for 
performing AI. A large number of inseminators were also 
trained in the early seventies to deliver AI services in 
the farm itself. This last scheme, enormously increased the 
coverage of the cross- breeding programme in Kerala.
?! The Green Revolution refers to the dramatic increase in 
food production in the Seventies. The food shortages of the 
Sixties, encouraged the Government of India to evolve a new 
programme to boost food production. The prograunme essentially 
consisted of the supply of an integrated package of inputs- 
fertilizers, high yielding varieties of seeds and credit on easy 
terms-, to areas which had good irrigation potential. The 
strategy was successful in boosting wheat production; but was 
largely confined to Punjab, Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh.
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The government's efforts contributed to the 
rapid diffusion of cross- breeding technology in Kerala. 
Official statistics on cross-breeding are available only 
from the 1977 livestock census onwards; but indirect 
estimates made by K.N Nair indicate that in the early
seventies the cross- bred cattle population in Kerala was 
only about 1 0 % . By 1977, however, this had increased to 
45%,^^ though in the eighties the diffusion of the
technology has tended to be slow.^* Policies for up-grading 
the milch stock were supplemented by an extensive health 
care system. The number of veterinary centres increased 
from only 147 in 1960-61 to over 1500 institutions by 
1990.^
The foregoing analysis indicates that the
dairy sector's impressive performance was the result of
State policies moving in tandem with market trends. These 
positive policies would at first appear to negate our 
argument that interest groups within the polity have biased 
policy formulation against food producers. A deeper 
analysis, however, reveals the same mix of positive and 
negative policies perceived in the case of paddy producers. 
The ISPK, ICDP, the health care system and the AI programme
72 Nair K N 1981. o p  cit
"Report on Fourteenth Quinquennial Livestock Census - 
1987". 1987. OP cit.
Currently, only 49.7 % of the cattle population is
crossbred. "Annual Report- 1989-90". The Kerala Livestock 
Development Board. Trivandrum.1991.
ibid.
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are all positive contributions to the development of the 
dairy sector. The government, however, has initiated 
policies inimical to the long-term interests of dairy 
farmers, such as price controls. State monopoly of 
processing facilities,licensing restrictions and the 
destruction of the autonomy of the dairy co-operatives.
The logic of these contradictory policies 
become apparent, once we understand the priorities of the 
State. The poor quality of the indigenous stock and the 
relatively high demographic pressure meant that in the 
sixties, milk availability was low and prices were high.A 
comparison with the rest of India is revealing. The per 
capita monthly consumption of milk in Kerala in 1961-62 was 
only 0.027 Keg as against the All India average of 0.065 
Keg. The unit cost of milk protein, however, was Rs 21.45 
per Keg in Kerala compared to the All India average of Rs 
13.06 per Keg.^
The above figures show that the consumption 
of milk in Kerala was less than half of the rest of India, 
while price was higher by 64% in the state. The 
availability and price of milk was a sensitive issue for 
the government, as along with rice, it was a barometer of 
the government's ability to maintain essential supplies at 
reasonable prices. Besides, the dominant groups within 
Kerala, be they trade unions, government employees, or the
See Nair K N. 1981. o p  cit.
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political elites, were all consumers interested in the 
plentiful availability of cheap milk.
Though the dairy development policies were 
aimed at increasing farm productivity, increased urban 
supplies were a high priority. This is clear from the 
choice of policy instruments such as ICDP, the primary 
purpose of which "was to increase the production of milk to 
feed the public sector dairy plants in the main urban 
centres".77 The first ICDP in Kerala was started at Alwaye 
in 1969. It is located in the industrial heartland of 
Kerala, and as such would appear to be inappropriate for an 
intensive dairy project. But, when we note that Alwaye is 
proximate to the province's biggest city- Cochin, where a 
public sector dairy was being under utilised for want of 
milk, the rationale for starting an ICDP at Alwaye becomes 
clear. Thus, what at first sight appeared to be an
agricultural development project to benefit farmers, turns 
out in reality to be a scheme to augment urban milk
supplies.
The rapid diffusion of cross-breeding
technology in Kerala has a similar history of dual 
objectives. The technology, though available in Kerala from 
the early sixties, became popular only in the early
seventies, when the Government launched a massive AI 
programme. This programme was actually started as an
77 George P S and Nair K. N : Livestock Economy of Kerala. 
Centre for Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1990
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employment generation prograorane, as its official 
naone"Special Employment Programme” indicates.
The government calculated that by
stimulating the dairy sector, Kerala's chronic unemployment 
problem could to some extent be ameliorated. The Chief 
Minister, C.Achutha Menon, in a speech in February 1971, 
indicated that the Government was thinking of establishing 
dairy colonies, with a view to provide "gainful employment 
to educated youth”. W h i l e  this particular scheme did not 
take off, the Special Employment Programme was launched 
with a similar objective. According to this programme, over 
1500 youth would be trained in AI methods and put in
panchayats so as to provide AI service to farmers on their 
doorsteps.
The perception of the political elites that
the programme was primarily directed at employment
generation rather than increasing farm productivity is 
evident from an analysis of the Legislative Assembly 
questions on the programme. Of a number of questions asked 
on the subject in the Kerala Assembly in 1973, the year 
when the programme was really started, not one question 
referred to the impact the programme would have on 
farmers.^ All questions referred either to the criteria
Speech by Achutha Menon, Chief Minister of Kerala, 
February, 1971. Reported in: The Kerala Co-operative Journal. 
February. 1971.
"Proceedings of the Kerala Legislative Assembly”. Seventh 
and Eight Sessions-1973. Legislative Secretariat. Trivandrum.
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for the selection of the youth to be employed in the
project or the panchayats where it would be implemented.
Our analysis of policy formulation with
respect to rice and milk revealed that the State's first 
priority was not increased farm productivity or higher farm 
incomes. Rather, these were the by- products of policies 
designed to solve problems of higher urgency such as
ensuring urban supplies or generating employment. These 
were the priorities of the dominant groups and it is these 
priorities that were translated into policies.
We have argued that the interests of the
dominant groups for cheap wage goods have biased 
agricultural policy against food producers. This does not 
imply that the producers of all commercial crops generally 
experience positive policies. We shall argue that 
commercial crop producers also experience negative or 
positive policies depending on whether their produce is 
required for consumption by the dominant groups. A 
comparative analysis of policies in the cashew and rubber 
sectors will illustrate our argument.
CASHEW
We observe from Table 11.10 that between 
1980 and 1990, Kerala lost nearly 14% of the area under 
cashew.
Ill
TABLE 11.10 
Area Under Cashew in Kerala: 1980-90.
In Hectares
Year Area Year Area
1980-81 141,277 1985-86 137,747
1981-82 139,960 1986-87 133,562
1982-83 141,307 1987-88 121,550
1983-84 142,339 1988-89 124,740
1984-85 136,863 1989-90 124,170
Source:!) 1980-81 to 1986-87: Statistics for Planning.
1988. 2) 1987-88 to 1989-90: Economic Review. 1990.
While the fall in acreage is the result of 
a number of factors, it is undeniable that State policies 
have contributed to farmers opting out of cashew 
cultivation. The government’s attempts to increase 
production through special programmes such as the "Multi 
State Cashew Development Programme", were accompanied by 
disincentives such as the 1981 "Kerala Raw Cashew nuts 
(Procurement and Distribution) Act ". This Act effectively 
banned private trade in raw cashew nuts. Under the 
provisions of the Act, farmers were obliged to sell all 
their produce to the agents of the State, at prices well 
below market rates. In 1990, the average price offered by
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the State was Rs 1300 per quintal, while the open market 
price was over Rs 1600.®°
The response of the farmers to the Act was 
two— fold. The immediate response was to transform the 
legitimate inter-province trade in cashew. Deprived of 
organised marketing outlets, farmers started to smuggle the 
nuts to markets in the neighbouring provinces of Karnataka 
and Tamilnadu. But the draconian provisions of the Act such 
as confiscation of the vehicles used in private trade and 
heavy fines increased the risks of the farmers. The only 
long term solution, therefore, was to opt out of cashew 
cultivation.
The rationale for this patently anti-farmer 
policy is to be found in the strategic location of the 
cashew processing industry in the political economy of 
Kerala. The industry is significant for three reasons. 
First, it accounted for about 45% of the total employment 
in the factory sector in Kerala in 1981.®^ Second, the 
workforce is concentrated in large factories employing 400 
or more workers. Third, the industry is concentrated in one 
district. In 1979, 99% of the employment generated in the 
cashew industry of the state was in Quilon district.®^ 
These three factors enabled the labour force within the
®° The source for the prices offered by the State is the 
"Economic Review" . 1990 op cit, while the open market prices 
were disclosed to me by farmers in the course of the sample 
survey.
®^ "Economic Review". 1981. o p  cit. 
®2 ibid.
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industry to organise themselves into a powerful pressure 
group.
While the trade unions within the industry 
received the backing of the major parties in varying 
degrees, some of the smaller parties were vitally dependent 
on the cashew industry for their political survival. The 
RSP for instance, drew its membership largely from the 
cashew workers of Quilon district and most of its key 
leaders have been associated with the trade unions within 
the industry. More significantly, the RSP has won almost 
all of its seats from Quilon district in successive 
elections."
We had observed in Section II, that given 
the instability of Kerala's coalition politics, even small 
parties like the RSP are decisive. Further, all political 
parties were interested in courting the well organised 
cashew workers of Quilon district. Consequentially,
The dependence of the RSP on Quilon can be seen from the 
following figures:
Year Total From Quilon 
Seats Won
1967 4 4
1970 4 4
1977 7 4
1980 6 4
1982 4 3
1987 5 4
Source: "Assembly Elections Since 1951". No Date, op cit.
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successive governments have formulated policies that have 
favoured the organised labour in the industry.
By the late sixties, wage costs in the
cashew industry had risen considerably due to trade union 
pressure. In addition, the industry witnessed persistent 
labour unrest on a massive scale. Factory owners responded 
by closing down factories and relocating them in the
neighbouring provinces. Faced with the loss of jobs and the 
consequent loss of influence and power, trade unions 
pressurised the State to take over the closed factories. 
Thus, in 1970, the Cashew Development Corporation and in 
1984 Capex- a State owned co-operative were formed by the 
State to run the factories taken over from the private
sector.** By 1989, the State was directly running over 70
factories employing nearly 54% of the total workforce in 
the organised cashew sector.*^
The State however could neither run the
factories cost effectively nor guarantee employment. By
1989-90, the State run factories had accumulated losses of 
over Rs 420 million.®* Further, due to shortage of raw
nuts, the factories could not give continuous employment. 
In 1981 the State factories gave only 61 days of
employment.*7 The State's response to the shortage of nuts
®* "Economic Review". 1981. op cit. 
®^  "Economic Review". 1990. o p  cit. 
«* ibid.
®^ "Economic Review". 1981. op cit.
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was the Kerala Raw Cashew nut (Procurement and 
Distribution) Act of 1981 referred to earlier.
We may summarise our analysis of the cashew 
industry by noting that the industry was vital to the 
political interests of the rival fronts in general and the 
RSP in particular. This enabled trade unions within the 
industry to safeguard their interests by compelling the 
State, first, to nationalise large sections of the industry 
and then to secure essential raw materials by using the 
State's coercive powers. In the process, the interests of 
the cashew farmers and the public at large were sacrificed.
RUBBER
We had argued that cashew farmers were 
vulnerable to negative policies of the State because they 
supply raw materials to Kerala's largest organised 
industry. Rubber cultivators on the other hand do not 
appear to be vulnerable, probably due to the absence of 
conflicting interests within the sector. Rubber in fact is 
a spectacular illustration of the results of positive State 
policy. Between 1950 and 1990, the acreage under rubber in 
Kerala increased from 67,913 to 376,000 hectares and total 
production jumped from 16,000 to 275,0000 tonnes.**
Market forces such as favourable relative 
prices have contributed to the shift into rubber; but an 
analysis of price movements of rubber in the Kottayam
*° "Economic Review". Various Issues, o p  cit.
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market during the last ten years, shows that prices alone 
were not decisive.
TABLE 11.11 
Trends in the Price of Natural Rubber in Kerala: 1981-90. 
(Rs/Quintal. At constant 1970-71 prices).
Year Price Year Price
1980-81 529.00 1985-86 495.00
1981-82 589.00 1986-87 439.00
1982-83 512.00 1987-88 430.00
1983-84 549.00 1988-89 417.00
1984-85 494.00 1989-90 469.00
Source : Economic Review. Various Issues.
Despite the decline in prices farmers were 
encouraged to shift into rubber due to a combination of 
positive State policies and the absence of disincentives 
such as monopoly procurement at pre-determined prices.
Three types of State policy can be 
distinguished: First, there are credit and subsidy schemes. 
Since yields from rubber can be taken only six or seven 
years after the initial investment. State policies are 
required to lower the initial entry barriers for small
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cultivators.** Schemes such as the Replanting Subsidy 
Scheme of 1957, New Planting Scheme of 1979 and the 
Plantation bevelopment Scheme of 1990, provided farmers 
with subsidy and cheap credit to start and continue rubber 
cultivation.
Second, the State intervened in the market 
in support of rubber cultivators. Several policy 
instruments were deployed by the State:(1) a minimum 
support price was periodically announced by the federal 
government on the basis of cost of production ; (2) the
State Trading Corporation(STC) was often used by the 
Government to purchase rubber directly from the farmers 
when the price fell below a critical minimum and ( 3 ) the 
Government restricted imports of natural rubber into the 
country by channelling it through the STC. The STC was also 
used to export rubber, when there was glut in the domestic 
market.
Third, the exemption of small rubber 
cultivators from some key legislative measures made rubber 
cultivation attractive. These measures included the Kerala 
Plantation Labour Act(1951),the Kerala Land Reforms 
Act,1963 and the Kerala Land Reforms( Amendment Act), 1969.
The exemption from the land reform measures was
®* According to the Rubber Act, 1947, a "small grower" means 
an owner whose estate does not exceed 50 acres of area. In 1988, 
the relative share of this group in total area and production was 
80.34 % and 74.66 % respectively. See: George T.K et al: " Role 
of Government and Structural Changes in Rubber Plantation 
Industry ". Economic and Political Weekly. Review of Industry and 
Management. Vol:XXIII. No:48. 1988.
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especially significant, as it encouraged large scale 
conversion of garden lands into rubber plantation.
These three sets of positive policies, by 
the federal and provincial governments and the absence of 
disincentives, have contributed to the spectacular growth 
of rubber cultivation in Kerala.The State's positive 
policies cannot be explained entirely by the position of 
rubber as a scarce industrial raw material. A fuller
explanation would require the examination of the location 
of the rubber sector in the overall political economy of 
Kerala.
The primary reason for the provincial
government's benign policies is the absence of conflicting 
interests. First, the rubber products industry in Kerala is 
very small. Currently, only 12% of the rubber produced
within Kerala is consumed there.®® Further, the industry 
accounts for less than 5% of the employment in the factory 
s e c t o r . S e c o n d ,  unlike cashew, there is no regional 
concentration in the rubber industry, as it is spread 
virtually all over the province. Third, the industry is 
highly decentralised with average employment in each
factory being only about 10. These characteristics of the 
rubber industry in Kerala- small, dispersed, decentralised 
and relatively new,- have hindered the formation of 
powerful interest groups within the rubber products 
industry. The absence of a large geographically
®® "Economic Review". 1990. op cit. 
ibid.
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concentrated labour force meant that the rubber, unlike the 
cashew industry was not strategically significant to either 
trade unions or to political parties.
Rubber cultivators, on the other hand 
mattered. Between 1961-62 and 1985-86, the area in the non­
estate sector (holdings with less than 50 acres), increased 
from 82,924 to 279,730 hectares.The increase in the 
relative importance of the non-estate sector,is seen from 
the fact that while it accounted for only 62.7 % of the 
area under rubber in 1961-62, it covered 85.6% of the area 
in 1985-86." Moreover, the cultivators were geographically 
concentrated. Five districts of south- central Kerala 
account for more than 65% of the acreage under rubber." 
Within these districts themselves, topographical 
requirements, such as elevation ensure that rubber would be 
confined to distinct compact areas.
The growth in the number of cultivators and 
their geographical concentration facilitated their 
mobilisation both through local farmers * organisations and 
political parties. The Kerala Congress especially has been 
sedulous in championing the cause of the rubber 
cultivators. Personal as well as political considerations 
account for this. First,a number of the prominent leaders 
of the Kerala Congress themselves have extensive holdings 
of rubber. Second, the rubber growing districts are vital
92 See: George T.K et al. 1988. op cit.
Quilon, Pathanamthitta, Kottayam, Idukki and Ernakulam. 
See: "Statistics for Planning ". 1988. op cit.
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to the party. An analysis of the electoral gains of the 
Kerala Congress over the years indicate that the party won 
the vast majority of its seats from the same five districts 
that account for the bulk of rubber acreage.** The Kerala 
Congress' strategic partnership with the Congress for much 
of the last two decades meant that the party, and by 
extension, rubber cultivators could successfully lobby both 
the provincial and federal government.*^
The existence of a significant estate sector 
among rubber producers further enhanced the ability of 
rubber growers to successfully lobby provincial and federal 
governments. Multinational companies such as the Malayalam 
Plantations and the State owned Kerala Plantation 
Corporation, has a stake in ensuring that State policies do 
not go against the interests of rubber producers.
The foregoing analysis indicates that 
favourable State policies towards rubber can be explained 
by the absence of an interest group within Kerala that 
required rubber at low prices and second,by the ability of
** Seats won by the various factions of the Kerala Congress
from the five districts, in successive elections are given below:
Year Total Seats Won Seats Won from the five
Districts
1970 13 10
1977 21 16
1982 14 12
1987 9 8
Source: " Assembly Election Since 1951." No Date, op cit.
*^ The lobbying is evident most when there are sharp falls
in the price of rubber. The federal government is often forced
to ban the import of natural rubber . The government also 
intervenes in the market to purchase rubber till prices 
stabilise.
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the rubber growers to mobilise themselves politically. This 
ability was the result of two sets of factors: the presence 
of large actors who could absorb the transaction costs 
involved in collective action and the electoral 
significance of rubber cultivators.
SUMMARY
In this Chapter, we analyzed the process of 
policy formulation in Kerala and offered some tentative 
explanations for its distinctive character. Section I 
indicated that the State was oriented primarily towards 
redistributive polices. While this has significantly 
increased the quality of life for the majority of the 
population, the neglect of the commodity producing sectors, 
is now undermining these achievements. Though the State has 
intervened massively in the economy,its negative resource 
position has in recent years constrained its ability to 
continue its interventionist policies.
In section II, we observed, that the 
presence of ideologically committed parties account for the 
bias towards redistributive polices . Equally important has 
been the existence of well organised interest groups. In 
the context of Kerala's unstable coalition politics, these 
groups significantly influence policy outcomes. The 
interest group process within the polity account for the 
distinctive industrial profile of the province.
Section III analyzed the implications of the 
interest group process for agricultural policies. Farmers 
in Kerala experience negative or positive polices according
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to their location within the political economy of the 
province. Since the dominant groups in the province are 
consumers of wage goods. State policy has aimed at securing 
these goods at low prices. This policy bias accounts for 
the mixture of negative and positive policies in the paddy 
and dairy sectors. Through a comparative analysis of cashew 
and rubber we also attempted to establish a causal 
connection between State policies and the interests of the 
dqminant groups.
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Dairy Markets in the Pre-Operation Flood Period
Analysis of milk production trends in Chapter II 
indicates that market forces coupled with positive State 
policies imparted considerable dynamism to the Animal 
Husbandry sector in Kerala. However, despite the impressive 
growth in total milk production, milk markets were still 
relatively under developed in the province. We shall show 
that market imperfections were due both to the nature of 
the product and to the inherent difficulties of 
organisation in an economy composed of millions of marginal
producers. Government attempts to correct these
imperfections through a variety of organisational forms are 
then analyzed and the considerations which dictated the 
preferred organisational form are also discussed. Finally, 
we shall argue that while State intervention was necessary 
to correct market distortions, the nature of the
intervention contributed to its comparative lack of
success.
The Structure of the Market.
State intervention in milk markets which pre­
dated Independence, accelerated during the Five Year Plans. 
The primary focus of Government concern was the low per 
capita consumption of milk and milk products. As against a
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recommended consumption of 124 grams per day, the 
consumption in Kerala was only 30 grams in 1964-65.^ Low 
per capita consumption was attributed to the low 
availability of milk in the province. The poor quality of 
the indigenous milch stock and the lack of organised 
marketing channels were diagnosed as the major factors 
inhibiting the growth of a dynamic dairy industry in 
Kerala.
To improve the milch stock, the ambitious cross 
breeding progreunme, to which we have already referred, was 
launched. Dairy markets were diagnosed as suffering from a 
number of other imperfections.First, it was a market in 
which the farmer ' s room for manoeuvre was severely 
constrained due to the absence of competing marketing 
channels. The average producer was too small to be able to 
influence the market and secure a remunerative price for 
his produce. It is true that he faced an equally small 
buyer. But a perishable commodity such as milk has to be 
disposed of quickly; and in the absence of choice, the 
market advantage will invariably lie with the trader. 
Farmers therefore will tend to restrict production by not 
investing in quality milch stock and underfeeding the 
animals.
Second,it was a segmented market overwhelmingly 
dominated by the unorganised sector. This was composed of
 ^ "Bulletin of Animal Husbandry Statistics : 1986". Various 
issues. Department of Animal Husbandrv. Government of Kerala.
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thousands of petty traders who on an average did not handle 
more than thirty or forty litres of milk a day. The low 
volumes they operated with, provided little surplus for 
investment in modern transport and processing equipment. 
Lack of investment in turn, crippled their ability to 
manage the seasonal variations associated with the milk 
industry. These deficiencies of the markets were identified 
by the State as the stumbling blocks for the development of 
a vibrant dairy industry in Kerala.^
Milk markets were relatively underdeveloped both 
in Travancore and Malabar prior to Independence. The 
requirements of Trivandrum were met by petty traders, who 
brought milk from the outlying panchayats of Nemom, Ulloor 
and Peroorkada.In Calicut, urban buffalo keepers seemed to 
have met the bulk of the city's demand. Contemporary 
records indicate that the intermediaries in Trivandrum took 
a sizable margin.It is reported that while traders on an 
average pay two" chakrams" for a" nazhi" of milk, they sell 
it for four "chakrams".^
The dominance of the unorganised sector 
continued despite active State intervention for over a 
decade and a half. A study by the NDDB in 1975, showed that 
in the cities of Trivandrum and Ernakulam, the traders 
still met the bulk of the demand:
 ^ "Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of 
Dairy Development. Government of Kerala.
 ^ T C kochunni Pillai :" Development of the Dairy Sector 
Through Co-operatives"; quoted in the Travancore Co-operative 
Journal. February. 1929.
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Table III.l
MARKET SYSTEMS IN TRIVANDRUM AND ERNAKULAM. 1975.
Marketing
Channel
Trivandrum Ernakulam
Market
share
Purchase
Price
Rs/litre
Sale
Price
Rs/litre
Market
share
Purchase
price
Rs/litre
Sale
Price
Rs/litre
State
Scheme
19% 1.62 1.84 12% 1.85 2.00
Own
Source
8% ---- 10% ---- ----
Traders 73% 1.25 2.10 78% 1.70 2.20
Source: ’’Dairy Development Project for the Districts of
Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey”. NDDB. ANAND. 1976.
The above table indicates that over 70% of
the market was accounted for by the unorganised sector. The
average price paid by the trader was 30% less than that of 
the Government scheme; while for poor quality milk they 
were charging 14% more. The price paid by the Government 
scheme itself was low as we shall show below. Under the 
circumstance it is clear that in Trivandrum, the farmers 
were being exploited by the traders.
The segmented nature of milk markets in Kerala
is well brought out by the contrasting situation in
Ernakulam. Here the price offered by traders do not seem to 
be very much lower than that offered by the Government 
scheme. But though Ernakulam is only 200 Kms away, the
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Trivandrum farmers apparently are unable to take advantage 
of the price difference.
The higher price at Ernakulam however seems to 
be a localised phenomenon; in most milk markets the traders 
were seen to have been paying a comparatively low price. 
Confirmation of this observation is obtained by a sample 
survey done by the author in twenty societies during June 
1991. Interviews with society officials and farmers 
indicate that prior to the formation of the society, the 
farmers were dependent on either the trader or the local 
tea-shop. While the tea-shops paid a higher price than the 
trader, they were not prompt in their payments. Often the 
farmers were forced to recover their dues in kind from the 
tea-shops. The vendors were prompter in their payments;but 
offered much lower prices.*
A serious lacuna of the existing market system 
was an inability to handle lean/flush variations. The NDDB, 
in its survey of the Travancore region in 1975, found that 
while total production during the lean period was only
363.000 litres per day(LPD), in flush this had increased to
546.000 LPD -an increase of over 50%.® In Kerala there are 
two flushes- one during June-July coinciding with the South 
West monsoon and another during November- December 
coinciding with the North-East monsoon.
* Sample Survey. June-July 1991.
® See: " Dairy Development Project for the Districts of
Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey - Kerala". NDDB. Anand.1976.
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In the monsoons, farmers are simultaneously faced 
with an increase in production and a contraction in demand. 
The comparatively cooler climate and availability of green 
fodder stimulates production, while continuous rains 
depress the demand for all beverages including milk. In the 
absence of large scale processing plants and feeder 
balancing dairies equipped with conservation facilities 
such as powder plants,market agents such as traders and 
tea-shops are unable to cope with the simultaneous 
phenomena of increased supply and diminished demand. They 
respond by cutting both procurement and price.
The supply responses of farmers are obviously 
not as flexible. While some of the increased production is 
consumed by the farmers themselves, the increase in net 
marketable surplus in the aggregate can still be 
considerable.Thus, the survey referred to above, estimates
.
that while the net marketable surplus in lean was 206,000 
LPD,in the flush, it increased to 295,000 LPD - an increase 
of over 43%.®
The problems of lean/flush management becomes 
more acute in highly commercialised markets. A comparative 
analysis of data in 1978 showed that 52% of the milk 
produced in Kerala was sold while the corresponding All- 
India figure was 24%.? A subsequent study in 1986 by the 
Centre For Development Studies, Trivandrum, showed that 63%
® ibid
 ^Sarvekshana Vol II, No:2 October 1978. Quoted in Nair T.S. 
1989. OP cit.
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of the milk produced was being sold.* As Kerala does not 
have a well developed ghee market like Gujarat or a sweet­
meat market as in West Bengal, the excess production has 
all to be sold as liquid milk, when facing a lower demand 
curve during the monsoon.
Inability to market milk during the flush has a 
very negative impact on the small farmer as he markets a 
disproportionably higher percentage of his output. A study 
by Nair K.N in 1976, showed that 79% of the total marketed 
surplus was contributed by farmers owning only one or two 
animals.* The higher degree of commercialisation among the 
small farmers implies that they are far more vulnerable to 
market failures.
Moreover, cross-breeding technology has 
transformed the basis of production in Kerala. Prior to the 
Indo-Swiss project and the massive A I programme, the 
farmers of Kerala operated a low cost,low-input,low out-put 
system of production with a low net marketable surplus. The 
diffusion of cross-breeding technology, is as we have seen, 
scale neutral. Consequently,the conversion to a high-cost, 
high out-put production system will enormously increase the 
risk and vulnerability of the farmers if the market fails 
to develop mechanisms for balancing seasonal variations.
Lean/flush variations can be evened out by 
investing in powder plants and feeder balancing dairies.
* George P.S and Nair K.N. 1989. op cit
* Nair K.N. 1981. o p  cit.
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However* to generate the volumes necessary to feed these 
plants, it is necessary to have a network of collection 
centres,chilling centres and processing plants. This is all 
the more necessary in a tropical country where milk is 
subject to rapid deterioration.This would entail a 
prohibitively high order of investment in a capital scarce 
economy. For instance, the Ernakulam dairy alone, which was 
commissioned in 1990, cost a little over Rs 40 million 
equal to the total 1990 per capita income of over 27,000 
Keralites).!! To feed this dairy, further investment in 
road milk tankers and chilling centres would be necessary. 
In a market, dominated by small traders with little 
investible surplus, there is little chance of the market 
generating such investment.
Since the liquid milk market operates with 
comparatively lower margins than the product markets, it 
attracts little outside capital. A study by the National 
Commission on Agriculture in 1976, found that private 
enterprises in the dairy industry are primarily concerned 
with the production and marketing of luxury dairy products 
such as baby food and malted beverages, the demand for 
which comes from a small segment of the urban rich. The 
report went on to conclude that "in general, the privately 
owned dairies remain on the periphery of the country's
Confidential records of K C M F. 1991. 
“ "Economic Review". 1991. op cit.
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dairy industry".” The scale of the investment required, 
prevents the agents operating within the market from 
investing, while the low margins of the liquid milk trade 
act as entry barriers to outside capital.
Kerala did not possess a single feeder-balancing 
dairy or powder plant even as late as 1980, when OF was 
launched. Further, under-investment in bulk carriers eroded 
the ability of the market to import milk during lean or 
ship it out during flush in any significant quantities. 
Consequently, the seasonal variations could not be managed 
by the market, leading to chronic shortages. Often during 
the peak lean season, milk had to be actually rationed in 
urban cities. Equally problematic was the flush, when there 
are recorded instances of excess milk being poured down 
city gutters.
The foregoing analysis indicates that the markets 
in Kerala revealed significant distortions. While total 
production went up steadily, there were wild swings in 
urban supply from year to year. These imperfections have 
negative impact on both producers and consumers. The impact 
on the consumer is clear enough; but he at least has the 
freedom to change his preferences. But the producer has 
little room for manoeuvre. Having no assurance of stable 
markets or remunerative prices, he will cut production in 
the long run. But in the short run, operating as he is in
” "Report of the National Commission on Agriculture". 1976. 
OP cit.
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a highly commercialised market,he is bound to suffer 
considerable financial difficulties.
The nature of the commodity profoundly affects 
the manner in which markets are formed. We have already 
referred to the fact that a perishable commodity in a 
tropical country would require investment on a large scale 
if organised, non-segmented markets are to emerge. In the 
absence of appropriate institutions, the costs involved in 
testing the quality of milk is also a factor retarding the 
functioning of milk markets . This can best be illustrated 
by referring to the study of rice and rubber markets by 
Popkin. He cites Akerlof's classic example of the used car 
market in which lack of information as to whether the car 
offered for sale is bad (a lemon) or good (a peach), drives 
down the price of all cars."
The absence of a mechanism that would transmit 
information quickly and accurately about the quality of 
goods, therefore, prevents market agents from obtaining 
optimum prices. Popkin argues that rubber markets are like 
used car markets in the sense that quality cannot be easily 
discerned; the quality of rice can, on the other hand, be 
easily tested by rubbing the grains together. He concludes 
therefore, that rice markets tend to be auction markets 
where the absence of high information costs enables the 
market to function effectively. But the difficulty of
" See Popkin S : "Public Choice and Rural Development-
Free-rider, Lemons and Institutional Design" in Russell C.S and 
Nicholson N.K ed: Public Choice and Rural Development.
Washington D.C: Resources for the Future. 1981.
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judging the quality of rubber quickly and cheaply can 
create market failures in the absence of appropriate 
organisations•
We may extend this argument to include milk 
markets. Milk prices are determined entirely by quality . 
The ease with which milk can be adulterated and the 
comparative difficulty of detecting the degree of 
adulteration in unorganised markets drives down milk prices 
to the average price prevailing in the market. This 
penalises the producers of good quality milk and they would 
be encouraged by the market to offer inferior milk. The 
absence of institutions that could guarantee the quality of 
milk,therefore, could result in market distortions.
Market imperfections of the sort we have analyzed 
can be corrected by the creation of appropriate 
institutions either by producer groups or through State 
intervention. The experience of the dairy industry in 
several countries indicates that the ownership pattern of 
productive assets such as milch stock and land does 
influence the nature of the intervention. Where large 
commercial farmers dominate the dairy industry, the chances 
of the farmers themselves organising the necessary 
institutions are greater than in an economy consisting of 
millions of small producers. There are several reasons for 
this.
First, with larger investible surplus, big 
commercial farmers are in a better position to invest in 
equipment and plant. Second, and more importantly, it is
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far more easier to organise a few big commercial farmers 
for collective action than millions of small producers. An 
effective milk procurement and distribution system is a 
'public good' for all the agents who are part of the 
system. The dairy farmers of Kerala would fall into the 
category of what Olson calls a "latent group". ^Such 
groups are often afflicted with acute free-rider problems 
and are unable to organise themselves effectively for 
collective action. Further, the transaction costs involved 
in organising them would be very high for an individual or 
even a group of individuals. For the individual farmer with 
a very low marketable surplus, it is not rational to incur 
the expenses involved in organising his fellow producers 
for collective action. It is far more rational to free- 
ride. Consequently, the 'public good' of an effective 
organisation for market intervention will not emerge 
spontaneously.
Olson argues that latent groups can be 
induced to act collectively by an entrepreneur who is 
prepared to bear the transaction cost and who can offer 
both selective incentives and disincentives. We have shown 
that the structure of the dairy industry in Kerala and the 
scale of investment required for building an institution 
for market intervention acted as barriers to collective 
action. The only actor willing and capable of absorbing the 
costs of organisation and overcoming the free-rider problem 
was the State. Hence, it was left to the State to intervene
See Olson M. 1965. op cit.
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in the market both through State run processing plants and 
through State sponsored Co-operatives.
Market Intervention by the State.
The chief instrument for market intervention was 
the co-operative. Before Operation Flood, two types of Co­
operatives were organised in Kerala - the primary milk co­
operative and the district milk supply union. The former 
operates in a limited geographical area- often a panchayat, 
while the latter has district- wide jurisdiction. The 
primaries are concerned with the collection of milk from 
the farmers and supplying it to the district unions. They 
also extend various facilities to the farmers such as loans 
for the purchase of milch cattle, subsidised inputs etc. 
The primaries are affiliated to the district unions which 
normally restrict their activities to the distribution of 
milk. Occasionally, they also engage in the business of 
supplying inputs in bulk to the primaries.
The dairy sector in Kerala witnessed a rapid 
expansion of co-operatives as the following table reveals:
Table III.2
Growth of Dairy Co-operatives in Kerala:1961-89.
Year Number of 
Societies
Membership Turnover
Rs/Millions
1961-62 150 N.A 3.17
1964-65 215 23,000 6.25
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Year Number of 
Societies
Membership Turnover
Rs/Millions
1968-69 347 41,963 18.63
1970-71 363 52,128 15.70
1972-73 417 63,170 29.00
1974-76 463 88,287 65.88
1978-79 848 178,814 96.67
1979-80 955 216,432 121.23
1980-81 1043 231,807 N.A
1984-85 1335 343,043
1986-87 1582 416,471
1987-88 1690 421,000
1988-89 1859 441,799
Source; "Administration Report". Various Issues. 
Department of Dairy Development.
The above table indicates that there has been a 
spectacular growth in both numbers and membership during 
the period under discussion : from a mere 150, the number 
of primaries had increased to 955 and membership had 
reached nearly a quarter of a million by 1980. The growth 
in membership however cannot be entirely taken at its face 
value. A large percentage of the members are "sleeping 
members", members who have joined the society not for 
deriving any benefits from it, but at the behest of 
political parties or local leaders. Such members take 
little interest in the day to day affairs of the society. 
In some societies the percentage of such members can be
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quite high. In Pullenchery^a society affiliated to the 
Malappurum union, out of a total membership of 462 in 1990, 
only about 31 members were regularly pouring milk (7%). 
^^The situation in the other societies are not dissimilar 
with participation rates seldom going over 50%. This 
situation does not seem unique to the dairy sector. In fact 
in a recent statement, the Kerala minister for Co-operative 
development has admitted that 38% of all members in the 
societies in the province are sleeping members.“
Apart from a few consumer societies, the vast 
majority of the societies were organised by the State. The 
reasons for the State choosing the Co-operative as the 
preferred mode of organisation is complex. We can only 
offer some tentative explanations.
Why Co-operatives ?
In many Third World countries, co-operatives have 
emerged as the preferred instrument of State intervention 
in the agrarian economy. Post-colonial States, saw in the 
co-operative structure, an optimum solution to the existing 
pattern of social and economic inequality. Co-operatives 
were expected to achieve a variety of goals, ranging from 
the grandiose vision of establishing Socialism to the more
Sample Survey. June-July. 1991.
Reported in the Malavala Manorama. 3/10/1991.
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modest goal of marketing agricultural produce^\ This 
fascination with the co-operative system can be traced to 
a number of factors.
Hyden, attributes the popularity of co-operatives 
among African governments to two reasons: the ideological 
and political attractiveness of the co-operative model and 
the strong faith of African leaders in macro planning."" 
Ideological considerations, we noted, is the main driving 
force behind the Ujamaa Co-operatives of Tanzania. Belief 
in the State's ability to engineer economic development 
through a rational planning exercise also encouraged the 
proliferation of co-operatives.
In India, both ideology and a commitment to 
central planning were equally important factors. The 
Government of India believed the co-operative to be the 
only agency capable of establishing a non-exploitative 
relationship between the rural producer and the urban 
consumer. This belief in the inherent egalitarian structure 
of the co-operative is to be viewed in the context of the
Saul J.S, observes that the guiding principle behind the 
rapid spread of the Ujamaa co-operatives in Tanzania, was 
President Nyerere's desire to " establish the Socialist principle 
of avoiding the exploitation of man by man". He quotes Nyerere, 
as saying that the co-operative movement has little merit if it 
merely serves the capitalist farmer. Only if production is 
organised on socialist lines, are co-operatives fulfilling their 
real goals.
See Saul J.S: "Marketing Co-operatives in a Developing Country: 
The Tanzanian Case", in Worsley P ed: Two Blades of Grass:
Rural Co-operatives in Agricultural Development 
Manchester:Manchester University Press. 1971.
See Hyden G " Approaches to Co-operative Development : 
Blueprint Versus Greenhouse" in Attwood D W and Baviskar B S 
ed: Who Shares: Co-operatives and Rural Development. Delhi: O
U P. 1988
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Community Development Project (CD) launched in the fifties. 
The underlying belief of the CD Programme was that existing 
unequal patterns of social and economic power could be 
rectified through cooperative effort rather than through 
class conflicts. In this context, the co-operative became 
a powerful ideological argument for avoiding potentially 
divisive and controversial egalitarian programmes such as 
land reforms. In other words, co-operatives became for the 
State, a soft option for tackling the myriad problems of 
poverty and social inequality.
Ideology, however, was not a major factor in the 
spread of co-operatives in Kerala. Other factors were more 
significant. The fascination with Western organisational 
forms accounts for the early induction of the co-operative 
in Kerala’s dairy sector. The earliest writers on the dairy 
industry of Travancore observed that milk producers in 
western countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Ireland 
prospered only after they had organised themselves into co­
operatives." The immediate inspiration for the 
organisation of the milk co-operative in Trivandrum in 1930 
was the success of the milk supplies union of Calcutta 
which had been started under the colonial administration. 
The Calicut milk supplies union which had been started in
19 See T C Kochunni Pillai. 1929. o p  cit.
The Registrar of the Travancore Co-operative Journal and 
some of the prominent public men of Trivandrum visited Calcutta 
in 1929 to study the functioning of the milk supplies union. They 
came back very impressed by its functioning and urged the 
Government to take the initiative in organising a milk supplies 
union. See: The Travancore Co-operative Journal. February. 1929.
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the late thirties was also inspired by Western models.Thus, 
the continuing hold of Western models of organisation 
partly explains the emergence of the co-operative as the 
preferred organisational form in the dairy industry.
However, this is but a partial explanation. It 
does not explain the phenomenal growth of the co-operatives 
during 1960-1980. We would argue that the popularity of the 
co-operative is due to the opportunity it affords political 
actors to maximise political and personal benefits. For 
upwardly mobile local politicians, the co-operative is the 
launching pad for a political career. The co-operative 
structure provides politicians the reach,resources and 
power to exercise political patronage. They can offer 
various incentives to their followers such as easy credit 
and subsidized inputs; further, they can reward close 
supporters with jobs and directorships in these 
organisations.In addition, the resources of the 
organisation- both human and material- can be mobilised at 
critical junctures such as elections.The institution can 
also be used as a tool to harass opponents: by refusing to 
sanction credit, withholding of inputs and in a number of 
other ways. As the same individual is often on the board of 
several local co-operatives, the network of patronage and 
influence he can build is considerable. This accounts for 
the keenness with which political parties fight elections 
in the various co-operative institutions of Kerala. In 
elections to primary credit societies. District Co­
operative Banks and other co-operative institutions, the
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main contest is between the two major political alliances: 
the UDF and the LDF.
An analysis of the contemporary co-operative 
scene in Kerala is illuminating. According to the records 
of the Co-operative Department, currently there are 8740 
co-operatives in the state.Together, they are estimated 
to have a membership of over 10 million persons- nearly one 
third of the total population of the state.These societies 
have been functionally organised by industry. There are 
credit, coir, hand-loom, rubber, khadi and a host of other 
types of societies. Together they cover virtually every 
facet of economic life in rural Kerala. The resources of 
these societies are considerable. The credit societies, 
which number about 1500, alone have advanced loans worth 
nearly Rs 7.4 billion in 1990-91." With several different 
types of co-operatives often functioning within a small 
geographical area such as the panchayat, the control of 
these institutions is of great strategic importance to all 
political parties. Consequently, the major political 
parties have always been keen to capture co-operatives from 
rivals and to start new co-operative institutions so as to 
undercut the influence of other parties. This a theme to 
which we shall return in the next chapter.
The State department concerned with Co-operatives 
has a powerful vested interest in ensuring that the number 
of co-operatives increases. The promotion opportunities of
Reported in the Malavala Manorama: 5/10/1991. 
ibid.
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the department officials are intimately linked with the 
growth of the co-operatives. Each co-operative has to be 
statutorily audited. On the basis of various criteria, the 
number of societies that can be audited by one co-operative 
inspector is fixed. The Government in consultation with the 
representatives of the employees, have fixed the ratio 
between different categories of staff- so many Assistant 
Registrars for so many co-operative inspectors and so on. 
In other words, promotion to higher positions is dependent 
on the number of subordinates below, and the number of the 
lowest category of staff are dependent on the number of 
societies there are to audit.The keenness of the Co­
operative Department, which is the statutory authority for 
all co-operatives, to proliferate co-operatives is obvious. 
The administrative departments, ie,the departments which
control the schemes that the co-operatives implement ---
for instance,the Dairy Development Department for dairy co­
operatives or Handloom Development Department for the 
handloom industry, have equally compelling reasons for 
increasing the number of co-operatives. The funds at their 
disposal are often tied to the number of co-operatives 
under their control and the size of the department is 
vitally dependent on the number and size of the schemes 
they implement. In subsequent chapters we shall show that 
the Dairy Development Department's growth has paralleled 
the growth of the co-operatives.
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The private gains of both bureaucrats and 
politicians are another powerful inducement for the 
proliferation of co-operatives. A study by the author in 
1986 showed that there was an enormous increase in the 
number of handloom co-operatives in Trivandrum district 
over the period 1980-84. Further analysis showed that a 
large percentage of the looms reported in the cooperative 
sector of Trivandrum district was bogus. The society 
officials in collusion with corrupt officials had 
exaggerated the number of the looms with a view to divert 
Government subsidy meant for handloom workers into their 
own hands. It was unofficially estimated that during a ten 
year period, subsidy worth over Rs 250 million had thus 
been illegally diverted." This gives some indication of 
the lure that the co-operative has for the politician and 
the bureaucrat.
The State dependence on outside capital has also 
influenced its choice of this organisational form. We have 
seen that financial assistance to the dairy sector by the 
Central Government during the Sixties and the Seventies was 
contingent on the assets thus created being handed over to 
the co-operatives. The NDDB's assistance under Operation 
Flood was to be channelled only through co-operatives.
The Hindu in its report dated 11/3/1986 quotes the 
minister for industries as stating that nearly 15,000 looms in 
Trivandrum district were bogus. This represents nearly 71% of the 
looms reported for Trivandrum . The Malavala Manorama in a 
report dated 2/3/1986 states that during a ten year period, bogus 
societies would have fraudulently collected over Rs 250 million 
in false subsidy claims. Also See V Rajagopalan. 1986. op cit.
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other national institutions such as National Cooperative 
Development Corporation (NCDC) and National Bank for 
Agricultural Development (NABARD) have also insisted that 
any investment in the agricultural sector should only be 
through Co-operatives. The state's perilous financial 
situation give no freedom of choice if it wanted to attract 
investment. Thus the choice of organisational form was 
often influenced by the demands of credit institutions.
Apart from these compulsions, there were other 
factors responsible for the proliferation of co-operatives 
in the dairy sector. The nature of products such as milk 
and sugar, facilitate the organisation of producers into 
co-operatives. As we have noted, both are bulky and easily 
perishable commodities which require lumpy investment for 
procurement and processing. Only by aggregating the 
resources of a large number of producers, can the required 
funds be generated. Further, in the processing industry of 
these products, there is no conflict between the interests 
of the large and small producers. In fact, to generate the 
volumes required for reaping economies of scale, the large 
producers require the produce of the small farmers.The 
absence of conflict facilitates the emergence and 
continued existence of co-operatives in the dairy industry.
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Dairy Co-operatives in Kerala.
We have analyzed the reasons for market 
distortions in the dairy industry of Kerala and have 
offered some explanations for the choice of the Co­
operative as the preferred instrument for intervention. We 
shall now attempt to evaluate the impact of the
intervention. This can be best done by briefly sketching 
the history of the major milk co-operatives of Kerala and 
the State's involvement with them during the period 1960- 
1980.
The Trivandrum Milk Supplies Union. (TMS)
We have noted above that the union was started in 
1939 and was inspired by western models and the success of 
the Calcutta union. Contemporary records indicate that 
State officials of the Co-operative department were
actively behind the organisation of the union. We have
little information of the activities of the union till the 
sixties when the State again started to take an interest in 
the affairs of the union. The State's involvement came in 
the form of the Trivandrum Milk Scheme which consisted of 
setting up a 6000 LPD processing plant. The plant was built 
with State capital and was transferred to the milk supplies 
union on the condition that 45% of the capital investment 
would be repaid in 15 years.
In the initial years the scheme appears to have 
been received well by the farmers- over 65 primary
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societies were supplying about 8500 LPD to the union by 
1964-65. But by 1967, there were serious complaints about 
the functioning of the union. The union had accumulated 
huge losses and was in serious financial difficulties. Not 
only had it failed to service the government loan, it ow: ed 
the farmers about Rs 0.37 million.
The farmers petitioned the Government against 
their own union and requested that the State should run the 
dairy directly. Accordingly, in February 1967, the State 
took over the direct control of procurement, processing and 
marketing of milk in Trivandrum city. However, despite the 
direct management of the dairy by the State, the dairy 
continued to suffer heavy losses which by 1976 had 
accumulated to Rs 1.29 million. Milk procurement which had 
picked up immediately after the Government took over was 
maintained at about 10,770 LPD.*® This would indicate that 
despite high capacity utilisation, the dairy was still 
suffering heavy losses. The combination of heavy losses and 
high capacity utilisation indicate that the State was 
artificially keeping the selling price low while marketing 
the maximum quantity of milk. Thus,both purchase and sales 
price had been virtually frozen between 1967 and 1972. By 
the time the dairy was handed over to the Kerala Livestock 
Development and Milk Marketing Board(KLDMMB), the newly 
created public sector corporation, the combination of low
"Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of 
Dairy Development, o p  cit.
*® ibid.
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prices,high operating costs and the large volume of sales 
at below market prices, had brought the dairy to virtual 
financial bankruptcy.
The Calicut Milk Supplies Union (CMS)
We have seen that prior to the formation of the union 
the demand for milk in Calicut was met by urban buffalo 
keepers. Chronic shortages and the indifferent quality of 
the milk prompted a group of prominent citizens to organise 
a consumer society. The group included advocates, public 
men and social workers. It started in a very small way with 
the average daily collection being less than 80 Lpd and was 
confined to the city of Calicut.2* The small size of the 
society and the involvement of prominent citizens helped 
the society to overcome the obstacle to collective action 
that we have analyzed above.
From its inception in 1939 to the mid- fifties, 
the union functioned autonomously with little involvement 
from the Government. However,during the late fifties, as 
part of the all India programme of modernising the dairy 
sector, the Calicut Milk Supply scheme was launched by the 
Government of Kerala. Like the other urban milk supply 
schemes,this consisted mainly of a pasteurisation plant 
which was commissioned in 1964.
The implementation of the scheme had a negative 
impact on the CMS union. First, it led to a loss of
"Administration Report". Various Issues. CMS Union.
Calicut.
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autonomy for the union. The sanction for the scheme was 
contingent on the union amending its bye-laws, so that the 
Government could have greater control over the affairs of 
the union. The CMS union was a union of consumers rather 
than that of producers. But the ownership pattern was 
highly egalitarian with 70% of the shares being held by 
members who had less than 10 shares each. ^^With such a 
broad based ownership pattern, the share holders could at
least in theory, exercise some degree of control over the
affairs of the union.
However, the Government decreed that since the 
milk scheme is to be implemented through the union, the 
bye-laws should be aunended to cede operational control to 
the Government. In 1960, the bye-laws were amended to give 
the Government 50% of the shares of the Union. Reflecting 
the changed ownership pattern, the board of the union was
also reconstituted to give the Government six
representatives out of a total of nine.^®
The impact of the scheme on milk procurement and 
profitability was equally adverse as the following table 
shows :
ibid.
2® ibid.
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TABLE III.3
Performance of the Calicut Milk Supply Union:1941-80
Year Milk Procured Profit/Loss 
in Rupees
1941-42 0.03 -309
1951-52 0.41 +10,619
1961-62 1.40 +16,619
1963-64 2.00 +25,000
1964-65 2.05 -85,000
1971-72 2.60 -699,000
1974-75 2.27 -1,255,000
1979-80 2.91 -1,099,000
Source: "Administration Report". Various Issues. CMS Union.
The above table indicates that up to 
the time when the Government Scheme was launched, the union 
was working with a fair degree of profitability. Between 
1951-52 and 1964-65 procurement rose by 400% whereas 
between 1964-65 and 1979-80, it rose by only 42%. 
Similarly, profitability fell after the mid sixties - from 
a small profit of Rs 0.025 million in 1963-64 to a loss of 
Rs 1.1 million by 1979-80.
The Malappuram District Co-operative Milk Supplies Union 
(MDCMSU)
The MDCMSU, located in Nilambur town in South 
Malabar, first started as a primary society in 1951 and
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became a district union in 1971.In the late forties and 
early fifties, waves of immigrants from central Travancore 
began to settle in the hill tracts of Malabar. These 
settlers brought dairy skills which formed the basis of the 
local dairy economy. The settlers kept milch cattle mainly 
for home consumption; but there was a small marketable
surplus which could not be sold for want of marketing 
channels. The only outlets were the few tea-shops of 
Nilaunbur town, which could absorb only a limited amount of 
milk.
It was at this juncture that the State's 
programme of assistance for starting up dairy co-operatives 
was being popularised by the local co-operative inspector. 
The promise of financial help from the State, persuaded 
several prominent individuals of Nilambur to start a 
society. They included a retired Army Major, the President 
of the local co-operative bank and the Panchayat
President.At a series of meetings of farmers, various 
incentives, including loans for the purchase of milch 
cattle and subsidized inputs were offered in the name of 
the State and share capital was collected.
The society thus came into existence as a result
of; (1) a need for assured marketing channels, (2) the 
availability of local leadership and(3) the existence of a 
State programme that could offer incentives and the 
resources to meet the transaction costs. Apart from the 
initial assistance to start the society, the State 
continued to help the society over several years. A
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chilling plant was constructed in 1969 with State help and 
a few years later, the society asked for and received the 
services of a Government official to act as the society's 
secretary.
An analysis of the union's growth and performance 
shows mixed results as Table III.4 reveals:
TABLE III.4 
Performance of MDCMSU:1964-79
Million litres per annum
Tear Milk Purchased Milk Sold
Local Outside Total Local Outside Total
1964-65 0.876 0.876 0.37 0.51 0.88
1970-71 1.14 (95%) 0.06 1.20 0.68 (42%) 0.52 1.20
1975-76 1.06 (89%) 0.14 1.20 0.66 (55%) 0.54 1.20
1978-79 0.91 (79%) 0.24 1.15 0.64 (41%) 0.51 1.15
Note: Figures in brackets denote percentage to total. 
Source: "Administration Report". Various Issues. MDCMSU
The above table questions the long term impact of 
the Union. On the one hand, it is obvious that local sales 
had almost doubled between 1964-65 and 1978-79, indicating 
that local consumption had increased significantly. On the 
other hand, the drop in local purchase- both in absolute
"Administration Report". Various Issues. MDCMSU.
Nilambur.
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and percentage terms would tend to indicate that the union 
was losing favour with the local farmers. The drop in 
procurement had a negative impact on the union's finances 
as it was not generating the volume of 1.18 MLPA required 
to break even. As a result, the union lost money steadily. 
A small surplus of Rs 0.14 million in 1964-65 had by 1978- 
79 been transformed into a marginal loss of Rs 0.05 
million. This was despite the fact that it had stopped 
servicing the Government loan and was finding it difficult 
to even meet the maintenance cost of its vehicles.
Apart from the major schemes analyzed above, the 
Government had launched similar schemes in all the 
districts. The results were not dissimilar. Thus, the 
Palghat scheme was commissioned and handed over to the 
union in 1967. By 1973-74, the capacity utilisation was 
down to about 21% and accumulated losses had climbed to Rs 
1.2 million. By 1977-78, the accumulated loss had risen to 
Rs 3.26 million. With the union virtually bankrupt, the 
Government took direct control in 1976. The Ernakulam milk 
scheme was started in 1967. Unlike the other schemes, it 
was never entrusted to any union. It was operated directly 
by the State and it too had by 1975-76, run up an 
accumulated loss of Rs 0.2 million.^
"Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of
Dairy Development, op cit.
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other Instruments of Intervention.
Co-operative societies and urban milk supply 
schemes were not the only instruments for market 
intervention employed by the State. Two other State- 
initiated schemes were Rural Dairy Centres and Urban Dairy 
Farms. The former were started on the assumption that 
markets had failed to provide a channel for tapping the 
milk production potential of the province. The State 
believed that in many rural milk sheds, production could be 
significantly increased, if the farmers were provided with 
a remunerative price and assured markets. Accordingly, by 
1976, chilling plants were set up in Mavelikkara, Peerumade 
and twelve other places.
The urban dairy farm was a scheme conceived by 
the Dairy Development Department when the farmers started 
withholding milk from the Trivandrum milk scheme on account 
of poor purchase price. The idea was to start a dairy farm 
at Valiyathura, where the department was already running a 
fodder farm. However, after a few million rupees was spent 
in constructing sheds and other infrastructure, the 
Government abruptly dropped the project in 1976.^^ A 
similar attempt was made a few years later and a Jersey 
farm was actually set up at Vithura - on the outskirts of 
Trivandrum. The farm is still in existence; but its
ibid.
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efficiency can be judged by the fact that there are more 
workers in the farm than there are milch cattle.”
Till 1976, market intervention was done by the 
State either directly through the urban milk schemes or 
through the co-operatives.In 1976, the State decided that 
for the integrated development of the dairy sector a new 
organisation was necessary. It, therefore, created a State 
company- the Kerala Livestock Development and Milk 
Marketing Board (KLDMMB) by combining the developmental 
activities of the Indo-Swiss project” with the commercial 
activities of the dairies and the chilling centres.
It was a venture doomed from the start as the 
ethos, the personnel and the activities of the two were 
incompatible. The personnel of the Indo-Swiss Project were 
mainly scientists involved in research. The dairies and 
chilling centres were,on the other hand,run by government 
officials of the Dairy Development Department. Despite the 
change in organisational form there was no perceptible 
change in the nature of the intervention. Prices were still 
centrally determined, the personnel were the same and the 
objective was still that of maintaining urban milk supply. 
Consequently, the results were also the same and by 1982, 
the organisation had an accumulated loss of Rs 3.3
32 Field Visit . June- July 1991.
The Indo-Swiss project was started in the early Sixties 
to evolve a modern cattle-breeding programme for Kerala. Its main 
activities included the supply of exotic bull semen and high 
quality fodder seeds to farmers.
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m i l l i o n . The KLDMMB engaged in milk marketing until 1982, 
when this function was transferred to the Kerala Co­
operative Milk Marketing Federation (KCMMF) formed under 
the Operation Flood programme. The KLDMMB was left with the 
developmental functions of the old Indo-Swiss project.
The Impact of Intervention.
So far we have briefly sketched the history of 
State intervention in milk markets in Kerala from the early 
sixties to the launching of OF. The State had intervened on 
the grounds that the absence of direct links between 
producers and consumers had deprived farmers of assured 
markets and remunerative prices. In this section, an 
attempt is made to evaluate whether the intervention of the 
State to correct market distortions has achieved its 
objectives in terms of four criteria: (1) Whether the
market share of the organised sector has expanded 
significantly due to the intervention (2) whether it had 
led to increased investment in the dairy sector with a 
concomitant increase in the ability to manage seasonal 
variations (3) Whether State intervention through farmers' 
co-operatives had led to increased and remunerative prices 
for the farmers and (4) finally whether the intervention 
was cost effective.
Confidential Records of the KLDMMB.1991.
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The performance of the State sponsored 
institutions can best be analyzed through the two tables 
given below:
Table III.5 
Performance of Urban Milk Supply Schemes :1964~81.
Agency
1964-65 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81
Milk* Profit/
Loss
Milk* Profit/
Loss
Milk* Profit/
Loss
Milk* Profit/
Loss
TNS 2.91 —0.60 3.77 -0.26 3.93 -1.29 — —
CMS 2.08 -0.45 2.50 -0.70 2.52 -1.29 2.87 -.96
PLG 3.04 -0.29 1.85 -1.20 1.06 -2.50 -- --
HLP 0.73 +0.01 1.20 HA 1.20 -0.11 1.65 HA
KTM ---- ——— 0.69 -0.11 2.06 -0.39 -- --
EXM 0.65 1.56 -0.34 2.91 -1.14 --
ALP — — — — ---- 0.91 -0.25
KLDB ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -- 19.35 -3.33
All 8.41 -1.35 11.57 -2.61 14.59 -6.97 23.87 -4.29
Milk* = Milk Handled
Key to initials: TMS= Trivandrum Milk Supply Scheme, CMS= 
Calicut Milk Supply Scheme, PLG= Palghat Milk Supply 
Scheme, MLP= Malappurum Milk Supply Scheme, KTM= Kottayam 
Milk Supply Scheme, EKM= Ernakulam Milk Supply Scheme, ALP= 
Alleppey Milk Supply Scheme, KLDB= Kerala Livestock 
Development and Milk Marketing Board.
Source : "Administration Report". Various Issues.
Department of Dairy Development. CMS and MDCMSU. 
Confidential files of KLDMMB.
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Table III.6
Performance of Primary Co-operatives and Milk Supply Unions 
:1964-80.
Milk in MLPA
1964-65 1975-76 1979-80
Number of Union# 10 9 8
In Profit NA 3 2
Number of Primaries 150 521 1043
In Profit Na 239 (46%) 533 (51%)
Milk Handled(MLPA) 8.8 34.27 55.12
Total Production(MLPA) 191.06 582.52 840.78
Source; "Administration Report”. Various Issues. Department 
of Dairy Development and "Economic Review". Various issues. 
OP cit.
Table III.5 shows that the milk handled by the 
State sector schemes has been steadily rising. From 1964-65 
to 1975-76 when the KLDMMB was formed, the annual average 
growth rate was around 6.7%; from 1975-76 to 1981-82, when 
the dairies were handed over to the federation, the total 
milk handled increased by an average of 10.6% per annum. 
The milk handled by the co-operative structure as a whole, 
has also been increasing over time - from 8.8 MLPA in 1964- 
65 to 55.12 MLPA in 1979-80.
While the growth rate in absolute terms has been 
satisfactory, the real test of the efficacy of the 
intervention can be judged only on the basis of the market 
share that these state- supported institutions have 
captured over the years. Judged on the basis of total 
production, the primaries and the unions together handled 
only 4.6% of the total milk produced in Kerala in 1964-65. 
In 1975-76 this increased to 5.88% and to 6.56% by 1979- 
80.Thus, by this criterion, the organised sector has shown 
steady, but unspectacular growth.
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However, to get a clearer understanding of the 
role of the organised sector we need to look at marketed 
surplus rather than at total production figures. In 1975-76 
an NDDB study of the southern districts of Kerala showed 
that 55% of the production was being marketed. By this 
criterion the organised sector is seen to be handling 10.7% 
of the marketed surplus;by 1979-80, the share of the 
organised sector in the marketed surplus had increased to 
12.85%.^® From the above analysis we can conclude that 
while the organised sector had shown steady progress as a 
result of the active intervention of the State, nearly 88% 
of the marketed surplus in the state was still handled by 
the unorganised sector in 1979-80. Or to put it in another 
way, despite State intervention for over 15 years market 
structures had not been significantly altered in Kerala.
Our second criterion of evaluation is whether 
State intervention had resulted in significant investment 
in procurement and processing facilities with a concomitant 
increase in the ability to handle seasonal variations. In 
the beginning of the Sixties, there was no processing 
facility in the state. By 1980, a total processing capacity 
of 68,000 Lpd had been built up through the various milk 
schemes. In addition, there were a number of chilling 
centres scattered all over rural Kerala. But with an 
average capacity of only 6000 LPD,these dairies found it 
difficult to process all the milk that was procured. Thus, 
even the Trivandrum dairy which had a rated capacity of
20,000 LPD, was in 1980, operating at a capacity of 135%;^* 
a situation which makes the dairy highly vulnerable during 
the flush season.
An inter temporal analysis shows that while 
between 1960-61 and 1970-71 a capacity of 40,000 LPD was
" Dairy Development Project for the Districts of 
Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey, Kerala. 1976. o d  cit and Nair 
T.S. 1989. OP cit.
"Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of
Dairy Development, op cit.
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added, between 1970-71 and 1979-80 a further capacity of 
only 28,000 Lpd was added. As total milk production had 
jumped from 0.21 million tonnes in 1964-65 to 8.66 million 
tonnes by 1979-80, the lack of investment in processing 
constrained the ability of the organised sector to handle 
seasonal variations.
An analysis of the functioning of CMS union, 
shows that supply and demand were not in equilibrium 
throughout the period under discussion. Thus, in 1968, milk 
was in such short supply that it had actually to be 
rationed. In 1970-71, on the other hand, an enormous 
increase in supply, saw the union imposing quotas on the 
quantity of milk that each society could send to the union. 
Despite this,the increase in supply was so great that the 
union was forced to purchase the milk from the farmers and 
then dump it in the city drains, incurring great financial 
losses in the process. In 1976 and 1978, the city once 
again suffered acute shortages, and the union was forced to 
import milk from Tamilnadu at great cost. The experience 
of CMS is not unique: all the other unions were also unable 
to efficiently manage the seasonal and annual variations in 
the production and supply of milk.
Our third criterion for evaluating the State's 
intervention in markets is whether it has succeeded in 
ensuring a remunerative price for farmers. This is the 
subject for detailed analysis in Chapter VI where we shall 
be discussing the politics of pricing. It will suffice to 
give here some indication of the prices offered by the 
Trivandrum Dairy , which as we have noted was directly run 
by the State from 1967 onwards. The purchase price for milk 
during the period 1967 to 1979 is given below:
cit.
"Administration Report". Various Issues. CMS Union, op
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Table III.7
Purchase Price of Milk in Trivandrum Dairy: 1967-79
Year Purchase Price: 
Rs/litre
1967 1.11 I
1969 1.11
1973 1.13
1976 1.65
1979 1.75
Source: "Administration Report". Various Issues. 
Department of Dairy Development, op cit.
The above figures indicate that between 1967 and 
1973, the purchase price was virtually frozen. The State 
had taken direct control of the dairy in 1967 on the 
grounds that the union had mismanaged the affairs of the 
dairy and had sacrificed the interests of the farmers.^® 
The freeze on prices indicates that the priority of the 
State was the maintenance of urban milk supplies rather 
than ensuring good prices for farmers. Since the Government 
did not raise the purchase price of milk, despite numerous 
representations by farmers, they withheld supplies to the 
dairy. Thus, procurement fell from 3.77 MLPA in 1970-71 to 
2.84 MLPA in 1973-74.” Procurement picked up again only 
after the Government agreed to raise prices.
The last criterion for evaluation is whether the 
organisations created by the State are financially viable
"Administration Report". 1968. Department of Dairy 
Development. Government of Kerala.
"Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of
Dairy Development, op cit.
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and self-sustaining. Table III.5 indicates that not one 
urban milk supply scheme was operating in profit. The 
accumulated losses increased from Rs 1.35 million in 1964- 
65 to Rs 6.37 million in 1975-76 before dropping down to Rs 
4.29 in 1979-80. Table III.6 shows that of the thousand odd 
societies in existence in 1979-80, only half were 
profitable. This would indicate that the institutions 
created by the State to intervene in the market were weak 
and wholly dependent on State budgetary support both for 
their day-to-day activities and for investment. When the 
State itself began to run chronic revenue deficits it 
became increasingly difficult to continue sustaining these 
institutions.
This analysis reveals that State intervention in 
milk markets during 1960-80 had few positive impacts and a 
number of negative impacts. A positive impact was that co­
operatives gave the farmer a choice which increased his 
bargaining capacity. However, as all the co-operatives in 
Kerala, together controlled only about 12.5% of the total 
marketable surplus in 1979-80, their impact was limited. 
The financial weakness of the State sponsored institutions 
and their inability to build sufficient processing 
capacity, have, as we have seen, constrained their ability 
to manage seasonal variations. It is difficult to identify 
precisely the reasons for this litany of failures.We shall 
attempt some tentative explanations.
*° Discussion with officials of the Dairy Development 
Department.
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The State's policy initiatives in the dairy 
sector, analyzed in this chapter, clearly indicate that the 
primary objective was the maintenance of urban supplies. 
The emphasis given to this objective forced the State to 
continue market operations even while they were draining 
the treasury. Further, the State appeared to have regarded 
its market intervention efforts as development efforts 
directed to achieving the goal of increasing per capita 
consumption of milk in Kerala by ensuring availability at 
below market prices.
Since these goals were not regarded as 
commercially viable objectives, fiscal prudence and 
profitability were not important considerations for either 
policy making politicians and bureaucrats or for the 
personnel manning the dairies. This resulted in such policy 
out-comes as keeping the sales price of milk low and 
maintaining high levels of supply even as the loss per 
litre kept on increasing. Thus,the consumer bias in policy 
resulted in these institutions turning from commercial 
institutions to development organs of the State, charged 
with the responsibility of increasing milk consumption 
without a concomitant responsibility for increasing 
production through price incentives.
The State had experimented with a variety of 
organisational forms- cooperatives. State dairies and a 
company. Despite the changes in form, control was still 
highly centralised. Neither the milk unions , the State
163
dairies nor the company had any real autonomy in policy or 
even over routine decisions. Thus, apart from pricing 
policies, the Government's permission was also required for 
all investment decisions. In addition, personnel could be 
appointed and their service conditions fixed only with the 
prior sanction of the Government. In the State dairies even 
small purchases over a small fixed amount had to get the 
clearance of the Director of Dairy Development. Such
centralisation implied that field officials and dairy 
managers were neither required to exercise initiative nor 
be accountable for the performance of the units under their 
control. The erosion of the autonomy of the societies and 
the lack of accountability in the State dairies, were
factors contributing to the inefficiency that often marked 
State intervention in markets.
Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed the structure 
of milk markets in Kerala and found that despite a high 
degree of commercialisation, the market consisted of 
millions of marginal producers with a low per capita
disposable surplus.The market was dominated by petty 
traders operating with low volumes. In such markets, the 
difficulties associated with collective action have 
prevented the emergence of efficient market clearing 
institutions. To correct these imperfections of the market, 
the State intervened both directly and through State-
sponsored cooperatives. Ideological biases, as well as the
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political and personal compulsions of State officials,often 
dictated the choice of the cooperative as the preferred 
organisational form.
The nature of the intervention - centralised 
control, consumer bias and fiscal indiscipline- contributed 
to the negative impacts of the intervention overshadowing 
some positive outcomes. Thus, on the one hand. State 
intervention contributed to the establishment of a network 
of farmers' organisations all over Kerala, through which, 
despite the absence of real autonomy, farmers could still 
play a modest role in influencing policy. More importantly, 
in places where the cooperative existed, the bargaining 
power of the farmer was increased.
These positive results were, however, nullified 
by the inability of these institutions to offer 
remunerative prices to the farmers, to generate surplus 
for investment, and, above all, in their inability to match 
supply and demand. Thus, on the eve of Operation Flood, two 
decades of State intervention in milk marketing had 
achieved few tangible results. However, the entire 
responsibility for this lack of success cannot be 
attributed to the State. The interest group process within 
the cooperative institutions and the free-rider problem 
affecting all of them were major contributory factors. We 
shall refer to these issues after an examination of 
Operation Flood in Chapter IV.
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Interest Groups and Operation Flood in Kerala
Introduction
In chapter 11^ we had argued that urban interest 
groups had distorted agrarian policy to the detriment of 
farmer interests in Kerala. Food producers in particular 
had been negatively affected by State policy.In this and 
the following two chapters, we shall analyze the 
implementation of a programme that was specifically 
designed to endow farmers with the power to resist such 
external pressure. We shall show that in the context of 
Kerala's political economy, even institutions specifically 
created to protect agrarian interests are at best only 
partially successful.
The core argument that we advance here, is that 
programme outcomes can be predicted by analysing the 
exchanges between the major participants. Large rural 
development projects involving the participation of several 
agencies are often handicapped by authority structures in 
which the exercise of power is weak and diffused. Since 
these programmes inevitably have multiple objectives, a 
weak organisational structure could lead to confusion over 
goals. In these circumstances, the direction in which the 
programme evolves will depend upon which interest groups
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are able to exercise effective control over the 
organisation.
The formal powers of the various groups can be 
inferred from the organisational charts. However, in the 
process of programme implementation, groups in control of 
valuable organisational resources or occupying strategic 
positions are able to allocate more of the organisation's 
resources to themselves. In the process, goal priorities 
change and the nature of the programme is often 
fundamentally altered.
We shall illustrate the above arguments with an 
analysis of Operation Flood (OF), the national dairy 
development programme launched in Kerala in the early 
eighties. OF was designed, (See Chapter I) to endow farmers 
with the power of collective action. However, we shall 
argue that this power is diluted by two sets of factors. 
First, OF is a large and complex programme with multiple 
objectives, designed and implemented by a central agency, 
following a national plan. The multiplicity of objectives 
leads to loss of focus, while the rigidity of the 
centralised model creates distortions in programme 
implementation.
Second, the underlying objective of OF is primarily 
political. We shall argue that OF attempted to wrest the 
power to frame and implement policies in the dairy sector 
from both the federal and state governments and to confer 
it on a new techno-bureaucratic managerial class who would
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act on behalf of farmer interests. The formal 
organisational structure of OF institutions in Kerala 
reflect this political aim.
However,in the process of programme 
implementation, opposing interest groups acted in concert 
to prevent the realisation of this goal. The conflicts over 
the hidden agenda had several negative consequences. First, 
it created tensions within the organisation, which were 
skilfully exploited by interest groups opposed to the OF 
programme in Kerala. Second, a great deal of the 
organisation's resources, both managerial and financial, 
was devoted to handling these conflicts, resulting in 
diminished attention to the true aims of the programme. 
Third, powerful interest groups within the organisation 
were able to exploit the internecine conflicts to 
appropriate more of the organisation's resources to 
themselves.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The 
first section will briefly delineate the circumstances 
leading to, and the rationale for the introduction of OF in 
Kerala. In the second section we shall identify the various 
interest groups involved in the progreunme and analyze the 
implications of their different goals for the programme as 
a whole.
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SECTION I 
THE PROGRAMME
OF I aimed at augmenting urban milk supplies in 
the cities of Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The scope 
of the project was therefore considerably less than that of 
OF II, which covered almost all the provinces of India, 
including Kerala. The introduction of OF II into Kerala was 
therefore part of a nation- wide dairy development project, 
rather than a programme designed specially to meet the 
province's requirements.
The national objectives of OF can be summarised thus:
( 1 ) To enable some ten million rural milk producers ' 
families to build a viable self-sustaining dairy industry.
(2) To enable the milk producers to rear a National Milch 
Herd of some 15 million cross-bred cows and upgraded 
buffaloes.
(3) To erect the infrastructure required to support a 
viable national dairy industry such as national frozen 
semen system, vaccine production and delivery system and 
the indigenous development of dairy processing and 
conservation methods.
(4) To erect a national milk grid which will link the rural 
milk sheds to major demand centres.
(5) To achieve a per capita daily consumption of 180 grams 
of milk and milk products in the course of the Eighties.^
 ^ "Report of the Evaluation Committee on Operation Flood- 
II". 1985. OP cit.
169
To achieve the above objectives, the project 
called for the organisation of 10.20 million rural feunilies 
in about 70,000 Anand Pattern Societies(APCO)^. These 
societies would then be federated into a three-tiered 
structure, that would have APCOs at the base, district 
unions in the middle and a state dairy federation at the 
apex.
The underlying objective of this organisational 
structure, according to the programme designers, was to 
endow farmers with the capacity to manage their own 
affairs. The OF structure,therefore, claimed to possess the 
following features: (a)elected boards at society, union and 
federation levels,(b) bye-laws which guarantee that the 
organisation would be run on democratic lines and would be 
accountable to the farmers,(c) ownership of processing 
plants and other infrastructure facilities by farmer 
members and(d) autonomy in decision-making in such areas as 
pricing, marketing and the appointment of personnel.
OF had very ambitious multiple goals. First, it 
attempted to impose one particular organisational model on 
the entire dairy industry in India. Second,it aimed at 
producing a pan- Indian dairy market through the National 
Milch Herd and the National Milk Grid. Third,it hoped to 
ensure higher farm incomes by endowing farmers with the 
power of collective action. Fourth, it attempted to detach 
the power to frame dairy policy from the federal and 
provincial governments and entrust it to a techno-
 ^ ibid.
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bureaucratie organisation- the National Dairy Development 
Board (NDDB) • The policies framed by the NDDB would be 
implemented not through the traditional State-dominated 
bureaucratic organisations, but through new farmer-owned, 
technocrat-managed structures created by the programme.
OF IN KERALA
As early as 1971, politicians in Kerala had been 
agitating for the inclusion of Kerala within the aunbit of 
the programme^. However, despite persistent lobbying, 
Kerala was not included in OF I. All that Kerala was able 
to wring out of the NDDB in the mid Seventies was a report 
entitled ’’Dairy Development Project for the Districts of 
Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey.” The project, as the title 
suggests,was very limited in its scope, confined as it was 
to three districts. Even this project did not get off the 
ground, as no funds were earmarked for the project either 
by the Government of Kerala or the NDDB.
The launch of OF II, with EEC and World Bank 
assistance, enabled the NDDB to offer a more ambitious 
project to Kerala. In a letter to the Chief Minister of 
Kerala, the NDDB Chairman offered to finance three separate 
dairy projects in Kerala. The first would be in the 
Travancore region and include the districts of Trivandrum, 
Quilon and Alleppey. The second would cover the districts 
of Ernakulam, Kottayam, Idukki and Trichur. The third
3 In a speech at the All India Dairy Conference held on 
February 8, 1971, the Minister for Co-operation and Agriculture, 
regretted the non- inclusion of Kerala in OF I and expressed the 
hope that the province would be included in the next phase of the 
programme. See: The Kerala Co-operative Journal. February, 1971.
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project would be in Malabar and would cover the districts 
of Cannanore, Kozhikode, Malappuram and Palghat.
The three projects together was estimated to 
cost Rs 105.65 million.* Funding for the projects was from 
two sources.The two projects in south and central Kerala 
would be funded directly by the NDDB using OF funds,while 
the Malabar project was to be funded by the Swiss 
Development Corporation (SDC)^. All the projects were to be 
implemented over seven years, starting in July 1978 and 
ending in June 1985.
The project planners gave themselves êunbitious 
targets as can be seen from the following table:
TABLE IV.1
Physical Targets of OF in Kerala:1979*85.
Trivandrum Ernakulam Kozhikode Total
Number of Societies 880 920 519 2319
No: Farmer Members 129,000 134,400 75,000 338,000
Incremental Processing Capacity(LPD) 220,000 160,000 125,000 505,000
Source: (1) "Operation Flood II, Dairy Development Project 
for Kerala". Indian Dairy Corporation. April 1980.
(2) "Swiss Aided Dairy Development Project in Cannanore 
District". NDDB. February 1980.
* Letter dated 1/6/78 from V. Kurien, Chairman, NDDB to A.K 
Antony, Chief Minister of Kerala. Confidential Records of the 
Chairman, NDDB. 1991.
 ^ The Swiss aided project is formally known as the North 
Kerala Dairy Development Project (NKDP). Though the funding 
pattern is different, the project is the exact replica of the OF 
project being implemented in south and central Kerala. Therefore, 
for our purpose, we are not making any distinctions between OF 
and NKDP. We would regard the entire dairy development project 
in Kerala as OF.
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We may recall (Chapter II above) that by 1979-80, 
there were already about 955 dairy societies with a total 
membership of 178,000. The new project proposed to double 
this figure. The most ambitious part of the project, 
however,was the proposed investment in processing capacity. 
The sheer scale of the effort can be gauged from the fact 
that in the twenty years from 1960 to 1980, the Government 
of Kerala had created a total processing capacity of only
68,000 Lpd. OF on the other hand,proposed to create in just 
seven years, an additional processing capacity of 505,000 
Lpd. In addition, the NDDB also proposed to invest in a new 
cattle feed plant, a cheese processing plant and a five 
tonne milk powder plant.
OF, thus, constitutes an intervention on a 
massive scale designed to alter dairy markets in Kerala 
significantly. It is different from past interventions both 
in its scale and nature and in the organisational changes 
that it sought to introduce.
Transforming the Technical Base of the Industry
Analysis of the investment pattern reveals a very 
heavy bias towards processing and marketing:
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TABLE IV.2
Summary of Projected and Actual Cost Estimates of 
OF in Kerala: 1980-91.
(Rs in millions)
Pattern of Investment 1980
Projected*
March 1991 
Actual
Investment in 
Processing & 
Marketing
118.34
(69.4%)
196.4
(88%)
Production Enhancement 
Programmes
29.12
(17.07%)
9.76
(4.39%)
Training and Project 
Implementation
23.09
(13.53%)
16.46
(7.61%)
Total 170.55* 222.62
Projected** This was the estimate prepared for the period 
1979-85.
Note: figures in brackets denote percentage to total cost. 
Source:(1) "OF II, Dairy Development Project for Kerala", 
op cit.
(2) Confidential records of the Kerala Co-operative Milk 
Marketing Federation (KCMMF).
The bias in favour of processing and marketing is 
striking. What is more significant is that in the process 
of implementation, the percentage of expenditure on this 
sector increased by nearly 20%, while investment that would 
directly enhance milk production declined by over 12%. 
This skewed investment pattern in the project estimates, 
reflects the priorities of the NDDB. The increased
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expenditure on processing and marketing, during 
implementation reflects the ability of powerful interest 
groups within the organisation to allocate resources to 
themselves.
It is undeniable that OF transformed the 
technical base of the dairy industry in Kerala. Prior to 
OF, the dairy plants in Kerala were small with an average 
processing capacity of only 6000 Lpd. The biggest dairy 
plant in the province, the Ernakulam dairy, had an 
installed capacity of only 10,000 Lpd. In contrast, the new 
dairy at Ernakulam has an installed capacity of 100,000 
Lpd.In addition, it is equipped to produce and store milk 
products such as butter and cream. The Alleppey dairy has 
installed sophisticated Aseptic packaging machines capable 
of processing 3500, 200 ml packets of UHT (ultra heat
treated) milk per hour. This APS (Aseptic Packaging 
Station), is only one of four such stations in South India 
and its commissioning in 1989 represents for Kerala, a 
quantum leap in dairy processing technology.
Both in the size of the new processing units and 
the sophisticated nature of the technology employed, OF w ô y c - 
a significant departure from past interventions. The 
changes in the technical base of the dairy industry was to 
have a significant impact in a number of related areas.
First, the large capacity of the new dairy plants 
required elaborate procurement machinery. A comparative 
analysis of the Trivandrum Regional Milk Producers' 
Union(TRCMPÜ) and the Calicut Milk Supply Union(CMS), the
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largest of the pre-OF unions, will give some idea of the 
structural changes that OF was imposing on the traditional 
dairy industry in Kerala.
The CMS Union, on average procured 15,700 Lpd in 
1988-89. The TRCMPU, on the other hand, procured 93,000 Lpd 
in 1988. The CMS union procured milk from 47 societies, 
while TRCMPU procured from nearly 500 societies in four 
districts. The size of the catchment area and the sheer 
volume of milk, necessitated the creation of a large 
procurement network involving chilling centres, road milk 
tankers and a large number of milk procurement trucks. As 
OF's declared aim is to capture 70% of the urban milk 
markets in Kerala, it is obvious that the already large 
procurement system will have to be further augmented. In 
fact, confidential records in the apex federation indicate 
that the programme coordinators visualise that an 
additional 90,000 Lpd of chilling capacity will have to be 
created to satisfy the requirements of the large processing 
plants.
The elaborate procurement and marketing network 
visualised by OF has three implications. First, given the 
low net marketable surplus of Kerala's dairy farmers, milk 
procurement systems have to be necessarily extensive. With 
each farmer producing only a few litres of marketable 
surplus, each society had an average procurement of around 
200 Lpd*. This meant that as potentially rich milk 
producing areas were covered, new societies had to be
* Records of KCMMF. 1991.
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organised in more and more marginal areas. This has 
increased the unit cost of procurement as transport 
networks were extended further away from the processing and 
marketing centres.
Second, the large capacity and the sophisticated 
nature of the procurement and processing systems required 
heavy inputs of capital. Though the original OF project 
contemplated a total investment of only Rs 105.65 million, 
the latest calculations indicate that the total cost would 
be around RS 350.65 million’. Third, the sophisticated 
nature of the technology meant that the organisation was 
required to maintain a large pool of highly skilled and 
trained personnel both in the managerial and non managerial 
cadres.
Changes in the Organisational Structure
The proposed transformation of the 
institutional framework of the dairy industry was even more 
radical than the technical changes that we have analyzed 
above. Prior to OF, societies were organised first at the 
village level. Some of the societies, over a period of 
time, gradually evolved into district unions. The 
Malappuram union(See Chapter III), started as a primary 
society in 1951 and became a district union only in 1971. 
Traditional pre- OF structures, though creatures of the 
State, were nevertheless organisations that evolved in 
response to local requirements. OF structures, in contrast,
’ ibid.
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were imposed from above in accordance with a pre-determined 
plan.
The plan called for a three tiered structure with 
the APCOS at the base, three regional unions in the middle 
and the Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing
Federation(KCMMF) at the apex. This structure was 
significantly different from the existing dairy 
institutions in Kerala. First, there were major differences 
in the functions and structure of the APCOS. Second, 
instead of the small district unions of the pre-OF 
period,OF had very large regional unions. Third, There was 
no single apex organisation that coordinated dairy policy 
in the pre-OF period. All the district unions were 
answerable only to the State, while the KLDMMB controlled 
only a few dairies in south Kerala.
Through a comparative analysis of pre-OF and OF 
institutions,we shall indicate below the nature of the 
changes that OF proposed to make and their implications:
(A) Primary Societies.
The differences between OF(APCOS) and pre-OF 
societies can best be analyzed by grouping them into two 
broad categories: (1) Membership Requirements and (2)
Procurement and Marketing Systems.
1. Membership Requirements.
The APCO bye-laws provide that only an adult 
person who possesses a milch animal and "who during the 120 
days previous to the date of application had poured milk
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for at least 90 days" can become a member. To ensure that 
having become a member, he/she continues to be a dairy 
farmer, the bye-laws provide that if a member does not pour 
500 litres of milk or does not supply milk for a total of
180 days during the previous year, he/she loses many of
his/her rights including the right to vote and stand for 
office. These provisions were designed to ensure that non 
farmers are prevented from joining and subsequently taking 
over the society.
Pre- OF societies, however did not have any such 
requirements. Though any local resident, whether he is a 
farmer or not, can become a member, voting rights are 
restricted to those who supply milk to the society. But 
since the bye-laws do not demand the conditionalities 
mentioned above, it is far easier for non farmers to take 
over a traditional society than an APCO.
2. Procurement and Marketing Systems.
The most significant changes have been introduced
in procurement and marketing. Several such changes can be
distinguished. First, dairy societies are notoriously prone 
to free rider problems. They tend to starve dairies of milk 
during the lean season and dump their excess milk on them 
during the flush. The APCO system was designed to overcome 
the free rider problem. They were expected only to procure 
milk and after retaining 20% of it for local sales, had to 
send the balance to the dairies. APCOS were thus only 
procurement centres in the OF design. But pre-OF societies
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were both procurement and marketing systems with less 
dependence on a centralised procurement and distribution 
network•
Second, the area of operation of OF and pre-OF 
societies were radically different. APCOS, reflecting their 
origin in the small villages of north India, were confined 
to small geographically compact areas. The pre-OF 
societies, reflecting the dispersed settlement pattern of 
Kerala, had extensive boundaries often covering several 
villages.
B Regional Unions
The programme called for the creation of three 
regional unions : The Trivandrum Regional Milk Producers' 
Union(TRCMPU), the Ernakulam Regional Milk Producers' 
Union(ERCMPU) and the Malabar Regional Milk Producers' 
Union(MRCMPU) based at Calicut.These unions performed by 
and large the same functions that the pre-OF unions 
performed, namely, the collection and distribution of milk. 
In addition, the new institutions took on the 
responsibility of distributing a variety of inputs such as 
subsidized cattle feed, veterinary care and fodder seeds. 
Thus, functionally, the new organisations were not too 
radically different from existing structures; but the scale 
on which they were organised was vastly different and this 
had a significant impact on the whole programme.
We had observed, that prior to the introduction 
of OF there were nine milk unions corresponding to the
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original nine districts in Kerala. OF proposed to compress 
the nine unions into the three regional unions.Such 
compression resulted in the creation of three super unions 
with enormous resources at their command. A comparative 
analysis of the number of societies affiliated to the 
various pre-OF unions and those affiliated to the OF unions 
is revealing:
TABLE IV.3
Number of Societies Affiliated to District and Regional 
Unions: 1969-70 & 1993.
Pre-OF Unions No:of Societies 
1969-70
OF Unions No: of
Societies
Proposed
Trivandrum 88
TRCMPU 880
Quilon 31
Alleppey 19
Kottayam 38
ERCMPU 920
Ernakulam 23
Trichur 21
Palghat 44
MRCMPU 519
Malappurum 20
Kozhikode 47
Cannanore 25
Source: "Administration Report". Various Issues. Department 
of Dairy Development, op cit and confidential records of 
KCMMF.
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The above table indicates that the proposed 
intermediate structures were huge organisations several 
times the size of the existing ones. This can lead to 
ambiguous outcomes in two crucial areas.First, there is 
asymmetry in the relationship between the regional unions 
and the affiliated societies. The small size of the pre-OF 
unions facilitated constant exchange of views and frequent 
consultations between them and their member societies. For 
instance between 1986 and 1990,the CMS union called over 10 
general body meetings of its affiliated societies; but 
during the same period, the TRCMPU called only 4 such 
meetings®. The constant consultations ensure that member 
societies have considerable access to decision makers. 
Thus, while the size of the OF unions confers on them the 
power to dominate markets, this is achieved at the cost of 
losing some degree of democratic control.
There is also asymmetry in the relationship 
between the regional unions and the apex federation. For 
reasons we shall analyze below, the institutional design 
deliberately strengthened the regional unions at the 
expense of the apex federation. Almost all the major 
activities of the programme including the organisation of 
societies, the distribution of inputs, the 
procurement,processing and marketing of milk, and the 
distribution of financial incentives to farmers and member 
societies are done by the unions. The apex federation has
® Minutes of the Board meetings of the CMS Union and TRCMPU: 
1985-91.
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only the functions of coordination and overseeing the 
construction of the new processing plants.This exclusion of 
the apex federation, which, after all, is the nominal head 
of the organisation, from all executive authority was to 
create considerable tension within the organisation. These 
tensions significantly altered the direction in which the 
programme evolved in Kerala.
The second area in which organisation size was to 
have serious consequences was in personnel policy. The huge 
size of the OF institutions and the varied and 
sophisticated nature of their activities demanded the 
maintenance of a large number of skilled personnel. A 
comparative analysis of the staff structure of the CMS 
union and the proposed structure for TRCMPU is 
illuminating. The chief executive officer of CMS was its 
secretary, and he had under him less than half a dozen 
officers. TRCMPU on the other hand had over 60 different 
categories of officers and workers including a Managing 
Director, a General Manager, senior managers, managers and 
numerous categories of executive officers.
The officer to worker ratio was 1:33 for the CMS 
union in 1989*. This would indicate that much of the 
activities of the union did not call for highly trained 
personnel. However, in TRCMPU, the ratio increased from 1 
officer for every 7.06 workers in 1986 when the union was
* Confidential records of the CMS union.1991.
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formed to 1: 5.76 in 1991^°. Apparently, the union required 
far more trained personnel than the CMS union to start with 
and as the progreunme evolved* the bias in favour of highly 
skilled personnel seemed to be getting stronger.
Confirmation of this bias can be obtained by 
analysing the recruitment pattern in TRCMPU between 1986 
and 1991. The analysis reveals that whereas the recruitment 
of workers went up by only 13%, that of officers went up by 
44% Most of the officers recruited during this period, 
had advanced qualifications such as veterinary and 
engineering degrees and MBAs.The presence of a large body 
of young and formally well educated officers had, as we 
shall show, profound implications for the direction in 
which the programme was evolving in Kerala.
C. The Apex Federation.
Under OF I the necessity for an apex federation 
was not envisaged. However, with the launching of OF II, 
the impossibility of the NDDB directly organising milk 
unions all over India soon became apparent. Hence, 
provincial level federations were created with the limited 
objective of organising the milk unions and overseeing the 
construction of the new processing plants. Once these 
preliminary functions were completed, the apex federation 
was expected to transfer all its powers to the intermediate
Confidential records of TRCMPU. 1991. 
ibid.
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organisations and confine itself to coordinating dairy 
policy.
This organisational design (see below) was 
primarily motivated by political considerations, which 
demanded a weak organisational structure where the nominal 
head - the apex federation-would be dependent on its 
subordinate agencies. But having once exercised power, the 
apex federation was disinclined to commit organisational 
suicide. The resultant tensions within the organisation was 
exploited by external agencies to the detriment of the 
programme.
We can now summarise the discussion on the structures 
that OF proposed to create in Kerala. First, we have seen 
that APCOS were designed to overcome the deficiencies of 
the pre-OF societies. Through rigid entry requirements, it 
sought to prevent the societies from being taken over by 
non-farmer interests.Second, we have noted that the 
intermediate structures created by OF were far more complex 
organisations than the earlier milk unions. Third, in place 
of the segmented market served by local milk unions, OF 
attempted to create a pan-Kerala market served by a pan- 
Kerala organisation,which, in turn,was part of a national 
organisation. Thus,though the avowed objective of OF was to 
wrest power from centralised State agencies and confer them 
on an autonomous farmers' organisation, the model that the 
programme adopted was rigidly centralised both in its 
design and implementation.
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The Rationale for OF in Kerala.
Given the size and scope of the intervention,it 
is relevant to question the rationale for the OF programme 
in Kerala. Despite two decades of sustained State 
intervention, dairy markets were still imperfect in Kerala. 
Markets could not cope with lean and flush variations while 
resource constraints limited the ability of the State to 
invest further in the dairy sector. It can therefore be 
argued that intervention by an external agency was 
necessary.
However, the nature of milk markets in Kerala 
posed serious obstacles to the implementation of a massive 
project such as OF. The marketable surplus of the Kerala 
dairy farmer is,as we have observed, very low. A recent 
study has indicated that of all the major provinces of 
India, Kerala has the highest percentage of households 
owing only one milch animal. In Kerala, 68.7% of the dairy 
households possess only one animal, while the corresponding 
All-India figure is 44.9%. Conversely, as against the All- 
India average of 13.6%, only 2.2% of dairy farmers in 
Kerala possess more than 4 milch animals .
These figures confirm the belief that the dairy 
sector in Kerala, though highly commercialised, operates on 
very low marketable surpluses. Even within the province, 
there are major differences. An NDDB study in 1980 found 
that while the density of milk production per square
" Base Line Study of Operation Flood Areas: 1988-89".
1990. OP cit.
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kilometre of geographical area was 59 LPD in south 
Kerala, it was only 29 LPD in north Kerala". These 
characteristics of the dairy industry were well known to 
the NDDB team who prepared the project report on OF in 
Kerala. In confidential interviews to the author, the 
members of this team admitted that they did not find 
adequate milk potential in Kerala to sustain a major dairy 
development programme" (author's italics).
A second major obstacle to the OF pattern is the 
increased consumption of milk in rural Kerala. A 
comparative analysis of consumption expenditure on milk and 
milk products shows that rural consumption had increased 
sharply in Kerala in the course of the Seventies:
TABLE IV.4
Average Monthly Expenditure on Milk and Milk Products-Rural 
Expenditure as Percentage of Urban Expenditure: 1972-78.
India Kerala
1972-73 1977-78 1972-73 1977-78
54.5% 57.8% 49.7% 70.6%
Source: Sarvekshana: Vol:II(3), January 1979; Vol:IX (3). 
Quoted in Nair K.N and Dhas A.C:" Social Implications of 
the Commercialisation of Milk Products in India." Centre 
for Development Studies. No date.
" " Swiss Aided Dairy Project in Cannanore Milk shed". 
NDDB. Anand. 1980.
Interviews with the members of the original project 
planning team at Madras and Bangalore. April. 1991.
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The above figures indicate that while at the All 
India level, rural expenditure as a percentage of urban 
expenditure had hardly increased, in Kerala it had 
increased by more than 20%. This would indicate that rural 
demand for milk was fast catching up with urban demand. 
This is primarily because purchasing power is diffused in 
Kerala.A district-wise analysis of per capita income shows 
that there is little difference between the incomes of the 
primarily rural districts and the more industrialised 
districts. For instance, Idukki, which is largely rural had 
a per capita income of Rs 2006 in 1989, as against a highly 
industrialised district- Ernakulam's income of Rs 
1899^*.Taken together, low marketable surplus and high 
rural demand is problematic for any programme that based 
its central strategy on feeding urban centres through the 
extraction of large volumes of milk from high- productive, 
low-consumption rural areas.
A third major constraint is the paucity of feed 
and fodder resources in Kerala.A study conducted in 1983 
estimated that Kerala requires six million tonnes of 
roughage per annum. But the available stock is only about 
3.85 million t o n n e s . S i n c e  the report was prepared, the 
availability of paddy straw, which constitutes the bulk of 
the roughage has further declined. Kerala is also acutely 
deficient in concentrates. Various experts have estimated
15 IIEconomic Review". 1990. o p  cit.
See Shivanandan P.K : " Milk Production in Kerala- An 
Analysis in the context of Operation Flood." Centre for 
Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1983.
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that between 70% to 80% of the province's requirements are 
imported from outside^. Increased commercialisation of the 
dairy industry under OF is bound to aggravate the mismatch 
between supply and demand.
The foregoing discussion indicates that Kerala 
did not have any of the comparative advantages necessary 
for mounting a dairy programme on the scale of OF. It had 
a poor resource base and low marketable surplus while the 
rural demand for milk was high. These factors were known to 
the highest policy makers of NDDB. The Chairman of NDDB in 
an interview with the author conceded that while finalising 
the OF project report, the NDDB had initially come to the 
conclusion that Kerala was unsuitable for being included in 
the programme^" (author's italics).
However, despite the unfavourable conditions and 
the scepticism evinced by the NDDB,from the planning team 
to the Chairman himself, OF was launched in Kerala.The 
explanations offered by the key actors are not entirely 
convincing. The Chairman of NDDB argued that it was the 
enthusiasm of the then Agriculture Minister, K.R Gouri, 
that finally convinced him to fund the project in Kerala.^® 
The former Chief Secretary of Kerala during whose tenure.
No firm figures are available regarding the extent to 
which Kerala is dependent on external markets for concentrate 
feed. Nair K.N, calculated that over 80% of the requirement is 
imported from outside. See:" Cattle Development in Kerala- Trends 
and Prospects". Economic and Political Weeklv. Vol:XXV. No:36. 
1990. The KCMMF's estimate is marginally lower at 70%. 
Confidential records of KCMMF. 1991.
“ Interview with V. Kurien. Chairman. NDDB. Anand 22/7/91.
" ibid
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as Commissioner for Economic Development, the programme was 
launched in Kerala, suggested that chronic milk shortages 
forced the government to approach the NDDB to fund the 
project While these explanations may have a kernel of 
truth, they surely do not explain how a major dairy project 
came to be launched in a province that apparently had such 
negative potential.
The availability of cheap finance is one valid 
explanation. The chronology of the implementation of OF in 
Kerala gives credence to this argument. We have observed 
earlier, that despite preparing a project report in the 
Seventies, the NDDB made no move to finance a dairy project 
in Kerala, until funds were made available by the World 
Bank and the EEC in the late Seventies. Even then, the 
programme was confined to south Kerala with its markedly 
greater potential than north Kerala. However, when the SDC 
offered to finance a dairy project in Malabar in the early 
eighties, OF was extended to north Kerala. Thus, the 
expansion of the project from a small dairy programme 
confined to the three districts of south Kerala to one 
covering all 14 districts appears to have been 
significantly influenced by the availability of external 
funding.However, this is but a partial explanation. We 
would argue that more fundamental reasons were responsible 
for the designing and the subsequent launching of a
Interview with V Ramachandran, former Chief Secretary to 
Government of Kerala. Madras. 2/4/1991.
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project, which at first sight had little chance of 
succeeding.
SECTION II 
Interest Groups and Operation Flood.
The various interest groups involved in the 
implementation of OF were: 1. The national technocracy as 
represented by the NDDB. 2. The State elites as represented 
by council of ministers and the higher bureaucracy. 3. The 
dairy bureaucracy as represented by the officers and staff 
of the Dairy Development Department. 4. The co-operative 
elites as represented by the leaders of the Kerala 
Societies Association and the leaders of the various milk 
unions. 5. The organised labour force in the dairy 
industry.
l.The National Technocracy.
The NDDB and its sister organisation, the IDC, 
were set up by the Government of India with the specific 
objective of implementing OF. Following the report of the 
Jha committee in 1985,the two organisations were merged 
into a reconstituted NDDB. Though set up on government 
initiative, the NDDB has complete autonomy in staffing and 
investment decisions.Its access to and autonomy in dealing 
with external financial institutions is also unmatched by 
other public institutions in India^\ Further, the
For a discussion on the NDDB, See George S. 1985. o p  cit 
and Gertsch L .1990. o p  cit.
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Government of India has ceded to the NDDB a great deal of 
its policy making power in the dairy sector.
The explicit aim of the NDDB as spelt out in their 
various appraisal reports, is to increase milk production 
in Kerala and thereby increase farm incomes. However, our 
analysis of the investment pattern in the previous section, 
revealed that the NDDB was far more concerned with 
increasing urban milk supplies than increasing rural milk 
production. The detailed project report makes this clear 
when it states that " the target is to capture 70% of the 
urban milk markets by the final phase of the project". 
This emphasis on building up processing capacity and 
underplaying production enhancement programmes was based on 
two assumptions. First, since the Government of Kerala had 
already spent considerable resources on increasing 
production, there was no necessity for the NDDB also to 
spend in this sector. The second assumption was the belief 
widely held in the NDDB, that once markets were found for 
their produce, farmers will automatically produce more. 
However, behind these well articulated beliefs, it is not 
difficult to expose the hidden bias in this orientation. 
Processing and marketing are, after all, activities 
performed by trained technocrats, whereas production is 
carried on by millions of marginal dairy farmers. It is 
therefore rational to expect that the investment pattern
22 "Operation Flood II: Sub project detailing for Kerala." 
No Date, op cit.
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would reflect the priorities of the technocrats rather than 
that of the producers.
The implicit aims of the NDDB are far more 
difficult to decipher. We shall however advance the 
hypothesis that the underlying rationale for the OF 
programme in Kerala was political rather than economic. The 
NDDB believed that for far too long, the State had 
dominated policy making and programme implementation in the 
dairy sector, to the detriment of the interests of the 
farmers. OF aimed at de-emphasising this role by creating 
farmers' organisations which would be insulated from State 
interference. The presence of a national technocracy with 
the necessary know-how and financial clout,it was believed, 
would constrain the ability of the State to adversely 
affect farmer interests.
These ideas have been given the status of a 
governing ideology by V Kurien, the Chairman of NDDB. In an 
interview with the author in July 1991, V Kurien emphasised 
the necessity for the creation of what he called "parallel 
democratic structures". He was of the opinion that the 
existing democratic structures- the party system and the 
government- were dominated by shortsighted political 
leaders and career civil servants who had appropriated the 
bulk of the nation's resources for their own use.^^ Co-
23 At the time I met him, V. Kurien was particularly angry 
with the bureaucracy. It appeared that for the first time a full 
secretary had been appointed in Delhi to frame and co-ordinate 
dairy policy in India. The Chairman took this as a personal 
affront as the NDDB had been setting the national agenda for 
dairy development for more than two decades. He apparently 
thought that the government was trying to recapture the territory 
it had lost to the NDDB.
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operative institutions, he thought, could offer a viable 
alternative to the existing party system in mobilising the 
Indian peasantry for collective action. He believed that it 
was the historic mission of the NDDB to create institutions 
that would endow them with necessary financial and 
organisational power to wrest their due share of the 
nation's resources.
Dr Kurien's vision of empowering the Indian 
peasantry essentially consisted of creating an 
organisational structure owned by farmers, but controlled 
by technocrats and from which the State would be carefully 
excluded. The strategy to exclude the State consisted of 
two parts: one long term and the other short term.
The long term strategy was to dilute the de jure 
control that the State exercised over the co-operatives in 
India. Co-operatives in India are largely the products of 
deliberate policy initiative by the State. Over the years, 
a plethora of rules and regulations have evolved to control 
and direct the activities of a co-operative from its 
inception. The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act of 1969, 
for instance, is an elaborate document, which prescribes 
among other things, the rules and procedures by which a co­
operative may be registered, what its area of operation can 
be, how its bye-laws are to be prepared, how they are to be 
amended; detailed guidelines on how director boards are to 
be constituted, how the day to day activities of the 
society is to be carried on and how the profits are to be 
disposed of.
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However, the most troubling aspects of the Act 
are the powers of the Registrar of Co-operatives. Four 
provisions of the Act are especially noteworthy. First, the 
Registrar has the power to refuse a society registration, 
if in his opinion, the society is not engaged in ”sound 
business".This confers enormous discretion on the Registrar 
to decide what is sound business and what is not. Second, 
even if a society is not willing to amend its bye-laws, the 
Registrar, through an executive direction can amend the 
bye-laws suo motto. This power confers on the Registrar the 
ability to alter the basic characteristics of a society 
without the consent of the members.
Third, society presidents can stand for higher 
elective office only if their society is given a good 
classification by the audit inspectors of the Co-operative 
department. Since they are subordinate officers of the 
Registrar, audit classification can be influenced by the 
Registrar, giving him enormous powers to decide who can 
stand for higher office. Fourth, Section 32 of the Kerala 
Co-operative Act, provides that the Registrar may dismiss 
an elected committee, if in his opinion it acts against the 
interests of the society or "wilfully disobeys or wilfully 
fails to comply with any lawful order or direction issued 
under the Act or rules" by the Registrar. In other words an 
elected committee can be dismissed if the Registrar comes 
to the conclusion that it has disobeyed him.
It is clear that the Registrar has enormous 
powers to decide whether a society needs to be registered,
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what its activities should be, who should be elected to run 
it and finally whether he/she should be permitted to 
continue running it. The Registrar, though a statutory 
official under the Act, is a transferable government 
official. So, a great deal of pressure is often brought on 
him to manipulate co-operative structures for the short­
term political advantage of the ruling party. Over the 
years, the NDDB has lobbied hard, both at the national and 
provincial levels, to circumscribe these discretionary 
powers of the Registrar by amending existing Acts. However, 
the amendment of acts of Parliament is necessarily a 
lengthy process.
The short term strategy, therefore,has been to 
ensure that policy making in, and operational control of 
the dairy industry is removed from the State.The NDDB 
sought to achieve this objective through three strategies. 
It demanded that all the assets owned by the State in the 
dairy industry should be turned over to the new OF 
institutions.By clause II of the agreement signed between 
the Government of Kerala and the NDDB, the state government 
agreed to " transfer to the co-operative
institutions...........  such dairy plants, chilling
facilities and other assets for milk production- 
enhancement belonging to the State Government and/or 
agencies controlled by the State Government and located in 
the Project Area"/** The agreement further stated that the
" Agreement between the Government of Kerala and the 
Indian Dairy Corporation". Government Order: G.O(P) No. 183/79/AD.
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State should entrust the OF organisations with the 
responsibility of providing various services such as 
artificial insemination, vaccination and transfer of 
technical information, currently performed by the various 
State departments. In the discussions following the signing 
of the agreement, the NDDB Chairman implicitly called for 
the abolition of the State departments of Dairy Development 
and Animal Husbandry.
The second strategy was to ensure that once the 
existing functions were taken over, the State was not 
permitted, at a subsequent date, to reappropriate the 
powers it had already conceded. To ensure this, the 
agreement expressly forbids the State to start any new 
dairy institution that would pose a threat to OF.^ The 
State was also required to promise that it would not 
interfere with the autonomy of the OF institutions, 
especially in such areas as pricing,investment and 
personnel policy. The sub-text in this agreement was that
Agriculture (Animal Husbandry) Department. Government of Kerala. 
Trivandrum. Dated 7/4/79. P:3.
In a discussion with the Minister for Agriculture on 
13/10/1980 at Anand, V Kurien said that since the apex
federation had now come into being, the functioning of other 
agencies such as the KLDMMB, the departments of Animal Husbandry 
and Dairy Development "should be so coordinated that the
responsibility of dairy development and animal husbandry remain 
restricted only to the federation in its area of operation". This 
was the diplomatic way of demanding the abolition of the 
departments in question. "Summary record of discussions held 
between K R Gouri, Minister for Agriculture and Social Welfare, 
Government of Kerala, and Dr: Kurien, Chairman NDDB ". October 
1980. Anand.
"Agreement between the Government of Kerala and Indian 
Dairy Corporation ". 1979. o p  cit.
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if the State violated its conditions, the NDDB would 
restrict the flow of funds under the programme. Taken 
together, the provisions of the agreement amount to a 
significant diminution of the State's power. However, the 
NDDB was still apprehensive about the genuineness of the 
State's commitment to the autonomy of institutions. It 
feared that once all the funds have been disbursed, the 
State might attempt to reestablish control.
Therefore, the third strategy was to prevent this 
by designing OF institutions in such a manner as to 
minimise the government's role in them. The first task was 
to limit the number of government nominees on the Board of 
the apex federation. The first board constituted in January 
1980, consisted of 4 government officials and one 
representative of the NDDB. By 1984, the NDDB had succeeded 
in limiting the number of government representatives to 
four in a board which now had a strength of 15 (9
representatives of "farmers", two nominees of the NDDB, the 
MD, who is usually a government official and three other 
nominees of the state government).
In addition to reducing the number of government 
representatives on the Board, the NDDB also designed the 
organisational structure in such a way as to ensure that 
effective power is exercised by the intermediate 
structures. We have noted that all the major activities 
involved in the programme,including the organisations of 
societies, the supply of subsidized inputs and the 
collection, processing and marketing of milk was performed
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by the regional unions. In addition, the apex federation 
was denied the power to raise resources. Day to day 
expenses were to be met out of the contributions made by 
the regional unions. Bereft of executive authority and 
denied financial autonomy, the apex federation was designed 
to play a limited role of coordinating dairy policy.
This institutional design of empowering the 
intermediate structures at the expense of the apex 
federation was part of the strategy of limiting the 
influence of the State over OF institutions.The NDDB 
calculated that apex institutions are more susceptible to 
a take over by the State than intermediate structures. Apex 
institutions are usually located at provincial headquarters 
near the centre of State power. Moreover, nominees of the 
State to the apex board will usually be senior bureaucrats, 
such as a Secretary to Government and departmental heads 
who carry considerable clout. They are more liable to 
overawe co-operative leaders than the comparatively junior 
officials who are usually nominated to the boards of the 
regional unions.
The State nominees to the apex federation consist of the 
Secretary to the Department of Animal Husbandry, Registrar of Co­
operatives- both IAS officers, and a Joint Secretary from the 
finance department.In addition, the MD of the apex federation is 
usually another IAS officer.On the other hand the government 
nominees to the board of ERCMPU consisted of two junior officials 
of the Co-operative and Dairy Development departments. In the 
highly hierarchical State structures of Kerala, these officials 
enjoy much less prestige and power than the officers nominated 
to the apex federation. Consequently, co-operative elites and the 
technocracy enjoy greater relative power in the intermediate 
organisation.
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The exclusion of the State from decision-making 
forums did not mean the automatic empowerment of the 
farmers or their representatives. OF institutions were 
designed to be farmer-owned, but technocrat-managed.The 
NDDB sought to ensure the primacy of the technocracy 
through two key committees : the programme committee and the 
personnel committee. The programme committee is organised 
at the apex federation level and its primary function is to 
co-ordinate the activities of the various regional unions. 
To ensure that the technocracy remains in effective control 
of the progreunme, the bye-laws provided that the committee 
should consist only of technocrats.
The personnel committee had enormous strategic 
significance. These committees recruited the key personnel, 
decided promotions, pay scales and related service matters. 
It was, therefore, important to the NDDB that this 
committee should not be dominated by any other interest 
group. The composition of these committees was carefully 
chosen. The personnel committee of the federation for 
instance, consisted of the following:the Chairman of the 
Federation; a representative each of the State and the 
NDDB; and the MD of the federation. This composition meant 
that given the NDDB's control over financial resources,only 
a coalition of disparate interest groups could prevent the 
technocracy from exercising de facto control in the 
committee.
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2.State Elites.
We had noted in the previous section, that the 
Government of Kerala had been pressing for the inclusion of 
Kerala in the OF programme since the early Seventies. 
Interviews with key civil servants connected with the 
programme reveal that the government was motivated by three 
sets of considerations:^®
First, urban consumer groups were increasingly 
critical of the chronic milk shortages in the urban centres 
of Kerala. A study by Nair T.S, showed that milk markets 
which were in equilibrium during the sixties, had by the 
late seventies suffered from severe distortions:
Table IV.5
Estimated Demand for Milk in Kerala:1964~65 & 1977-78
Year Production Demand
1964-65 204,000 204,000
1977-78 702,000 870,000
Source: Nair T.S: 1988. op cit.
The disequilibrium was more severe in Trivandrum 
and Calicut cities, where the shortages were a source of 
great embarrassment to the government. In Calicut, 
consumers had to book several days in advance if they 
wanted milk in excess of their daily quota. A survey
®^ Interview with V Ramachandran, former Chief Secretary to 
Government of Kerala. Madras. 2/4/1991
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conducted immediately prior to the extension of the OF 
programme to Calicut, showed that while the city had an 
effective demand of about 97,000 Lpd, the CMS union was 
able to supply only about 25,000 Lpd \  The balance was 
met irregularly by the informal sector.The pressure on the 
State to solve the shortages was acute, as ministers were 
subject to increasing criticism in the press and the 
legislature.^
The second consideration was the potential that 
OF held for ameliorating Kerala's unemployment problem. 
Shivanandan P.K estimated that the programme would create 
direct employment of about 2500 persons and generate 
additional indirect employment of 125,000 man days at an 
incremental cost of RS 1600 per man day.^
Third, the government believed that the Animal 
Husbandry section was the key to the revival of the entire
" Marketing Plan for Augmenting Liquid Milk Sales in 
Calicut". KCMMF. 1988.
In an interview to the author on 2/4/1991, the former 
Chief Secretary to the government, admitted that milk shortages 
was an overriding concern with the government, while agreeing to 
the OF programme.
Shivanandan P.K 1983. op cit. ( A former Managing 
Director of KLDMMB, Shivanandan was associated with OF during 
its, initial planning phase) Since the unit cost of creating jobs 
in the industrial sector would be far higher that the figures 
just quoted, planners and politicians were very sanguine about 
the employment potential of the programme.
The former minister for dairy development used to declare in 
public meetings that every additional 8 litres of milk produced 
will create a job in Kerala. The minister informed the author 
that he had got these figures from a World Bank publication. 
However, the important point is not whether the figures are 
accurate or not, but that ministers and bureaucrats were 
convinced that investment in this sector would create substantial 
job opportunities in Kerala.
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agriculture sector in Kerala. We had noted in Chapter II 
that this sector was the most dynamic sector in Kerala. 
Ministers and planners believed that further investment in 
this sector would have ripple effects in the entire 
agrarian economy. A post-facto rationalisation of this 
belief can be seen in a confidential paper prepared in 1987 
for the incoming Communist-led ministry. This paper 
entitled " Rationalisation for Taking up Animal Husbandry 
Sector for Increasing Production and thus Enhancing State 
Income"^\ argues that since market conditions are 
favourable to the Animal Husbandry sector, further 
investment in this sector, will produce spectacular results 
in the short run. In a stagnating agrarian economy 
afflicted by frequent changes of government, these 
arguments of quick and spectacular results would appear 
particularly seductive.
The above arguments, though valid in themselves, 
do not fully explain the readiness with which the 
Government of Kerala adopted the OF programme. OF 
represented a diminution of the State's control over a 
major development programme. The State was required to hand 
over control of all existing dairy infrastructure to the 
new federation. Further, the State had to give an 
undertaking that it would not interfere in the day to day 
affairs of the organisation. Such self-sacrifice is 
paradoxical in a polity used to subverting institutions and
Confidential memo prepared by the Secretary to 
Government, Department of Animal Husbandry, for the Minister for 
Civil Supplies and Dairy Development. Government of Kerala. 1987.
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programmes for political gain. However, the rationality of 
such actions becomes apparent, once we delineate the 
political gains that OF bestows on political actors. We 
shall illustrate this by analysing the decision to locate 
a dairy plant and a cattle feed plant in Alleppey district.
The Alleppey dairy plant represents an instance 
of political expediency triumphing over sound commercial 
sense. Prior to OF, Alleppey's urban milk demand was met by 
a small plant with a capacity of 6000 Lpd. In place of this 
plant, a new plant with a capacity of 60,000 Lpd was 
planned. With a similar capacity in the neighbouring 
district of Quilon and a new 100,000 Lpd plant in the 
nearby district of Ernakulam, there was obviously a problem 
of excess capacity at Alleppey. The mid-term appraisal team 
which visited Alleppey during the early eighties observed 
that ” economic organisation of procurement activities 
around Alleppey would not be immediately feasible ... It 
would also not be feasible to appreciably expand milk 
marketing in Alleppey and its suburbs within the project 
p e r i o d " H e n c e  the team recommended that the dairy should 
be scaled down to 30,000 Lpd. However, as construction had 
already started with the larger capacity in mind, 
considerable expense was incurred in modifying the project. 
The economic irrationality of the project can be discerned
33 " OF II in Kerala- A Mid Course Correction Report”. NDDB. 
Anand.1985.
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from the fact that as late as June 1991, the plant was 
operating only at 28% of its originally planned capacity
The case of the Pattanakkad cattle feed plant, 
also located in Alleppey district, is even more 
illuminating. Ideally, location decisions on cattle feed 
plants in Kerala should take into consideration a number of 
factors: first, its nearness to raw material markets. Over 
90% of the raw material required for compounded cattle feed 
in Kerala is imported from outside the province. This would 
indicate that the plant should be located as close to the
border as possible so as to minimise the cost of
transporting large quantities of bulky raw materials such 
as rice bran and sunflower cake. However, Pattanakkad is 
nearly 200 kms from the Palghat pass through which the bulk 
of goods is transported into Kerala. Second, in India, the 
transport of goods by rail is cheaper than road, especially 
over long distances. Pattanakkad, however, does not have a 
rail head. Consequentially, raw materials have to be
unloaded at the nearest rail head in the neighbouring 
district of Ernakulam and transported by lorries to
Pattanakkad. Internal studies have shown that due to its 
location in Alleppey district, the plant had to incur an 
additional cost of over RS 1.5 million every year^^.
Confidential records of KCMMF.1991.
The federation has an old cattle feed plant in Palghat 
district. A comparative analysis of transportation costs for 
Pattanakkad and the Palghat plants show that the former has to 
incur on an average Rs 50 per tonne more in transportation costs. 
Confidential internal memo prepared for the Managing Director. 
No date.
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The two plants were located in Alleppey district 
despite the obvious negative economic consequences of the 
choice. The political nature of the decision becomes clear 
when we note that the then Agriculture Minister, who was 
primarily responsible for introducing OF into Kerala, comes 
from Alleppey district. The location of two major new 
plants conferred on her considerable political capital. 
First, the projects raised her profile in the district and 
enabled her to reap considerable electoral gains. Second, 
the new projects generate employment opportunities that can 
be used to reward supporters and followers.
The above discussion clearly indicates that 
economically irrational decisions are perversely, 
nonetheless politically rational. Further, we can infer 
that apart from notions of the public good, political 
leaders in Kerala were motivated by the potential political 
benefits that OF can confer on them. This would explain the 
rapidity and ease with which the Government agreed to 
surrender much of its policy making authority to an 
external organisation such as the NDDB.^®
The former Chief Secretary to the Government of Kerala, 
had disclosed to the author that the State Cabinet was initially 
divided over OF. Many ministers were reluctant to surrender 
control over dairy policy. They were won over by the size of the 
project and the potential political benefits that such a massive 
project will confer on the government that initiates it. 
Interview with V Ramachandran, Former Chief Secretary. Madras. 
2/4/1991.
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3.The Dairy Bureaucracy.
The response of the dairy bureaucracy in Kerala 
was more ambiguous. It had obvious reasons for welcoming a 
progreunme that proposed to invest over Rs 200 million in 
the dairy sector. Since the mid Seventies, the dairy 
department had not been involved in any major development 
project. Further, by the beginning of the Eighties the 
budget of the department had declined in real terms from RS 
3.92 million in 1975-76 to Rs 2.00 million in 1979-80 
(1970-71 prices).37 OF was therefore initially welcomed by 
the department, as it believed that the funds would be 
channelled through it.3*
However, the NDDB's insistence that OF funds 
would be channelled only through OF institutions and its 
demand that the department should be wound up constituted 
a serious threat. An analysis of the department's budget 
shows that the department was being increasingly 
marginalised:
37 "Administration Report". Various Issues. Department of 
Dairy Development, op cit.
3® This was a reasonable assumption to make, as similar 
programmes funded by the World Bank, such as the Training and 
Visit (T&Vj and the Social Forestry programmes were implemented 
by the Agriculture and Forestry departments respectively. These 
departments had used the opportunity to create more posts and 
purchase new equipments and vehicles. The departments therefore 
derived considerable benefits from the programmes.
207
TABLE IV.6
Abstract of Plan and Non-Plan Expenditure of the Dairy 
Development Department:1983-90•
Rs in millions. 1970-71 prices.
1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1988-90
Plan 2.77
(53%)
3.15
(49%)
2.18
(34%)
2.29
(34%)
Non-Plan 2.49 3.30 4.18 4.41
Total 5.26 6.45 6.36 6.70
Note: Figures in brackets denote percentage to total.
Source: "Administration Report" .Various Issues. Department 
of Dairy Development Department, op cit.
The above figures show that since OF started in 
Kerala, the plan funds available with the department had 
declined both in relative and absolute terms. This would 
indicate that while the department's role in dairy 
development had declined, it continued to maintain a large 
bureaucratic structure/" This structure still had a number
Plan funds refer to funds that are ear-marked for new 
developmental projects, while non-plan funds are used mainly to 
defray staff and administration costs and to fund continuing 
programmes. The level of plan funds at the disposal of a 
department is usually a reliable indicator of the department's 
ability to wrest more resources from the State.
The department which had a skeleton staff of only 91 in 
1963-64 had by 1988-89 grown into a huge structure with 920 
staff. Administration Reports of the Dairy Development 
Department. Various Issues.
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of residuary powers. First, the Joint-Registrar (Dairy), 
functioned under the control of the Dairy Director.His 
powers could be used to harass the opponents of the 
department in the dairy sector. Second, through the powers 
of inspection, department officials could still exercise 
control over all dairy societies, including APCOS. Third, 
through its control over the non-OF funds disbursed by the 
State, the department could selectively reward societies 
and thereby create allies among the dairy societies.
4.Co-operative Elites
There are conceptual problems in identifying co­
operative elites in the dairy industry. First, the co­
operative leadership is very heterogenous with few common 
bonds. Society presidents are drawn from a variety of 
backgrounds such as trade, the professions and increasingly 
in recent years,professional politicians.Second,the 
institutional structure created conflicts of interests 
within the co-operative leadership. The primary co­
operative's interests, for instance, are best served by 
free riding on the dairy plant's facilities - dumping milk 
during flush and starving it during the lean. The interests 
of the Union leadership that runs the plants, on the other 
hand, are best optimised by imposing a quota during the 
flush and maximising the inflow during the lean. These 
opposing economic interests lead to constant conflicts 
within the co-operative leadership. Third, the segmented 
nature of milk markets in Kerala produced co-operative
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institutions that had few lateral linkages. Prior to OF, 
the various milk unions in Kerala had few common forums 
through which closer organisational links could be forged.
These attributes of the co-operative leadership 
explain, in part, the difficulty in identifying the co­
operative elites as a coherent and homogenous interest 
group with common aims and a shared ideology. The launching 
of OF has sharpened the existing divisions within the co­
operative elites. To explain this, we need to sketch 
briefly the attempts made by the co-operative elites to 
form a pan-Kerala pressure group.
We observed in Chapter II that the CMS Union was 
organised with a view to maximising urban milk supplies. 
The neglect of producer interests by the managing 
committee,led to the formation of the first producer 
pressure group in the dairy sector in Kerala. In 1952, the 
primary dairy societies of Calicut district came together 
to form the Kozhikode Milk Societies Association. The 
primary aim of the association was to enhance the 
bargaining position of the societies which supplied milk to 
the CMS Union. The launching of the Calicut milk supplies 
scheme in the early sixties, afforded the association the 
opportunity to play a more ambitious role. In return for 
the investment made by the State, the CMS Union was obliged 
to amend its bye-laws to give greater representation to 
farmer interests.
The Societies' Association exploited the 
opportunity by capturing the management of the CMS Union.
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The office bearers of CMS, could henceforth be elected only 
with the concurrence of the leadership of the association. 
Further, in matters affecting the vital interests of the 
producers, such as producer price and bonus, prior 
concurrence of the association leadership was necessary 
before the CMS management could take a decision. This 
system soon spread to the neighbouring district of 
Malappuram.
The success of the Malabar societies inspired 
societies in south Kerala to think about a pan Kerala 
organisation. In 1970, a few of the prominent leaders of 
the dairy co-operatives met in Quilon and decided to 
organise an "All Kerala Societies Association". District 
associations were soon set up in all the districts and the 
Malabar association also merged with the new pan Kerala 
organisation. By the mid Seventies, the association was 
claiming a membership of over 1000 societies.
However, though a pan Kerala organisation had 
come into being, conditions in south Kerala were radically 
different from those prevailing in Malabar. In the latter 
region, as we have observed above, the Societies' 
Association effectively controlled the milk unions; but in 
south Kerala the association faced the State which owned 
most of the processing facilities. Moreover, the co­
operative leadership here were excluded from any 
significant role both in policy formulation and 
implementation.Consequentially,the relationship between the 
co-operative elites and the State was more strained in
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south Kerala than in Malabar. The late Seventies witnessed 
a series of direct actions by the dairy farmers. Under the 
leadership of the Societies Association, farmers organised 
rallies, "dharnas" and sit-ins against the State for its 
alleged anti farmer activities.^
Operation Flood had a differential impact on the 
fortunes of the co-operative elites in south and north
Kerala. The co-operative elites in the south generally
welcomed the programme while their counterparts in the 
north opposed it. The latter have attempted to block the 
expansion of the programme into Malabar by a variety of 
means. First, they attempted to prevent or postpone the 
integration of the CMS and Malappuram Unions with OF
institutions.
Second, the co-operative elites in Malabar have 
been advising the primary societies not to convert their 
societies into APCOS. Consequently, the situation in 
Malabar in 1990-91 was very fluid with a variety of
societies existing simultaneously. A study commissioned by 
the federation showed that out of the 519 societies in 
Malabar, only 148 (29%) are fully fledged APCOS The
remainder are only partially converted or have not been 
converted at all.Third, primary societies have been advised 
to withhold milk from the dairies run by OF institutions.
Interview with P.S Abraham, President of the Kerala Milk 
Societies Association.Calicut. 15/6/91.
" North Kerala Dairy Project- Strategy for Dairy Co­
operative Formation and Milk Procurement ". Centre for Management 
Development. Trivandrum. 1990.
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Instead, they have been encouraged to market milk on their 
own in urban centres with a view to defeat the marketing 
goals of MRCMPU.
The differing response of the co-operative elites 
in north and south Kerala to OF, needs to be explained. Two 
sets of reasons can be distinguished- one economic and the 
other political. We have noted in section I that OF was 
introduced into Malabar much later than in the south. 
Learning from the south Kerala experience, programme 
coordinators in Malabar dispensed with some of the least 
cost effective selective incentives, including subsidized 
veterinary care and interest free working capital loan, 
which had made the programme so attractive in the south. 
This naturally antagonised the co-operative elites of 
Malabar who were fully alive to the political and economic 
rewards that could be derived from a judicious and 
selective administration of these incentives.
Second, the milk prices offered by OF were 
substantially lower than those prevailing in Malabar. In a 
mistaken attempt to rationalise prices across the province, 
OF institutions were reluctant to set their purchase prices 
in Malabar above those prevailing in South Kerala. But as 
market prices were higher in Malabar, the co-operative 
elites were placed in the unenviable position of explaining 
to the farmers that to participate in the OF programme they 
had to accept lower prices for their produce.
Further, pre-OF institutions in Malabar had a 
number of production incentives such as a higher price for
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supply during the lean season. Since OF was following a 
national policy, such incentives were withdrawn when OF was 
launched in Malabar. The farmers and the co-operative 
leaders therefore perceived that it was not in their best 
interests to support the programme.
There were equally compelling political reasons. 
The co-operative elites in the south were not in positions 
of power during the pre-OF period since the State owned the 
bulk of the processing and marketing facilities.OF,by 
transferring these facilities to farmers* organisation, 
afforded the co-operative elites enormous opportunities to 
gain control over sizable economic and organisational 
resources. These resources, could, then be deployed for 
generating political resources. The Congress party 
benefited most, as local leaders of the party had taken the 
initiative in organising dairy co-operatives in south 
Kerala. When OF, with its huge resources, was extended to 
Malabar, it sharpened the conflict between the rival 
political alliances. The LDF government sought to bring 
under their control,the majority of the dairy co-operatives 
in Malabar, a move which was resisted by the co-operative 
leaders belonging to the Congress party. Co-operative 
leaders, especially in south Kerala, were career 
politicians who realised that the increasing 
commercialisation of the dairy sector in Kerala afforded 
considerable political opportunities. The career of a 
former President of the Kerala Societies' Association- 
Prayar Gopalakrishnan, is a case in point.
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In the Sixties,he was a student leader in the 
Kerala Students Union- the student wing of the Indian 
National Congress. Later, as Youth Congress leader he held 
several party positions both in the sub-district and 
district levels. Realising the potential of the dairy 
sector for aggregating political capital, he became 
associated with the dairy societies and was instrumental in 
the formation of the All Kerala Societies' Association. 
When OF was launched, he was co-opted onto the Board and 
when the first elections were held in 1986, he was returned 
as Chairman of the apex federation, a position which he 
still occupies. In the 1992 elections to the Kerala 
Legislative Assembly, he was a serious contender for a 
party ticket; but as he was offered a seat only in an 
opposition stronghold, he declined to contest. The career 
path of the President illustrates our argument that career 
politicians have found in the dairy sector a profitable 
avenue for furthering their personal and political 
interests.
The co-operative elites in Malabar, however, were 
negatively affected by OF. They were already in control of 
pre- OF institutions such as the CMS, Malappurum and Wyanad 
Unions. OF abolished these three unions and in their place 
formed one super union- MRCMPU. The considerable political 
and economic loss this entailed could have been made more 
palatable if the ex-leaders had been provided for within 
the new organisation. However, the demands of coalition 
politics in Kerala prevented the State from nominating any
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of the office bearers of the former unions to the first 
board of MRCMPU. All the nominees were political appointees 
of the new government that had come to power in 1987.
The economic and political loss suffered by the 
co-operative elites in Malabar combined with the loss of 
the selective incentives described above, alienated a large 
section of the co-operative elites in Malabar from the OF 
programme. This has seriously undermined the cohesiveness 
of the co-operative leadership in the dairy sector. 
Currently, the elites are divided both geographically 
between the north and the south and horizontally into 
groups owing allegiance to various political parties.
The Kerala Societies' Association, which in the 
late seventies had emerged as a powerful pressure group is 
now in terminal decline. The southern leaders have found 
the OF institutions a better vehicle for optimising their 
economic and political interests; but the Malabar leaders, 
evicted from their old institutions and denied a place in 
the new dispensation, are embittered and disillusioned. 
Attempts are afoot to revive the Societies' Association to 
act as a countervailing force to the OF institutions. This 
would imply that OF institutions which have been 
specifically designed to protect and promote farmer 
interests, are not acceptable to a significant section of 
the co-operative leadership.
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5.The Organised Labour Force
The organised labour force in the dairy 
industry, consists mainly of workers employed in the milk 
processing and chilling plants. In the pre-OF period, they 
did not constitute a powerful pressure group. The diffused 
ownership pattern in the co-operative sector with 
autonomous milk unions in each district prevented the 
emergence of a pan Kerala labour union in the dairy sector. 
The formation of the KLDMMB in 1976, afforded labour with 
its first opportunity to organise themselves on an all 
Kerala basis. Both CITU( a Communist affiliated union) and 
INTUC (Congress) exploited the opportunity offered by the 
presence of a public sector company to consolidate their 
position in the dairy sector.
The launching of OF, set the stage for a series 
of conflicts between OF institutions and organised labour. 
The outcome of these skirmishes was to have profound 
implications for the future of the programme in Kerala. Two 
such conflicts are relevant for our purpose. The first test 
csune over the issue of the old dairies that were to be 
transferred by the State to the apex federation. On 
realising the extent of over staffing in these plants, the 
NDDB had second thoughts about the OF institutions taking 
over all the staff. But labour leaders successfully lobbied 
with the government. During negotiations between the 
government representatives and the NDDB it was made clear
43 Interview with the Director of Dairy Development. 19/3/91
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that continued State support for the programme hinged upon 
this issue.Eventually, the NDDB acceded to the demands 
of labour and the dairies with all their staff were taken 
over by the OF institutions.
The implications of this decision can best be 
illustrated by citing the case of the grossly overstaffed 
Kottayam dairy. The extent of surplus labour in the dairy 
can be judged by the fact that for the 60,000 Lpd plant at 
Quilon, the NDDB had projected a manpower requirement of 
only 36. As against this the Kottayam dairy had in 1983, a 
staff strength of 96 employees, to process a mere 1200 Lpd 
\  However, the leader of the Congress- led union in the 
dairy happened to be the then Home Minister. 
Consequentially, the federation was forced to take over the 
dairy with all the employees.
Second, the expansion of OF to Malabar was 
facilitated by the pressure tactics of the trade unions. 
Both the CMS and Malappurum unions had second thoughts 
about merging with OF institutions. Trade unions adopted a 
dual strategy to counter the hesitancy of the local co­
operative elites. At the dairy level they pressurised their 
management by threats of direct action to speed up the 
process of integration. Simultaneously, through the good 
offices of prominent trade union leaders, the government 
was persuaded to bring pressure on the Malabar leaders. It 
is undeniable that the integration of pre-OF institutions
ibid
45 Confidential report on the Kottayam dairy. KCMMF.1991.
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in Malabar would not have proceeded so quickly without the 
pressure of the trade unions/"
The trade unions had much to gain from the 
integration of the pre-OF dairies with OF institutions. 
First, by the terms of the agreement under which the 
Malabar milk unions merged with the federation, all the 
existing jobs were protected. Second, within a year the pay 
scales of all the employees were to be brought on par with 
the existing pay scales in the federation. This was a 
considerable windfall for the staff of the old milk unions 
as federation pay scales were substantially higher than 
their old pay scales, as the following table reveals:
TABLE IV.7
Comparative Statement of Pay Scales in Pre- OF and OF 
Institutions.
As on March 1990. Rs/month
Category OF CMS MDCMSU
Senior Assistant 2154.00 1702.00 1044.00
Junior Assistant 1874.00 1569.00 943.00
Plant Operator 1991.00 1191.00 937.00 ■
Source: Confidential records of TRCMPU, CMS and MDCMSU
Unions.
The above table indicates that organised labour 
in the pre- OF milk unions gained substantially by the 
advent of OF. However this had negative implications for 
the future of the progreimme in Kerala. As in the case of
Interview with M Chathu, President of CMS Union.Calicut. 
24/4/91.
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Kottayam dairy, both CMS and the Malappurum Unions were 
heavily over staffed. Thus in the CMS union, there were 171 
employees to process 20,000 Lpd"^ (as against the NDDB 
projection of 36 employees to process 60,000 Lpd). The 
Malappurum union had 89 employees to chill 15,000 Lpd^° (as 
against the NDDB projection of 12 employees to chill 20,000 
Lpd) .
The absorption of all the staff meant that, 
MRCMPU, the new OF institution, was crippled from the very 
beginning by excess staffing. The upward revision of pay 
scales to match federation pay scales increased the 
financial strain on MRCMPU. The Regional Union has 
calculated that the absorption of all the staff will result 
in employee cost rising from Rs 69.12 million per annum to 
Rs 144.00 million^. Since MRCMPU, made a nominal profit of 
only RS 0.06 million in 1990-91®°, it is clear that the 
additional commitment will severely cripple its ability to 
implement the programme successfully.
The foregoing discussion reveals that organised 
labour welcomed the introduction of OF in Kerala as the 
potential financial benefits were considerable. We have 
also seen that the new projects were capital intensive and 
required relatively less inputs of labour. But the ability 
of organised labour to lobby successfully both with the
Confidential records of CMS Union. 1991. 
Confidential records of MDCMSU.1991. 
Confidential records of MRCMPU.1991.
®° ibid
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management and with political leaders ensured that all 
existing jobs were protected with enhanced emoluments. 
However, these achievements were won at the expense of the 
future viability of OF institutions in Kerala.
SUMMARY
In this Chapter, we first analyzed the nature of 
the intervention represented by OF. We suggested that it 
has been different from previous interventions both in its 
scale and the radical nature of the technical and 
organisational changes that it proposed to introduce. The 
technical transformation of the industry in turn 
necessitated changes in organisational structure. This 
significantly influenced the direction in which the 
programme evolved in Kerala.
Interviews with key decision makers have revealed 
that they were aware that Kerala had few of the comparative 
advantages necessary to sustain a massive dairy development 
programme.®^ Despite this knowledge, OF was launched in 
Kerala. The availability of external funding is but a 
partial explanation. A fuller explanation would need to 
take into consideration the aims and goals of the key 
actors in the programme.
We have argued that all the interest groups 
associated with the progrcunme in Kerala initially believed 
that they could derive substantial benefits from the
Interview with V.Kurien, Chairman NDDB and members of the 
NDDB planning team, op cit. 1991.
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programme. They also had mutually conflicting goals. The 
National Technocracy's underlying goal was to limit the 
power of the State in policy formulation and implementation 
through the creation of a powerful farmers' organisation; 
but the institutional design envisaged effective control of 
the organisation in the hands of the technocracy. State 
elites welcomed the programme, despite the diminution of 
State power, because of the electoral and political 
benefits that the programme could confer on them. The dairy 
bureaucracy, on the other hand, became serious opponents of 
the programme, though they also initially welcomed the 
progrcunme.
The programme had a differential impact on the 
fortunes of the co-operative elites. The southern 
leadership was empowered by the programme, while the 
Malabar leaders lost their traditional positions of 
authority and prestige which led to a split in the co­
operative leadership, with serious implications for the 
programme, especially in Malabar. Organised labour 
benefited enormously from the launching of the programme, 
but at the expense of the future viability of the programme 
in Kerala.
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Performance of Operation Flood in Kerala
In Chapter IV, we had indicated that OF was a 
multi dimensional programme with a number of conflicting 
objectives. The programme was expected to maintain urban 
supplies, increase the share of the organised sector, 
stimulate the agrarian sector and increase farm incomes. We 
had however suggested that while these were the stated aims 
of OF, the underlying goals were primarily political. In 
Chapters V and VI, we shall analyze the extent to which 
programme planners were able to achieve their stated 
objectives. Here, we shall first analyze whether OF had 
succeeded in its macro goal of ensuring stable markets for 
the dairy farmers of Kerala and then go on to examine 
whether the institutions created by the progrcunme are 
commercially viable.
SECTION I
Operation Flood and Dairy Markets in Kerala.
Analysis of procurement and sales data indicate 
that in absolute terms, OF institutions had enormously 
expanded their markets. While the KCMMF^ was marketing only 
around 67,000 Litres Per Day(LPD) in 1983 when it took over
 ^ When we refer to data pertaining to all the OF 
institutions in Kerala,the data would be recorded under the head 
of KCMMF- the apex institution for all the three regional unions- 
TRCMPU, ERCMPU and MRCMPU.
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the dairies, by 1991 it was marketing on an average 286,000 
LPD^ In contrast, the CMS, which was marketing about 8800 
LPD in 1983,had increased its sales to only 14,242 LPD in
1990. However,absolute figures of sales increases are 
unreliable for evaluating the success of Operation Flood in 
Kerala. A more realistic analysis would be to examine 
whether the share of the organised sector has expanded due 
to the intervention of OF.
We have no precise data as to the total quantity of 
milk produced in the state. The Animal Husbandry department 
"guestimates" the quantity of milk produced on the basis of 
the number of animals in milk. Consequently, the figures 
for total milk production have to be accepted with a great 
deal of reservation. Table V.l provides a comparative 
analysis of milk produced in the state and milk procured by 
the KCMMF.
The table indicates that OF institutions still 
control less than 10% of the total marketable surplus. We 
may recall that in 1979-80 the organised sector was 
handling about 13% of the marketable surplus. This would 
mean that despite the massive investment in processing and 
marketing facilities during the last decade, OF had not 
been able to increase its share of the organised sector 
substantially. However, such a conclusion would be 
misleading as it does not reflect the market position of
 ^Confidential records of the KCMMF.1991.
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KCMMF .OF, as we have emphasised, aimed at capturing the urban 
milk markets. In this effort, it seems to have had some 
success, as in many urban centres it has captured a 
substantial share of the market. Informal surveys conducted 
by KCMMF indicate that in Trivandrum, it controls more than 
70% of the market. Though this high percentage is not 
reflected in other urban centres, KCMMF is the market leader 
in a number of them, with a very visible presence.^
TABLE V.l
Comparative Statement of Total MILk Production and MXXk 
Marketed by KCMMF : 1980-90 (in tonnes).
1980-81 1989-90
Total Milk Produced 908,000 1,600,000
Milk Procured by KCMMF 2,184 (0.24%) 90,579 (5.66%)
Total Marketable Surplus* 572,000 1,008,000
Procurement as percentage 
of Marketable Surplus
0.38% 9.02%
Source: "Economic Review". 1990. op cit and records of KCMMF.
Note: Figures in brackets denote percentage to total
production.
* A number of studies have indicated that the dairy economy 
of Kerala has been highly commercialised. The Centre for 
Development Studies Trivandrum, had calculated that 63% of 
the milk produced in the state is marketed*. We have adopted 
this figure for arriving at the marketable surplus.
 ^ In 1988, KCMMF had about 45% of the market in five 
towns.In Quilon and Alleppey, it had over 50% of the market. See 
"Analytical Report and Progress of Operation Flood in the 
Southern Region ". NDDB. Anand. 1988.
* See : George P.S and Nair K.N. 1990. o p  cit.
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The very high visibility of KCMMF in the urban centres 
increases its vulnerability to short term imbalances in the 
market. As a larger percentage of consumers switched from 
informal market channels to KCMMF, any shortages affecting 
the organisation had ripple effects throughout the urban 
markets in Kerala. Prior to OF, the segmented nature of 
dairy markets in Kerala meant that shortages were localised 
with lesser spill-over effects for the whole economy. But 
the presence of KCMMF as a significant market agent in 
every major urban centre, magnified the organisation's 
problems into an economy wide crisis. From the second half 
of 1990 onwards KCMMF began to experience a steady fall in 
milk procurement. Sales, however, continued to rise leading 
to a chronic mismatch between demand and supply, as can be 
seen from Table V.2.
Table V.2
Average Daily Procurement and Sales of KCMMF: 1984-
91.(LPD)
Year Procurement % Change Sales % Change
1984 88,536 89,609
1986 123,149 +39 135,858 +52
1988 211,292 +72 189,180 +39
1989 236,380 + 12 238,825 +26
1990 228,943 -3 282,536 + 18
1991* 215,707 —6 286,917 +2
Source: Confidential records of KCMMF. 1991. * Average of 
eight months.
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We observe from the above table that while 
sales had increased by 20% between 1989 and 1991, 
procurement had actually dropped by 9%. Gaps between supply 
and demand are commonplace in milk markets and is generally 
met by imports of milk from external markets or by
recombination of milk powder. Thus, during the mid 
eighties, when the monsoon failed in Kerala, temporary 
shortages were solved by procuring milk powder from the 
NDDB and fluid milk from the sister federations of
Tamilnadu and Karnataka. Similarly, when there was excess 
supply during the flush season, the milk was shipped out to 
the milk powder plants in the neighbouring provinces for 
conversion. Thus,OF,through the linkages it established 
between the milk producers of Kerala and those of the 
neighbouring provinces, seemed to offer some remedy for the 
chronic instability of dairy markets in Kerala.
Such measures are, however, effective only when 
the gap between supply and demand is narrow and temporary. 
But in the case of KCMMF the gap seems to have steadily
widened in 1991. During the early months of 1991 the gap
between procurement and sales was on an average 70,000 LPD. 
In March 1991 it widened to over 93,000 LPD which is nearly 
45% of the total procurement of KCMMF^.In addition, the 
decline appeared to be secular rather than 
temporary.Between August 1990 and 1991, procurement dropped 
in ten consecutive months.
® Confidential records of KCMMF.1991.
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The extent of the shortage and its persistence over 
several months severely handicapped the ability of KCMMF to 
maintain urban supplies. Consequently, sales had to be 
curtailed by introducing an informal system of rationing in 
most urban centres. The crisis was especially acute in the 
cities of Calicut, Cochin and Trivandrum where KCMMF had a 
substantial market share. Since the consumers in these 
centres are highly influential and well organised, the 
organisational crisis and its impact was extensively 
covered by the media.* It was argued that OF, which had set 
out to ensure stability in dairy markets, had failed to
sustain its initial momentum. The validity of this
contention can be evaluated by identifying the nature of
the crisis. Is it a crisis of excess demand or of under
supply?.
Demand Factors
From Table V.2 we observe that urban demand was 
rising faster than supply from 1989. Analysis of data 
collected from the saunple societies indicates that rural 
demand was also rising fast between 1990 and 1991. In 
Chapter IV, we had indicated that primary societies are 
permitted to sell a portion of the milk locally, while the
* The "Malavala Manorama", Kerala's largest selling 
Malayalam daily ran a series of articles in April 1991, which 
explicitly stated that OF had failed in its goal of ensuring 
urban milk supplies. The paper suggested that organisational 
problems were primarily responsible for the crisis.
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bulk of the milk has to be sent to the dairy plants.
Depending upon their proximity to urban consumption 
centres, the quantity of milk that a society can sell 
locally will vary greatly. However, year on year change in
the quantity of milk sold locally, is usually a reliable
indicator of the increase or decrease in rural demand. We 
furnish below information on the local sales of 14 
societies from our sample of twenty societies, for which 
the information is available:
TABLE V.3
Percentage Change in Local Sales of Selected
Societies :1990-91
Society March 1990 March 1991
Pullenchery 8 9
Karulai 52 62
Kappil Karad 11 21
Palemad 28 44
Nilgunbur Town 60 77
Cheruvannor 63 56
Kuppayakode 39 54
Vattoli Bazar 33 37
Puthenvelikkara 7 5
Puliyanam 7 15
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Society March 1990 March 1991
Needappara 19 27
Vengola 4 23
Kuzhamvila 2 6
Uchakada 1 2
Note: The figures furnished above,represent the percentage 
of milk that was sold locally out of the total milk 
procured by the society.
Source: Field Survey by the Author, June-July 1991.
Except in the case of two societies local sales have 
expanded quite significantly for all the other societies. 
Confirmation of this trend towards higher local sales can 
be obtained by analysing the quantity of milk that 
societies have sent to the dairies. The difference between 
the quantity procured and and the quantity sent to the 
dairy represent the amount that is sold locally.
TABLE V.4
Percentage of Milk Supplied to Dairies as Percentage 
of Total Procurement :1986-91.
Region 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991
TRCMPU 82.7% 93.5% 86.4% 83.9% 75.0%
ERCMPU 81.9% 84.0% 97.4% 77.8% 68.0%
Source: Confidential records of KCMMF.1991.
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In Trivandrum region, the percentage of local sales 
has increased from 6.55% in 1988 to 25% in 1991; in 
Ernakulam region, the percentage has increased from 16% to 
32%. The two tables taken together would suggest that rural 
demand has expanded enormously between 1988 and 1991.
The increased demand for milk and milk products 
towards the close of the eighties has not been adequately 
explained. We can offer at best some very tentative 
suggestions. First, the increased commercialisation of the 
dairy economy has stimulated demand for milk products. The 
strategy of OF, as we noted earlier, was based on the 
assumption that increased demand would automatically 
stimulate increased production. The NDDB believed that 
farmers restricted production due to lack of assured 
markets for their produce.
The first step in the OF strategy, therefore, was to
. •  . • •  . . . . . . . . . . . .
increase market share by a combination of expelling 
existing market agents and boosting urban demand. Towards 
this end, distribution systems were vastly strengthened and 
advertisement stepped up. A substantial grant for defraying 
the initial advertisement expenditure, and subsidies for 
setting up the distribution system enabled OF institutions 
to penetrate urban markets easily. Initial supplies are 
maintained by the NDDB supplying milk powder at below 
market prices.By maintaining supplies even during the lean 
months when other market agents have to restrict supplies, 
OF institutions were able not only to increase their share 
but also to expand total demand significantly.
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The comparatively better performance of the
Kerala economy towards the close of the eighties could be
a contributory factor.Between 1981 and 1988, the per capita 
income of the province had declined at constant figures 
from Rs 1494 to Rs 1416. It, however, rose to Rs 1530 in 
1989 and to Rs 1596 in 1990^. The higher disposable income 
could have induced higher demand for milk products.
Third, the relative movements in the price of 
milk and milk substitutes in the second half of the
eighties favoured a switch to milk products:
TABLE V.5
Price of Milk and Milk Substitutes:1985-90.
1985 1990
Item Rs Index Rs Index
Mutton Rs/KG 24.00 100 40.00 167
Beef Rs/KG 12.00 100 16.00 133
Chicken Rs/KG 20.00 100 30.00 150
Eggs Rs/lOO 50.00 100 63.00 126
Milk 
Rs/Litre
4.00 100 5.00 125
Source: Bureau of Economics and Statistics.
Government of Kerala.
’ "Economic Review". 1990. op cit.
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We see from the above table that the index numbers for 
all the commodities were higher than milk. The increased 
availability of milk in the urban centres, following the 
launching of Operation Flood, combined with its relatively 
lower price could have led to the expansion of demand. It 
is fair to assume that the current disequilibrium in milk 
markets is partly due to the rapid growth in demand during 
the recent years.
Supply Factors
We observed in Table V.l, that milk procurement 
by OF institutions had come down during the last two years. 
A sustained drop in procurement implies that farmers are 
either unable or unwilling to supply at levels required to 
meet current demand. The former implies that constraints in 
the dairy economy as a whole has reduced the productive 
capabilities of farmers. The latter, on the other hand, 
denotes organisational problems. To identify the nature of 
the problem we need to analyze procurement patterns in 
three different markets:1) The dairy economy in Kerala as 
a whole, 2) OF and non OF markets in Kerala and 3) OF 
markets in the rest of India.
1) Production Trends in the Dairy Economy
One explanation for the drop in procurement is 
that it could be reflecting a drop in total production in 
the state. However, records with the Animal Husbandry(AH) 
Department indicate that total production in Kerala has
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increased from 1.51 million tonnes in 1988-89 to 1.6 
million tonnes in 1989-90*.A study by the KCMMF, quoting 
field surveys of the AH Department, found that there has 
been a marginal increase in the population of animals in 
milk between 1988 and 1990. The productivity of cross-bred 
animals was also estimated to have gone up marginally. Due 
to these factors, total milk production, according to the 
study, increased from 3.58 million Kg per day in 1988-89 to 
3.84 million Kg in 1989-90.The report concludes that there 
was " no evidence of a fall in production."*
These macro statistics are however contradicted 
by the results of the field survey we conducted in mid 
1991.In response to a question whether in comparison to the 
previous year, the respondent was supplying more or less 
milk during the current year, only 22% reported that they 
were supplying more milk, while 56% reported less. Of the 
latter more than 91% stated that reduced production was the 
main reason for the lower supply.
Interviews with society presidents confirm the 
impression that during the last two years, farmers have 
been slowly opting out of milk production. The president of 
Vengola, a society in Ernakulam district reported that 
farmers in his area are reducing the number of cows so as
* "Economic Review". Various issues, op cit.
* "Milk Availability Study". KCMMF. Trivandrum. 1991. 
Field Survey. June-July 1991.
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to reduce their risk." The majority of the presidents 
interviewed in the various regions informed the author that 
negative returns from dairying were forcing many farmers to 
opt out of dairying altogether."
The contradiction in the two sets of data points 
to the difficulties involved in assessing production levels 
in the dairy economy. The discrepancy could be partly
explained by the fact that the field studies of the AH
Department were carried out during 1989 when milk
production was at its peak in Kerala. Our survey, which was 
conducted two years later would capture information that 
was unavailable at the time of the official survey. From 
the above it is fair to assume that some drop in total 
production has occurred, which is yet to appear in official 
statistics.
2) OF and Non OF markets in Kerala
The probability of a drop in total
production is confirmed when we analyze the procurement 
patterns of OF and non OF institutions in Kerala in Table 
V.6 below.
"Interview with the President of the Vengola society. 
17/6/91.
" Field visit: June-July, 1991.
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TABLE V.6
Procurement of Milk by OF and non OF institutions in 
Kerala: 1986-91. Litres Per Day
Agency 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991
TRCMPU 52,790 93,104 107,414 104,059 95,271
ERCMPU 54,006 94,645 95,973 88,971 72,493
MDCMSU 8,053 10,823 12,620 13,030 10,641
Source:Confidential records of TRCMPU, ERCMPU and 
MDCMSU.1991.
Note: The first two are OF institutions,while MDCMSU is a 
non- OF institution which was converted into an OF 
institution in August 1990.
We may observe from the above data that even in 
the non OF institution, procurement has dropped during
1991. One of the arguments advanced for the drop in the 
procurement of MDCMSU in 1991 was its conversion into an OF 
institution. We had noted in chapter IV that the co­
operative elites of Malabar were extremely disillusioned by 
the OF programme and sought to discredit its achievements. 
To assess whether the drop in procurement was due to its 
conversion into an OF institution, we analyze below the 
monthly procurement of MDCMSU before and after its 
conversion into an OF institution in August 1990.
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TABLE V.7
Procurement of MDCMSU Before 
Conversion:1988-91.
and After its
Prior After
1988 1989 1990 1990 1991
January — — —— 0.393 0.367 — — —— 0.244
February — — —— 0.343 0.295 — — —— 0.184
March — — —— 0.382 0.306 — — —— 0.202
April — — —— 0.352 0.290 — — —— 0.186
May — — —— 0.387 0.311 — — —— 0.176
June — — —— 0.404 0.319 — — —— NA
July — — — — 0.427 0.339 — — — — NA
August 0.347 0.445 — — —— 0.329 NA
September 0.379 0.445 — — —— 0.329 NA
October 0.419 0.467 — — —— 0.320 NA
November 0.421 0.433 — — —— 0.342 NA
December 0.428 0.430 —' —— — 0.314 NA
Source: Confidential records of MDCMSU.1991.
From the month of January 1990 onwards procurement had 
started to decline. The drop in procurement that we 
observed in Table V.6 is a continuation of the fall that 
started well before the organisation was taken over by OF. 
Analysis of procurement patterns in the societies attached 
to the CMS union also reveal that the decline had begun 
before CMS was absorbed into the OF programme.Thus, while 
the OF programme may have a number of negative aspects, the 
shortages that Kerala experienced from the second half of 
1990 cannot be attributed to the programme alone.
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3) OF markets outside Kerala.
To examine whether the shortages in Kerala were 
unique to the province we analyzed the procurement patterns 
of OF institutions all over India:
TABLE V.8
Average Procurement of Milk by OF Institutions in 
India:1988-91 (000 KG/day)
Region 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91
North 1082.00 1339.98 1258.54
East 156.80 217.08 197.45
West 3961.76 5124.78 5247.40
South 2767.32 3132.72 2999.28
All India 7967.88 9813.72 9702.67
Source: NDDB Anand.1991.
At the All India level, procurement dropped by 
1.13% between 1989-90 and 1990-91. A more detailed analysis 
within the southern region showed that among the four major 
states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamilnadu and Kerala, 
only in Andhra did procurement increase marginally; in all 
the other provinces it declined. We can conclude that the 
decline is not confined to Kerala; and that it is part of 
a pan Indian phenomenon.
The foregoing analysis indicates that in all the 
three markets - OF markets outside Kerala, OF markets 
within Kerala and non-OF markets in Kerala -, procurement
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had dropped since the beginning of the current decade. It 
will take us too far afield to analyze the reasons for the 
distortions in markets outside Kerala; but for the markets 
in Kerala we can offer some tentative explanations.
Reasons for the Fall in Procurement:
1 Poor Resource Base of Kerala
We had observed in Chapter IV that programme 
planners were aware that Kerala did not possess a 
comparative advantage in mounting a massive dairy 
development programme. The current scarcity could therefore 
be an indication that the limits to the dairy potential of 
the province has been reached. In Table V.9 we analyze the 
average procurement by each society since the inception of 
the prograunme :
TABLE V.9
Average Daily Procurement by APCOS in Kerala:1982-91.
Year No: of 
Societies
Average LPD
1982 150 152
1986 569 196
1988 988 193
1989 1067 214
1990 1159 198
1991 1217 177
Source: Records of KCMMF. 1991.
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The average procurement has stagnated since the 
mid eighties, indicating that the OF was pursuing a 
strategy of rapid expansion of the catchment area rather 
than intense exploitation of selected areas.This was 
inevitable given the low density of milk production in 
Kerala. But the current deficits would imply that the 
programme has reached a plateau and that further increase 
in procurement cannot be expected by increasing the 
catchment area further. This has severe negative 
implications for a programme whose central strategy has 
been built on increasing market share rather than 
augmenting the productive potential of the farmers.
2) The Crisis of 1989.
The procurement drop could also be attributed in 
part to the farmer's loss of faith in the organisation. One 
of the key commitments of OF was stable marketing 
arrangements. In 1989, however KCMMF failed to honour its 
commitments. Between December 1988 and December 1989, 
procurement increased by 60% while sales increased by only 
9%. Faced with mounting surpluses and unable to convert the 
milk due to the non availability of conversion facilities 
both in and outside Kerala,the organisation was forced to 
suspend milk procurement.Thus,in 1989, ERCMPU declared milk 
procurement holidays 9 times.^
Confidential records of ERCMPU.1991.
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The crisis of 1989 had two serious consequences 
for the programme in Kerala. First, it destroyed the 
farmers' faith in the ability of KCMMF to correct temporary 
market distortions. To reduce their risk,farmers adopted 
the twin strategy of developing alternate informal 
marketing arrangements and to reduce their stock of milch 
cattle. Both the strategies will have serious negative 
consequences for the programme in the medium term.
Second, the crisis enabled the government of 
Kerala to exercise for the first time, a degree of control 
over the operational activities of KCMMF. We had noted in 
Chapter IV that the government had given an undertaking to 
the NDDB that it would not interfere in the activities of 
KCMMF. However, faced with the failure of the National Milk 
Grid to take care of the excess milk in Kerala, the 
Government stepped in. It issued a circular which set aside 
the NDDB stipulation that APCOS were permitted to sell only 
20% of the their procurement locally.
The government's intention was to stimulate 
rural demand and thus reduce the excess supply. However, it 
had the unintended effect of undermining the Kerala 
government's own strategy of feeding urban milk markets 
through blanket rural procurement.Freed from the 
contractual obligation of supplying 80% of their 
procurement to the dairies, primary societies began to 
concentrate on local markets.This strategy had no adverse 
impact when there was a surplus in the milk markets as a 
whole. However when total production dropped, the APCOS'
241
first priority was to meet the increased rural demand, 
which was more attractive financially than selling to the 
dairies.
3) The Free-rider Problem.
A third factor may be the free rider problem 
which is endemic in cooperative institutions. Three types 
of free rider problems can be distinguished in the dairy 
markets of Kerala: free riding by non OF institutions on 
the dairies of KCMMF, free riding by the affiliated 
societies of OF and free riding by individual dairy 
farmers.
Non OF milk unions have a tendency to dump their 
excess milk during the flush on to the OF dairies and 
starve them during the lean. This opportunistic use of 
KCMMF's facilities reduces the ability to deal with the 
perennial problem of lean/flush variations.The ability of 
an organisation to prevent free riding is dependent in part 
on its coercive ability. Dairies can prevent free riding by 
refusing to accept milk during flush unless supplies are 
maintained during the lean. ERCMPU had in fact prepared a 
list of chronic free riders and had issued instructions to 
its dairies not to accept their milk during the flush 
season. But these instructions were overridden by the 
Kerala government and the dairies were forced to accept all 
the milk of the free riders.( The government's action was 
prompted by the belief that the political leadership of 
ERCMPU was singling out societies that were not allied to
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the leadership politically ), The effect of the State 
intervention was to dilute the coercive capability of the 
organisation and thus encourage more free riding in the 
future.
The affiliated societies of OF - the APCOS -, are 
equally guilty of free riding on the dairies. A monthly 
analysis of procurement trends of ERCMPU indicates that 
societies significantly reduce supply during the lean 
m o n t h s . A  comparative analysis of the free rider problem 
in the non OF institution of CMS indicates that while the 
problem exists, CMS is better able to deal with it than OF 
institutions.Free riders are quickly detected and punished.
The differential ability of the two organisations 
to deal with these free rider problems needs discussion. 
One explanation is obviously the difference in size. In 
1990, the number of societies affiliated to ERCMPU and 
TRCMPU was respectively 373 and 538. CMS on the other hand 
had only 47 affiliated societies. The tendency to free ride
14 In the following table we analyze the despatch of milk 
from the APCOS affiliated to ERCMPU.
Milk Sent to Dairies as Percentage of Total Procurement.
Lean Months Flush Months
February 71.43 January 79.43
March 72.54 June 80.60
April 75.95 July 83.13
May 74.SI August 82.44
September 77.90 October 78.78
November 78.18
December 81.22
Source: Confidential records of ERCMPU.1991.
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is greater in larger groups ".In the case of the larger 
group)the contribution of each society is marginal to the 
total procurement.Thus,as against TRCMPU's average daily 
procurement of 109,700 LPD in 1990, the average daily 
procurement of an affiliated society was only 215 LPD. The 
average daily procurement of a society attached to CMS, on 
the other hand, was 441 litres compared to its total 
procurement of 20,700 LPD in 1989. Consequently, free
riding by a society affiliated to the CMS would constitute 
a greater threat than free riding by a society attached to 
TRCMPU.
Second, the coercive capability of CMS was not 
diluted by the State as in the case of OF institutions. 
Apart from refusing to accept milk during the flush, CMS 
used a system called "marginal profit" to curb the free 
rider tendencies of its members." According to this system 
if any society violated its agreement with the union and 
sold more milk in the open market, then the excess profit 
accruing to the society was confiscated by the union. Since
this coercive power was willingly devolved on the
management by the members, "marginal profit" was a very
effective device to control free riding. However, when 
MRCMPU, the successor organisation of CMS, attempted to 
impose the same proviso it met with resistance from the 
societies and the management was forced to withdraw.This 
may be due to the fact that societies in Malabar viewed
See Olson M. 1965. o p  cit 
Confidential records of CMS Union.1991.
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MRCMPU as an alien organisation imposed by the OF 
programme, while CMS was an organisation that gradually 
evolved in response to local needs.
The third type of free riding is that of 
individual farmers. Farmers tend to either supply milk when 
they have no other alternatives or supply a very limited 
quantity so as to become eligible for subsidized inputs. A 
study by the Centre for Development Studies,Trivandrum, 
showed that farmers prefer to sell to the local consumers 
or to tea shops and that sales to cooperatives are made 
mainly to dispose of the milk that the local markets cannot 
a b s o r b . S u c h  a strategy with its minimal commitment to 
organisational goals means that when local demand expands, 
supply to the organisation will be reduced.
This strategy is entirely rational for the 
farmer.In the next chapter we shall show that the co­
operative elites have failed to adequately protect farm 
incomes through a higher producer price. They have sought 
to compensate this failure by providing inputs at below 
market prices. But this strategy of under-providing the 
collective good of a higher producer price while 
simultaneously delivering selective incentives such as 
subsidized cattle feed and veterinary service, encourages 
free riding by farmers.This proposition can be illustrated 
by analysing the ratio of inputs consumed by farmers to 
outputs supplied by them.
7^ See George P S and Nair K N. 1990. op cit
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Analysis of data relating to TRCMPU indicates 
that while in 1988 in return for every kilogram of cattle 
feed received, farmers supplied 2.78 litres, by 1990 this 
had fallen to 2.18 litres. A similar phenomenon was 
observed in the case of veterinary service. The number of 
cases treated by the veterinary doctors of TRCMPU for every 
1000 litres of milk received, increased from 2.52 in 1989 
to 3.53 in 1990.^® These figures imply that while the 
organisation was expanding its services, the farmers were 
actually reducing their supply.
Such behaviour is entirely rational given that 
the current strategy severely distorts the incentive 
system. The cost of veterinary service, for instance, is 
partly recouped by the organisation deducting a small 
amount from the price of the milk supplied by every 
farmer.This reduces the price of the milk for all the 
farmers. However, data with the KCMMF shows that less than 
50% of the farmers use the veterinary s e r v i c e . I n  other 
words, 100% of the farmers bear the cost of supplying a 
good which is consumed only by 50% of the farmers. 
Consequently, it is rational for each farmer to maximise 
his return by providing the least quantity of milk possible 
to the society.
®^ Confidential records of TRCMPU.1991.
Confidential records of KCMMF.1991.
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4) Interest group Conflicts
We had noted in Chapter IV, that there were 
intra-group conflicts between the co-operative elites. In 
Malabar, this conflict was given an institutional form 
through the creation of an "Action Committee" to agitate 
against the policies of 0F.^° This committee organised
"dharnas", protest "jathas" and lobbied with the government 
against OF institutions. Its most effective strategy,
however, was to persuade societies to stop supplying milk 
to OF institutions.
Societies were encouraged to heed the advice of 
the "Action Committee" due to a variety of factors. First, 
by reducing supply to the dairies, they had more to sell in 
the open market. At a time of national shortage, open 
market sales were obviously more attractive than sales to 
the dairies. Second, society presidents hoped that by 
restricting supply, the management of KCMMF could be forced 
to restore many of the benefits that they enjoyed before 
the coming of OF to Malabar.
The attitude of the Department of Dairy 
Development was a further incentive. We have indicated in
Chapter IV, that the dairy bureaucracy was deeply alienated
by the programme. Departmental officials sought to
Interview with M.Ali, the President of the Cheruvannor 
Society. 15/6/91.
These . benefits included a higher price for milk, 
incentive bonus for supplying quantities in excess of the 
contract, and a special price structure for supply during the 
lean season.
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reestablish their influence by exploiting the divisions 
within the co-operative elites. Societies were, thus, 
offered grants to purchase refrigerators and other 
equipment necessary for augmenting open market sales. Such 
grants were legitimised on the ground of increasing rural 
consumption. They, however, served a deeper purpose. On the 
one hand, they enabled the department to detach societies 
from the OF management through the use of selective 
incentives. More importantly, increased open market sales 
reduced the inflow to OF dairies. The resultant shortages 
in the urban markets were then cited an an indication of 
the failure of OF.
Operation Flood has, thus, a mixed record in 
stabilising dairy markets in Kerala. In the initial years 
of the programme, KCMMF's institutional links with both the 
NDDB and the neighbouring federations enabled it to handle 
seasonal variations. However, the crisis of 1989 and the 
drop in procurement in 1990-91, indicate that dairy markets 
in Kerala are still unsettled.
SECTION II
Financial Performance of OF Institutions in Kerala.
Much of the appeal of OF can be traced to its claim to 
have evolved a commercially viable dairy development 
programme. We have observed in Chapter III that previous 
State interventions in the dairy markets were unsustainable
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in the long run due to their financial weakness. OF,on the 
other hand, was envisaged to be a self-sustaining, 
profitable progrcunme which would not be dependent on 
continued budgetary support.
The performance of OF institutions in Kerala however, 
has, at best, been mixed. The primary societies- the APCOS, 
have done well. Over 80% of the APCOS are currently 
operating on a profit. When we recall that during the pre- 
OF period, only 51% of the societies were profitable OF's 
claim of better financial performance appears to be 
justified.
However, the middle and upper tiers of the structure, 
namely the regional unions and the apex federation appear 
to be in deep financial trouble. The accumulated losses of 
KCMMF, (including that of TRCMPU and ERCMPU) were estimated 
to be Rs 19.23 million in March 1989^^. These losses are 
partly due to the historical legacy of taking over the 
unprofitable institutions operated by the government and 
the pre-OF milk unions.When KCMMF took over the dairies and 
the cattle feed plant in 1983-84, the organisation was also 
forced to take over the liabilities of these institutions 
amounting to Rs 3.3 million. Thus,the current perilous 
state of the organisation's finances cannot be entirely 
attributed to the OF programme. Further there are striking 
differences in the performances between OF institutions in 
Kerala as Table V.IO reveals;
Analysis of All India data reveal that OF institutions 
all over India are in trouble. The accumulated losses of all the 
unions in India, increased from Rs 1791.71 million in 1987 to Rs 
2107.75 million in 1989. Of the 138 unions for which information 
is available, 119 unions have accumulated losses of varying 
degrees. Confidential records of the NDDB. Anand. 1991.
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TABLE V.IO
Profit and Loss Account of OF Institutions in Kerala: 1985 
91.
( Rs/Millions)
Item Federation TRCMPO ERCMPU
1985-86 1990-91 1985-86 1990-91 1985-86 1990-91
I INCOME: 
A) Sales 32.307 150.065 94.449 262.637 82.274 218.964
B) Other Income 1.215 4.090 0.161 4.119 0.158 2.105
C) Stock Out — — 0.262 9.953 54.895 12.746 30.455
Total 33.522 154.417 106.203 321.651 95.178 251.524
II Expenditure: 
A)Raw Material 25.536 129.376 81.997 222.471 79.552 181.734
B)Manufacturing 0.835 3.338 2.125 5.364 2.496 8.053
C)Employees Cost 2.544 7.932 8.345 19.640 7.587 20.303
D) Administration 1.349 1.018 2.263 4.506 2.751 4.153
E)Selling Costs 1.693 6.931 2.635 5.091 2.841 5.597
F )Interest 0.768 2.661 — — 2.412 ------ 1.326
G )Depreciation 1.138 3.375 2.101 3.328 0.133 5.000
B)Stock In 0.571 11.327 54.895 26.318
I )Miscellaneous ------ 2.202 ---- 2.859 4.759 4.333
Total 33.863 157.404 110,793 320.566 100.119 256.817
III Profit/Loss -0.341 -2.987 -4.590 1.085 -4.941 -5.293
Source: Confidential records of KCMMF. 1991.
While TRCMPU has been able to convert a loss of 
Rs 4.59 million into a profit of Rs 1.085 million, the 
losses of the other two institutions have increased over
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the years. A detailed analysis of the performance of these 
institutions illuminates the functioning of the prograunme 
in Kerala. Based on this, it would be possible to make some 
tentative prediction as to the direction in which the 
programme will evolve in the future. We shall first analyze 
the the performance of the federation and then go on to 
examine the two unions.
The Federation.
Table V.IO shows that the losses of the 
Federation have increased from Rs 0.341 million to Rs 2.987 
million during the last five years^^. The Federation 
operates the Central Products Dairy( CPD) at Alleppey and 
two cattle feed plants. Analysis of the performance of 
these three plants reveals that in 1991, the CPD lost Rs 
1.96 million, while the balance of Rs 1.018 million is 
accounted for by the two cattle feed plants.
The CPD's losses were mainly due to the tetra 
brick plant that was commissioned to pack milk only in 
March 1990. To break even, the plant needs to pack at least 
13,000 trays a month. During 1990-91, the plant packed only 
3500 trays a month. However, as the project has completed
During this period, the federation handed over the 
Cannanore and Palghat dairies to the newly formed Malabar 
regional union. This does affect the overall picture as they were 
profitable dairies and their transfer reduces the overall 
profitability of the Federation. However, since our analysis is 
mainly concerned with the profitability of the Central Products 
Dairy and the cattle feed plants, the transfer of the dairies 
will not affect the validity of our argument.
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only one full year of operation it is too early to make any 
prediction as to its future.
The cattle feed plants' losses are more difficult 
to rationalise. To understand the nature of the problem, we 
analyze the working of the Pattanakkad cattle feed 
plant.The decision to locate the new plant at Pattanakkad 
was based on non-commercial considerations and we saw ( See 
Chapter IV above) that this decision had adversely affected 
its financial viability. In addition, we observe that 
pricing decisions have tended to further increase the 
financial vulnerability of the plant. The plant has an 
effective capacity of 30,000 tonnes of feed a year. In 
1990-91, it produced 24,251 MTS (metric tonnes), of feed, 
thereby achieving a capacity utilisation of 81%. By normal 
standards, it should have been making considerable profits. 
Instead, the plant lost money each year.The decision of the 
Board of Directors to under-price the products of the plant 
appears to be the main reason for this loss.
The Board had directed that the bulk of the feed 
produced should be earmarked for APCOS. This was a 
reasonable direction to make, given that the plant was set 
up to meet the requirements of the farmer members. However 
the programme planners did not intend that the feed should 
be supplied at a price less than its cost of production. In 
1990, the average cost of production for a tonne of feed 
was Rs 2256. The price realised by the plant by sale of
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feed to the societies was well below this rate, as can be 
seen from Table V.ll.
TABLE V.ll
Price Realised From Alternative Marketing Outlets: 
1990-91. Rs/MT
Outlet April 90 
to Sept 90
Oct 90 
to Jan 91
February
1991
March
1991
Stockist 2312.66 2312.66 2497.50 2497.50
APCOS 1920.00 2126.00 2126.00 2115.11
Difference 392.66 186.66 371.50 382.11
Quantity sold to 
APCOS (HT)
6649 4336 901 1333
Note: Revenue foregone as a result of sales at below
market rates: ( the difference between stockist's purchase 
price and APCOS's price multiplied by quantity sold to 
APCOS) = RS 5.050 million.
Source: Confidential note from Marketing Manager to
Chairman, KCMMF, dated 24/8/91.
From the above table it is clear that the net 
realisation from sales to APCOs was less than the average 
cost of production of Rs 2256 per tonne in each of the four 
time periods. Since sales to APCOs constituted 63% of total 
sales in 1990-91, the total loss to the plant should have 
been higher than the loss it actually incurred. The losses 
were lower only because the higher returns from selling to 
stockist offset the losses from the sales to the societies.
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The conclusion must be that the Board has quite 
consciously adopted a pricing policy that imposed 
considerable financial burdens on the plant. The 
rationality of this commercially indefensible decision 
becomes apparent when we analyze the benefits that accrue 
to the decision makers. First, it is a powerful instrument 
for generating political support from farmer members. The 
average price of comparable cattle feed in Kerala is given 
below:
TABLE V.12 
Price of Cattle Feed in Kerala 
March 1991
Sale Price of Mysore Feeds Rs 3100.00
Sale Price of K S Feeds Rs 3000.00
Sale Price of Tata Feeds Rs 3000.00
Sale Price of Godrej Feeds Rs 3100.00
Sale Price of KCMMF Feed to 
APCOS
Rs 2115.11
Source: KCMMF records.1991.
Market prices of comparable feed are at least 40 
to 47% higher than KCMMF feed. Given the fact that Co­
operative elites are unable to raise milk prices, providing 
feed at below market prices would be an alternative option 
to ensure continued political support. An equally
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compelling reason is the possibility of rewarding key 
political supporters through policy generated rents. 
Recipients of the subsidized feed can exploit the enormous 
gap between the prices of KCMMF feed and open market prices 
to their advantage. Thus, while there is little economic 
rationale for the underpricing of goods, the political 
gains are considerable.
The Regional Unions.
Table V.ll shows ERCMPU continuing to lose money, 
while TRCMPU, has been able to make profits. Poor financial 
performance is linked to the organisation's inability to 
keep down costs. A detailed analysis of the figures in 
Table V.ll shows that, excluding raw materials and stock 
transfers, expenditure of the two unions had increased in 
real terms from Rs 38.036 million in 1985-86 to Rs 67.33 
million in 1990-91. This constitutes a 77% growth in 
expenditure. This would have to be met by increasing the 
margin between the purchase and selling price of milk. 
However, the margins taken by the two unions show declining 
trends. Thus the margin has declined in real terms from Rs 
1.37 per litre in 1985 to Rs 1.12 in 1991. Whereas 
expenditure grew at an annual rate of 15%, income fell at 
a rate of -3%. In the next chapter, we discuss why the 
Unions were unable to increase operating margins by levying 
a higher sales price. Here we shall only note the rapid 
growth in expenditure, and offer some tentative explanation 
for it. For analytical purpose we distinguish four
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expenditure heads: raw materials; distribution costs;
amortisation costs; and labour cost. Since the major 
component of raw materials is milk, we discuss it in the 
next chapter when we discuss the pricing of milk.
1) Distribution Costs:
This includes both procurement and selling costs. 
Procurement costs have been increasing primarily as a 
result of expanding the programme to cover more marginal 
areas. A recent study indicates that whereas in the 
traditional milch tracts 35 to 40 litres of milk are 
collected in every KM, in the newly developed areas only 6 
to 8 litres are collected^^. With total procurement 
stagnating, the marginal cost of milk procurement is bound 
to rise as the programme spreads to less productive areas.
OF's central strategy is to shift milk in bulk 
from low demand/ high productive rural tracts to high 
demand/low productive urban centres. Processing centres 
were therefore set up in major urban centres so as to be 
proximate to the major consumption centres. But demand in 
Kerala is diffused^^. As a result, the entire procurement, 
processing and marketing strategies of OF often appears to
See Kurup K.P.P and Nair T.S : " Milk Marketing in
Kerala- Impact on Cattle Development Strategies." National 
Seminar on Dairv Development as an Instrument for Socio Economic 
Growth: The Kerala Experience. 21/5/90. Trivandrum.
The dispersed settlement pattern of Kerala ensures that 
demand is not concentrated in urban centres alone. Further, we 
have indicated previously, that purchasing power is diffused in 
Kerala with little difference between districts that are largely 
urban and those that are predominantly rural.
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be inappropriate for existing market conditions. To 
illustrate, Pathanamthitta is a small town approximately 70 
KM south-east of Quilon, where the main processing plant 
for the area is located. Currently, milk is being collected 
from the area around Pathanamthitta, brought to Quilon for 
processing and sent back to Pathanamthitta town for 
sales.The transportation costs involved in such an exercise 
is significant.
2) Amortisation Costs
Servicing the debts contracted from the NDDB will 
become increasingly onerous in the future. Currently, the 
yearly repayments are manageable because of the repayment 
holiday of five years.The NDDB estimates indicate that only 
19% of the loans disbursed to date fell due before 1990 
This accounts for the low interest and depreciation charges 
recorded in Table V.ll But as the programme matures, the 
debts will be more difficult to service on current 
performance.
3) Labour Cost
The largest of the three expenditures is 
labour.In real terms, labour cost for the two unions 
increased from Rs 15.93 million in 1986 to Rs 29.25 in 1991 
- an annual average growth of 17%. This increase is 
primarily due to higher emoluments rather than an increase 
in staff strength.Between 1986 and 1991, the number of
Confidential records of the NDDB. Anand.1991.
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employees in the two organisations grew at an average rate 
of 3.5%. However, the rate of growth in their emoluments 
was far higher, as the following table shows :
TABLE V.13
Growth in the Emoluments of Staff:1986-91
(Rs/Month.1986 prices)
Category* March
1986
March
1991
Annual Growth 
Rate %
I OFFICERS:
A) Senior Manager 3347.00 4596.00 7.46
B) Manager 2235.00 4256.00 18.08
C) Assistant Manager 2059.00 3368.00 12.71
D) Asst :Accounts Officer 1566.00 2851.00 16.42
E)Milk Procurement Officer 1861.00 2919.00 11.37
II Non Officers:
A) Senior Assistant 1465.00 1734.00 3.68
B) Junior Assistant 1215.00 1519.00 5.00
C) Plant Attendant 1354.00 1627.00 4.03
D) Plant Operator 1300.00 1592.00 4.50
F) Electrician 1179.00 1465.00 4.86
Source: Records of TRCMPU.1991.
* These categories are representative and not exhaustive.
The above table indicates that during the last 
five years staff incomes have increased substantially.
The figures relate to TRCMPU. However, as staffing 
patterns and salary structures are similar in all OF institutions 
in Kerala, the salary structure in TRCMPU can be extended to 
other institutions.
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Officers especially have improved their financial status 
dramatically. The inability of OF institutions to keep down 
staff costs despite mounting losses needs to be explained. 
First, the workers in KCMMF are highly unionised with 
strong links to the political leadership outside the 
organisation. One of the largest unions in KCMMF owes its 
allegiance to the Indian National Congress. The elected 
officials of the KCMMF board, who take part in the 
negotiations for pay settlements, are professional 
politicians belonging to the Congress party. In such 
negotiations, labour unions are represented by outside 
leaders who are often senior to the Board members, in the 
Congress party hierarchy. There is thus a conflict of 
interest, which is often resolved through a generous pay 
settlement. Organisational resources are thud expended to 
lubricate inter-personal political relationships.
Higher managerial pay is linked neither to 
efficiency gains nor profits. Rather it would appear that 
there is an implicit trade off, with co-operative leaders 
trading higher managerial pay in return for greater 
operational control over the organisation. Over the last 
five years, co-operative elites have established supremacy 
over forums that were designed by the NDDB to be dominated 
by the technocrats. These include the Programme Committee 
of the Federation and the Personnel committee of the 
Unions. Co-operative elites in recent years have begun to 
assume control of routine decision making through the use 
of new sub-committees of the Board. In TRCMPU,for instance,
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two new sub committees- the Purchase and Affiliation 
Committees were set up in 1990. The former consists of 
selected non-officials from the Board and finalises 
purchase contracts- a function formerly performed by
officials answerable to the board. The potential for 
exploiting this strategic position for generating "rents” 
is obvious.
This gives us a macro overview of the rapid
growth in expenditure. However, it does not explain why 
TRCMPU was able to improve its position while ERCMPU
continued to make losses. A comparative analysis of the 
expenditure patterns of the two unions reveals that the 
cost of handling one litre of milk in ERCMPU is 
substantially higher than in TRCMPU. A study by the Centre 
for Management Development, Trivandrum in 1988, found that 
whereas the cost of procuring, processing and marketing a 
litre of milk was Rs 1.48 in TRCMPU, it was Rs 1.60 in 
ERCMPU^®. This is because while total expenditure was 
higher in ERCMPU, the volume of milk handled was
substantially lower. While in 1990-91, TRCMPU's 
expenditure( excluding raw materials and stock transfers) 
was Rs 43.20 million, it sold on an average 121,700 LPD. In 
contrast, ERCMPU, while selling only 98,600 LPD had an 
expenditure of Rs 48.77 million. Thus, while volume of 
sales was 19% lower than TRCMPU, expenditure was 13% 
higher.
See:"A Report on the Study of Pricing of Milk". Centre 
for Management Development Studies. Trivandrum. 1988.
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ERCMPU faces the twin problems of lower sales and 
higher costs. While it is true that the Union functions in 
a more competitive market than TRCMPU problems internal 
to the organisation appear to have been more decisive in 
the indifferent performance of the Union.
In 1987, following the election of a new Board of
)
Directors,the incumbent Managing Director was dismissed and 
a new MD was appointed. This decision of the Board was 
perceived by both the government and the NDDB as 
illegitimate, as the guidelines for the selection of the MD 
was not observed by the Board. The government and the NDDB 
attempted to prevent the new MD from taking office. 
However, with the help of a court order, the Union was able 
to get its decision implemented. The power struggle however 
considerably weakened the autonomy of the MD.He was forced 
to cede a great deal of his executive authority to the 
Board Chairman in return for his support. Labour union 
leaders had also been approached to intercede with the 
government on the MD's behalf.This weakened his bargaining 
position with the employees of the organisation.
The loss of managerial autonomy had disastrous 
consequences for the organisation as a whole. Employees' 
productivity dropped and a "relaxed" attitude to work norms
TRCMPU does not have any organised competitor in its main 
markets. But in ERCMPU's main markets. People's Dairy Development 
Project(PDDP), a voluntary organisation sponsored by the church, 
is a very strong competitor.
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was noticeable among the staffs®. More significantly, 
professional politicians on the Board, were now in a 
relatively better position to enjoy policy generated rents. 
Allegations about the impropriety of many decisions in 
respect of the purchase of goods and appointment of staff 
began to surface regularly.
It is difficult to quantify the efficiency losses 
generated by the loss of managerial autonomy or the 
deployment of organisational resources for private gain. 
But the vastly different performance of TRCMPU, where the 
technocracy, till recently, had considerable autonomy 
indicates that the costs are not insubstantial. However, 
there are indications that even here,managers have started 
to give ground to professional politicians. The new Board, 
which has assumed office in 1991^ appears set to emulate the 
example of the ERCMPU board. The use of organisational 
resources for private political ends have thus contributed 
to the financial fragility of OF institutions. An 
examination of the financial performance of the two major
The most significant illustration of this tendency was 
the inability of the ERCMPU management to implement a new 
productivity enhancement programme. The details of this scheme 
had been finalised in consultation with the representatives of 
the workers. But the erosion in the MD's power enabled the 
workers to scuttle the entire programme.
The apex federation, the government and the NDDB were 
regularly flooded with complaints detailing the alleged 
misdemeanours of the ERCMPU board. Responding to these 
allegations, the government first appointed an inquiry commission 
to go into some of the allegations. Then in 1990, following 
complaints, it stayed the decision of ERCMPU to appoint new 
staff.
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non-OF unions in Kerala —  CMS and MDCMSU strengthens our 
argument.
SECTION III
Financial Performance of Non OF Institutions in Kerala: CMS 
and MDCMSU
TABLE V.14
Profit and Loss Statement of Non OF Institutions in 
Kerala:1980-89
Rs in millions
CMS MDCMSU
Year Profit/lose Profit/lose Profit/loee Profit/loss
Current Accumulated Current Accumulated
1980-81 -0.18 -1.24 -0.48 -0.98
1983-84 +0.04 -0.95 -0.80 -3.04
1985-86 +0.29 -0.85 -0.40 -4.12
1987-88 +0.18 -0.15 -0.24 -4.59
1988-89 +0.24 +0.09 -0.67 -5.26
Source: Records of CMS and MDCMSU.1991.
The two unions display contrasting financial 
profiles. CMS, although it started the decade with a loss, 
made profits in all the subsequent years. As a result it 
converted its accumulated losses into a small profit by the 
end of the decade. MDCMSU, on the other hand, continued to 
make losses.
Analysis of the records of MDCMSU, reveals that 
the Union's tendency to procure far more milk than it can
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profitably market, is responsible for its recurrent 
losses.In 1989 for instance, out of the 12,600 LPD it 
procured, it marketed only about 55% profitably in the 
local markets. The balance was sold in external markets at 
a substantial loss. Milk purchased at Rs 3.68 per litre was 
being sold for Rs 3.53. The gap between purchase and sale 
price was even wider in the earlier years. In 1983- 84, 
milk, purchased at Rs 3.27 per litre, was being sold in 
external markets at Rs 2.50. It is obvious that such 
commercial practices can be continued only at the cost of 
imposing severe financial burdens on the organisation.
While no direct correlation can be drawn between 
fiscal irresponsibility and politicisation of the Board, it 
is relevant to note that CMS till 1987 had a largely non 
political Board.MDCMSU on the other hand was a cockpit of 
intense political rivalry. Political survival in MDCMSU, in 
the early eighties depended on the ability of the 
management to procure all the milk offered by member 
societies^. Fiscal rectitude was the main casualty in the 
struggle.
The roots of the conflict go as far back as the split in 
the Congress in the late Sixties.When the party split, the senior 
most leader of the party in Malappurum district, Aryadan Mohammed 
and the current chairman of MDCMSU, T V George were on opposite 
sides. Both had interests in the Union. Consequently, political 
rivalries which had their origins outside the Union began to 
impinge on its affairs. The Board, obviously felt that failure 
to lift all the milk of the farmers would be exploited by their 
political rivals both within and outside the organisation. 
Consequently, though it was financially ruinous, the Board 
continued its policy of buying dear and selling cheap.
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Summary
In this chapter, we examined whether OF had been 
able to achieve its goal of correcting the distortions that 
plagued dairy markets in the pre- OF period. OF 
institutions, through their links with the NDDB and sister 
federations in the neighbouring provinces, were initially 
able to impart some stability to dairy markets in Kerala. 
But a combination of increased demand and reduced 
procurement induced widespread shortages during 1991 and 
1992. While reduction in total production is a partial 
explanation, strategic choices made by key actors 
aggravated the problem. The NDDB's extensive strategy of 
milk procurement and the State's response to the 1989 
crisis, the co-operative elite's strategy of selective 
incentives and intra group conflicts, have in varying 
degrees contributed to the present crisis in Kerala of 
chronic milk shortages .
We have analyzed the financial performance of OF 
institutions in some detail. The variations in the 
performance of organisations are to a significant extent 
dependent on the degree to which the Boards of these 
institutions have deployed organisational resources for 
generating political capital. Implicit bargaining within 
organisations has resulted in the co-operative elites 
winning operational control over routine decision-making in 
many areas. This control is exercised to produce policy 
generated rents to reward political allies and followers. 
This process however imposes a very high financial burden
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on the organisation. On the one hand, powerful interest 
groups within the organisation such as the "technocracy" 
and trade unions have to be propitiated by generous pay 
settlements. On the other hand, rewarding political allies 
and compensating farmers through selective incentives such 
as subsidized inputs constitutes a continuous drain on the 
organisations * resources.
The supply of selective incentives, we have 
argued, can, in part, be explained by the failure of the 
co-operative elites to provide higher milk procurement 
prices to the farmers. Subsidized cattle feed and other 
inputs are thus offered instead of higher milk prices. 
Since the primary objective of OF is to provide 
remunerative prices for the produce of dairy farmers, this 
failure needs explanation. We now turn to an examination 
of these issues in Chapter VI.
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The Politics of Milk Pricing
It is notoriously difficult to isolate and 
capture the economic returns that farmers derive from 
complex multi dimensional agrarian progrsunmes. Such 
programmes cannot be viewed in isolation from the changes 
that occur within the larger agrarian economy^.Further, the 
farmer is both a producer and a consumer. As Bates 
observes, the farmer operates simultaneously in three 
markets- the product market, the input market and the
market for consumption goods^ • The real income of the 
farmer is therefore a function of the interaction of these 
three markets.
Any attempt to evaluate the economic benefits
that Kerala farmers have derived from the OF programme runs 
into a number of difficulties. First, as we have observed 
in previous chapters, dairying is marginal to the vast 
majority of farmers in Kerala. Consequently, it would be 
difficult to evaluate whether the programme has had an
impact - positive or negative on farm incomes. Second,
little comparative data is available on the differential
 ^ Changes in cropping pattern, the presence or absence of 
plentiful supply of fodder, changes induced in the composition 
of the bovine heard as a response to larger agrarian changes; all 
these tend to profoundly influence the economics of the dairy 
industry.
 ^ See Bates R H: 1981 and 1988. o p  cit
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growth of farm incomes in OF and non-OF areas. In any case, 
the reliability of such data, as a basis for judging farm 
incomes, is suspect. This is because, the OF progrêunme 
first covered areas which were already well endowed. Hence 
it would be difficult to net out the benefits that have 
accrued to the farmers through the programme specifically, 
from the benefits that arise due to the differences in 
initial endowments.
Therefore, we do not propose in this chapter to 
attempt an impact study of the economic benefits of OF in 
Kerala. Instead, we shall first examine whether farmers in 
Kerala perceive that the programme has benefitted them. 
Second, following Bates, we shall briefly examine how 
Kerala farmers in general and dairy farmers, in particular, 
have fared in the three markets identified above.Third, we 
shall analyze whether the institutional framework, which 
was designed to empower farmers, has succeeded in the twin 
tasks of achieving higher product prices with greater 
accountability.
SECTION I
OF and the Dairy Farmer
In the course of the field survey, we observed 
that farmers, especially in Malabar, harboured ambiguous 
feelings about OF. To a specific question about who has 
benefited most from the programme, only 48% of the 
respondents replied that farmers benefited most. But this
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all Kerala statistic masks very major regional differences. 
Thus, 83% and 75% of the respondents in Ernakulam and 
Trivandrum regions, respectively, stated that farmers 
benefited most, while the corresponding figures for 
Malappurum and Kozhikode districts were 21% and 11% 
respectively.
These regional variations can be explained by 
the fact that the progrcunme has been in operation for 
nearly ten years in south/central Kerala, while it was 
introduced into north Kerala only in 1989-90. The 
introduction of the programme in Malabar was accompanied by 
the cessation of a number of traditional practices 
including the vendor system and the incentive price during 
the lean season (See Chapter IV). The sudden transition 
from one system to another could have biased the 
perceptions of the farmers against the programme in 
Malabar.
However, farmers all over Kerala appear to be 
unhappy about the sum total of benefits that the programme 
has provided. Only 21% of the farmers in Kerala as a whole, 
felt that APCOS had provided them with all the services 
they expected when they joined the society. Milk prices 
were the overriding concern of the majority of the farmers. 
Two questions were asked to determine the perceptions of 
farmers about the prices offered by the societies. 86% of 
the farmers responded that when compared to prices 
prevailing in the local markets, the price offered by the 
society was unsatisfactory. There appears, however, to be
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substantial regional differences. While 87% of the fanners 
in Malappurum found that prices were unsatisfactory, only 
66% in Trivandrum agreed with this view. The gap between 
open market prices and the prices offered by the society 
were wider in Malappurum than in Trivandrum.
However, there are no such regional variations 
when asked about the prices offered by the society in 
relation to the cost of production. Nearly 90% of farmers 
in all four regions replied that prices were 
unsatisfactory. This would suggest that while farmers are 
concerned about the disparity between market prices and 
society prices, they are far more agitated about the 
inability of the organisation to provide them with a price 
that would enable them to break even^.
Interviews conducted with local co-operative 
leaders confirm the findings of the survey: farmers are
disenchanted with the prices offered by the programme. 
Increasingly, they view dairying as an unprofitable 
activity. This was not the situation at the beginning of 
the programme. In the early eighties, OF was perceived as 
a viable instrument through which farm incomes could be 
augmented. A number of studies have shown that farmers were
 ^ We may note that similar surveys in the past have found 
that farmers were unhappy about the prices offered by the 
society. The survey by the Centre for Development Studies, 
Trivandrum, in 1987-88 found that 79% of the respondents were 
unhappy about the existing price structure. See George P.S and 
Nair K.N. 1990. o p  cit.
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taking up dairying as a means of livelihood.* About 45% of 
the respondents stated that they had started dairying as 
a source of livelihood. The regional variations in the 
response are significant. Over 58% of the farmers in 
Trivandrum stated that they started to keep cows in order 
to earn their livelihood as against only 29% in Kozhikode 
district. Since OF has been in existence in Trivandrum for 
over a decade, while it was only recently introduced in 
Kozhikode, the difference in response could imply that OF 
has been a crucial factor in encouraging people to take up 
dairying.
The rationale for taking up dairying has 
significant policy implications. If dairying is largely 
taken up for consumption purposes- to meet household 
demand- then the economics of milk production may not be 
crucial for the farmer. He may be willing to suffer a 
temporary monetary loss. But for those farmers who take up 
dairying for commercial reasons, the inability to break 
even will have disastrous consequences. Farmers' 
perceptions therefore are significantly coloured not only 
by the objective reality of the price structure, but by the 
subjective rationale that induced them to enter the 
industry initially. Given the fact that a significant 
percentage of the small farmers in Kerala had been lured
* The Centre for Development Studies, found that since the 
programme started in Kerala, a significant number of small 
farmers have tended to become cattle owners. It noted in 1987, 
that about 30% of the small farmers have started maintaining 
cattle only during the last five years and concludes that the 
ownership pattern indicated a definite tendency that acquisition 
of cattle among small holdings was a recent tendency, ibid.
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into dairying by the potential benefits of OF, the failure 
of the programme to provide a remunerative price for milk 
has tarnished the image of the progreunme in the eyes of 
many farmers. We now turn to examine whether this 
assessment of the progrcunme by the farmers is in fact 
valid.
Markets and Farmers in Kerala
We had observed earlier that a farmer ' s real 
income is dependent on the interaction of three markets. 
Even if product prices are increased through institutional 
intervention, when farmers experience adverse conditions in 
input markets and the market for consumption goods, then 
the net benefits to the farmer may be negative. Therefore, 
analysis of dairy markets alone may not be sufficient to 
understand whether a specific dairy programme has increased 
farm incomes in real terms. Analysis of the performance of 
the larger agrarian economy would also be necessary.
We have in Chapter II, seen that since the mid 
eighties, growth rates in agriculture had been stagnant. A 
more detailed analysis reveals that farm incomes in general 
had declined in real terms during the eighties. The most 
reliable indicator of this declining trend is the parity 
index which is a ratio of the prices received by the farmer 
to those paid by him.® The index has therefore two
® The parity index is prepared annually by the Department of 
Economics and Statistics, Government of Kerala. To calculate the 
index of prices received, the following agricultural farm 
products, which have a marketable surplus are taken into account: 
Paddy, Coconut, Cashew, Arecnut, Ginger, Pepper, Banana, Tapioca
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components: prices received and prices paid. The index of 
prices received is computed by taking the average price 
quoted in the district and sub district markets for a 
basket of agricultural commodities. The index of prices 
paid has two components: farm cultivation costs and
domestic expenditure. The former is computed by taking the 
average cost of inputs such as wages, agricultural 
implements, manure and livestock. In the absence of 
separate cost of living indices for farmers, the consumer 
price index has been used to calculate the index of 
domestic expenditure.
TABLE VI.1
Index Numbers of Parity Between Prices Paid and Received 
by Farmers in Kerala:1980-90.
Tear P/REC* D/EXP* C/COST* P/PAID* Parity
Index
1980 481 441 607 518 93
1981 516 501 704 594 87
1982 539 530 776 641 84
1983 688 600 835 707 97
1984 883 666 1086 850 104
1985 783 685 1157 896 88
1986 921 745 1299 986 93
1987 1063 804 1413 1066 100
1988 1044 860 1520 1143 91
1989 1017 897 1604 1200 85
1990 1044 935 1711 1265 83
* P/REC= Prices Received. D/EXP= Domestic Expenditure 
C/COST= Cultivation Cost. P/PAID= Prices Paid.
Source: "Economic Review".Various Issues, op cit.
and Sugar cane.
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A number of observations may be made from the 
above table. First, during the eighties, except for two 
years, the parity index has been negative, indicating that 
real incomes of the farmers have been declining during the 
period. Second, since 1987, the index number for prices 
received has dropped in absolute terms. This would suggest 
that stagnating or even declining trends in farm gate 
prices have contributed substantially to the negative 
returns of the farmers. Third, we may note that farm 
cultivation costs have been rising more rapidly than 
domestic expenditure. Thus, between 1980 and 1990, while 
domestic expenditure grew at an annual average rate of 10%, 
input costs grew by 17%. The above analysis indicates that 
factors within the agrarian economy are primarily 
responsible for the rapid decline in farm incomes during 
the eighties.
Our analysis has thus shown that farmers in 
general have seen their real incomes eroding during the 
eighties. But the analysis does not give any clues as to 
the performance of the dairy farmer. In Table VI.2 below, 
we give the index numbers of prices paid and received by 
dairy farmers.®
® We have given the prices of the inputs that are most 
commonly used in Kerala. No attempt has been made to arrive at 
a common index of all the inputs. Such an exercise would be 
futile given that farmers in different parts of the province and 
in different economic classes use the various inputs in different 
proportions.
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TABLE VI.2 
Index of Prices Paid and Received by 
Dairy Farmers in Kerala:1980-90•
Base 1970 = 100
Tear Groundnut
Cake
Coconut
Cake
Cotton
Seed
Paddy
Straw
Milk
1980 378 230 216 192 189
1984 373 338 358 913 283
1986 349 262 360 1105 310
1988 500 364 482 1235 349
1990 570 380 531 1235 380
Source:Field reports of the Department of Animal Husbandry, 
Government of Kerala.
Except for coconut cake, the index numbers for 
all the other inputs are substantially higher than milk. 
The index numbers for paddy straw, which is the main source 
of roughage,is especially significant. It is also pertinent 
to note that whereas between 1980 and 1986, the index 
numbers for milk moved by 121 points, between 1986 and 
1990, it moved by only 70 points, pointing to the relative 
stagnation of milk prices since the mid eighties.
We now turn to excunine whether milk prices have 
increased in real terms during the OF period.
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TABLE VI.3
Prices Offered by OF Institutions at Constant
Prices :1980-90
Rs per litre*. 1980 prices
Tear Price
1980-81 2.34
1982-83 2.06
1983-84 1.82
1984-85 2.00
1985-86 2.01
1986-87 1.86
1987-88 1.97
1988-89 1.88
1989-90 1.96
*Quality= 4.5% Fat, 8.5% Solids non Fat. Source: Records of 
KCMMF.
The above figures indicate that the prices 
received by dairy fanners have declined in real terms 
during the eighties. Between 1982 and 1990, prices dropped 
by 16%. Thus, contrary to the professed aims of the 
programme, OF, like its predecessors, has been unable to 
ensure a remunerative price for the dairy farmers of 
Kerala.
The Economics of Milk Production
The combination of high input costs and low output 
costs has contributed to the perception that dairying is an
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unprofitable activity. The lack of a remunerative price is 
especially damaging to producers who are dependent on the 
market for the bulk of their inputs. Several studies 
conducted by different agencies confirm the perception of 
the farmers that dairying in Kerala is a decreasingly 
profitable activity. We give below a brief summary of a few 
of these studies.
One of the earliest studies conducted in the 
eighties, is that of the National Bank of Agricultural and 
Rural Development.7 Through an intensive study of Quilon 
district, the study excimined whether dairying was 
economical in Kerala. The reference period for the study 
was 1982-83 and as such gives an idea of the economics of 
dairying at the very beginning of OF.In calculating the 
cost of production the study took into account actual cash 
expenses, the imputed cost of home grown fodder and family 
labour and the interest on capital. On the basis of these 
costs, the study found that as against an average gross 
realisation of Rs 2.30 per litre, the farmer's cost of 
production was Rs 2.88.
The study by the Directorate of Animal Husbandry 
surveyed 96 households in four districts.® In order to 
capture the cyclical variations in milk production, the 
study covered an extended period of thirty months from
 ^ " Dairy Development in Quilon District: An Ex Post
Evaluation Study" . Economic Analysis and Publications Department, 
National Bank for Agricultural Development. Bombay. 1987.
® "Report of the Study on Cost of Production of Milk in 
Kerala - 1984-87". Department of Animal Husbandry. Government of 
Kerala. Trivandrum, 1987.
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November 1984 onwards. The study estimated cost of 
production on the basis of components such as feed costs, 
paid and unpaid labour, depreciation on animals and other 
assets, interest on capital and miscellaneous recurring 
expenditure. The study found that on an average, the cost 
of production of a litre of milk during the period 1984-86 
was Rs 3.02 per KG. Since the purchase price of milk was 
between Rs 3.14 and Rs 3.47 per KG during the period, it 
would appear that dairying was profitable.*
The Centre for Development Studies estimated the 
cost of production of milk for the period 1987-88, on the 
basis of out of pocket expenses a l o n e . T h e  study found 
that the cost of producing a litre of milk from a cross­
bred cow during the period was Rs 3.70. Comparing this 
price with prevailing local market prices, the study found 
that returns do not cover costs. If imputed costs such as 
family labour were included, then it becomes very evident 
that the " prevailing price does not offer adequate returns 
to family labour"
The most recent study was commissioned by the 
Government of K e r a l a . I n  response to persistent demands 
by the farmers to raise the price of milk, the government 
appointed a committee in 1991 to go into the whole question
* ibid
See George P S and Nair K N. 1990. o p  cit. 
ibid.
See " Report of the Committee on Milk Pricing". 
Secretariat. Department of Agriculture fPairvl. Government of 
Kerala. Trivandrum.1991.
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of milk pricing. The committee found production costs were 
substantially higher than milk prices during the period 
1987 to 1991, as the following figures indicate:
TABLE VI.4
Production Costs in the Dairy Industry in 
Kerala:1989-91
1987 1988 1991
Production Cost: Rs/litre 3.75 4.58 4.97
Purchase Price : Rs/litre 3.44 3.87 4.22
Source: Report of the Committee on Milk Pricing.1991. op 
cit.
On the basis of this finding,the government agreed 
with KCMMF's decision to raise milk prices in February 
1991.
We have delineated above, the results of four 
studies that have attempted to assess production costs in 
the dairy sector during the OF period. Three of the four 
studies have found that prices received by the farmers are 
substantially lower than production costs. A word of 
caution however is in order. It is extremely difficult to 
capture the production cost of an activity that is marginal 
to the total income of the majority of farmers. The 
opportunity cost of labour is usually very low and farmers 
supplement purchased inputs with large quantities of home 
grown feed and fodder. The proportion in which these are
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used vary from farm to farm, making the task of calculating 
uniform production costs very difficult. Further, farmers 
tend to underestimate returns and overestimate production 
costs.
However, despite these reservations, there is 
sufficient evidence, as we have seen,to conclude that 
production costs, especially when imputed costs are taken 
into account, have been higher than milk prices. The 
unfavourable movement of relative prices is especially 
destructive in an economy dominated by marginal producers. 
Over 97% of the holdings in Kerala are less than one 
hectare. Farmers with small holdings are far more dependent 
on the market for inputs than farmers with larger land 
holdings. Consequently, the rising cost of inputs imposes 
a proportionally higher burden on the small and marginal 
farmers than on the comparatively better off farmers. Thus, 
at a time of stagnant milk prices, and rising input costs, 
the scale bias inherent in the dairy economy would tend to 
have a differential impact on small and large farmers.
This is confirmed by a study conducted by the 
Centre for Management Development in 1987.“ The study 
found that when production costs are computed on the basis 
of cash expenditure only, the farmer earns a profit of only 
RS 49 per month when he has one milking cow. But the profit 
goes up to Rs 514 per month, when he has three cows. In 
other words, the larger the herd size, the lower the unit 
cost of production. However, since farmers with larger
" A Report on the Study of Pricing of Milk". 1988. op cit.
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herds also tend to have larger holdings,^ the lower 
production costs would most likely be due to lesser 
dependence on the market for inputs, than due to any 
efficiency gains derived by greater herd size. Structural 
constraints within the agrarian economy of Kerala, such as 
low per capita holdings of land and cattle, paucity of feed 
and fodder, have all contributed to high production costs. 
To reverse the negative returns of the farmer, either 
production costs have to be lowered or output prices have 
to be substantially increased.
Production costs are dependent on a number of 
factors. Any possibility of substantially reducing input 
costs through the provision of subsidized inputs by the 
State or its agencies is remote. Given the fact that 
currently only about 10% of concentrate feed requirements 
of the dairy farmers is met by the co-operative sector,^ 
any further expansion in coverage will require investment 
of a very high order. The financial viability of such an 
exercise is suspect. A more feasible alternative is to 
increase the productivity of the existing milch stock 
through better management practices. Among the measures 
suggested to increase productivity are: increasing the
reproductive efficiency of the milch stock, by reducing the
The CDS study, clearly found a correlation between size 
of holdings and herd size. Thus 21% of the households had less 
than 10 cents of land and they accounted for just 6% of the total 
cattle population. On the other hand 10% of the households with 
more that 250 cents of land accounted for 26% of the cattle 
population. See George P.S and Nair K.N. 1990. op cit.
Confidential records of KCMMF.1991
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age of first calving and the inter calving period; second, 
strengthening the extension system to impart improved
management practices to the farmers and third, introducing 
a better health care system.“
These measures can become operational only in the 
medium to long term. The proximate remedy for the
unprofitability of the dairy sector is an increase in the 
purchase price of milk. Given the fact that demand for milk 
products continues to be high in Kerala, the inability of 
the market to increase milk prices needs to be examined.
SECTION II
The Politics of Milk Pricing in Kerala.
The market's failure to provide higher prices to 
dairy farmers can be attributed primarily to two factors: 
the structure of the dairy market in Kerala and the
organisational weakness of KCMMF.
The Structure of the Dairy Market
Dairy farmers in Kerala have operated 
simultaneously in several product markets : the preferred 
outlets are local consumers within the village such as
neighbours and tea shops where the average price received 
by the farmer from local sales is at least 10% higher than 
the price realised from sales to co-operatives; but since 
the absorptive capacity of local markets is comparatively 
low, farmers are dependent on the co-operative sector to
See George P S et al: " Policy Options for Cattle
Development in Kerala". Centre for Development Studies. 
Trivandrum. 1989.
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market the milk that cannot be profitably disposed off in 
the local markets.
The KCMMF is the largest single market agent in 
all the major urban markets in Kerala, but the organisation 
controls less than 10% of the marketable surplus in Kerala. 
This market profile constrains the ability of KCMMF to use 
price as a mechanism for augmenting milk supplies. The low 
volume of marketable surplus controlled by the KCMMF 
enables other market agents to capture the benefits of a 
price rise engineered by the KCMMF. This is especially true 
in markets where rival market agents have a significant 
share of the market.
The above proposition can be tested by analysing 
the supply response of farmers to a price rise^^.In 
February 1991 the KCMMF raised milk prices by 10%. In the 
Trivandrum region, procurement increased in all the five 
sample societies studied in depth, at rates ranging from 4% 
to 50%. In the region as a whole the average daily 
procurement increased from 61,933 LPD to 81,458 LPD, an 
increase of 32%. In Ernakulam on the other hand, only in 
one of the four sample societies did procurement increase; 
in two societies procurement actually dropped after the 
price rise while in one it remained the same. In the region 
as a whole procurement increased only by 7% after the price 
rise.
The supply response is obtained by analysing the average 
daily collection for one month prior to and after a price rise. 
Data for the regional union as a whole as well as data from 
individual societies were collected. Source; Field Survey June- 
July 1991.
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We would argue that the differential supply 
response of the fanners in the two regions is a product of 
the degree to which the organisation has control over the 
market. In Trivandrum city, for instance, KCMMF controls 
more than 75% of the market. In Ernakulam on the other hand 
less than 40% of the market is estimated to be controlled 
by KCMMF.Moreover, in Ernakulam, KCMMF has a prominent 
rival in the People's Dairy Development Project (PDDP),now, 
the largest non-OF institution in Kerala. Consequently, any 
price increase by KCMMF is quickly matched by the PDDP and 
other agents." The greater market share in Trivandrum 
enables the organisation to capture a larger share of the 
benefits of a price hike while the comparatively weaker 
control over markets in Ernakulam reduces the organisations 
capacity to profit from a price rise.^° It is only in
Confidential Records of the KCMMF. 1991.
" The Chairman of the People's Dairy Development Project, 
one of the largest non-OF institutions in Kerala, informed the 
author that their pricing strategy is linked to that of KCMMF. 
Whenever the latter raises its price, PDDP also raises its price, 
though with a higher margin so as to attract more farmers to its 
fold. If for instance, KCMMF raised its price to Rs 4.25 per 
litre, PDDP would offer Rs 4.75 or Rs 5.00 per litre. Interview 
with Father Muttamana, Chairman PDDP, 19/6/91, Alwaye.
This situation makes KCMMF vulnerable to what Olson 
described as the" surprising tendency for the exploitation of the 
great by the small". Olson pointed out that in groups dominated 
by one large member, the disproportional gains accruing to 
various members would encourage the smaller members to free ride. 
See Olson M. 1965. op cit.
As KCMMF is the largest single agent in the dairy 
markets of Kerala, it generally bears the transaction costs 
involved in securing a higher price for milk. It lobbies with the 
government for permission to raise milk prices and bears much of 
the criticism levelled by consumer groups.But once KCMMF has 
raised its price other agents immediately follow with similar 
increases and captures the bulk of the benefits flowing from the 
price rise.
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Trivandrum that the KCMMF completely dominates the market: 
in other urban markets, it is vulnerable to varying degrees 
of free riding by other market agents. The organisation 
therefore ends by bearing all the transaction costs 
involved in a price rise, while deriving sub optimal 
benefits from it. This reduces the incentive for using 
price as an instrument for augmenting milk supplies.
A further constraint is that producer prices are 
already among the highest in India as the following figures 
indicate:
TABLE VI.5
Average Procurement Price of Milk in Selected States of 
India: 1981-91.
Rs/litre Quality: Fat:4.00% SNF: 8.5%
Province 1981-82 1985-86 1987-88 1990-91
Punjab 1.73 2.43 2.79 3.68
Gujarat 1.93 2.51 3.45 3.54
Weat Bengal 1.93 2.54 3.08 3.62
Andhra Pradesh 1.88 2.74 2.91 3.46
Karnataka 2.69 3.30 3.73 3.85
Tamilnadu 1.94 2.88 3.02 3.78
Kerala 2.69 3.30 3.73 4.19
Source: NDDB. Anand.1991.
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From the above figures it is evident that milk 
prices in Kerala has consistently remained higher than 
those prevailing in the rest of India. The difference 
between Kerala and the adjacent state of Tamilnadu (TN) is 
especially pertinent for our analysis. The much lower 
procurement price in TN has two implications. First, cheap 
milk will flow in from TN if KCMMF raises its prices 
without any reference to the prevailing prices in TN. In 
periods of shortages, this will not depress the markets. 
However, as we observed in chapter IV, during the first 
half of the eighties, markets were generally in
equilibrium. Consequently, KCMMF was careful not to disturb 
the equilibrium by raising producer prices to levels that 
were totally incompatible with prices generally prevailing 
in the region.
Second, an excessively high procurement price 
handicaps the organisation. Other provinces, having
comparatively lower procurement prices, are unwilling to 
buy from KCMMF at the rates prevailing in Kerala.
Consequently, in times of flush, KCMMF is forced to sell 
either at rates well below market rates or cannot sell at 
a l l . I n  the former case, the organisation suffers
enormous losses; in the latter case, the organisation is 
forced to declare procurement holidays.
21 In 1988-89 3.74 million litres of milk, priced on an 
average at Rs 4.87 per Kg was sold to neighbouring provinces at 
prices ranging from Rs 3.80 to Rs 4.00 per KG. Confidential 
records of KCMMF. 1991.
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The commercialisation of the dairy markets in 
Kerala and the increasing closer links that this forges 
with the national markets via the National Milk Grid force 
some painful choices on the organisation. On the one hand 
the comparatively high production costs in Kerala compel 
KCMMF to offer a price that is substantially higher than 
those prevailing in the region. This imposes little cost as 
long as scarcities exist in the market. But, if, as the 
government intends, dairying is to be used as an instrument 
for stimulating the agrarian sector in Kerala, the 
resultant milk surplus will have to be procured by the 
organisation and disposed off in the national markets. This 
would entail a choice between lowering the purchase price 
so as to reflect national prices or allowing the 
organisation to suffer continuous losses.
Organisational Weakness.
The increasing vulnerability of the organisation 
to State pressure is perhaps the single most important 
factor standing in the way of higher procurement prices. 
This vulnerability manifests itself in a number of key 
areas such as investment strategy, personnel policy and 
pricing decisions. We may recall from Chapter III that the 
conditionalities attached to the OF programme, enjoined the 
State not to intervene in the routine decision making 
process of the organisation. However, over the years, the 
government has managed to reestablish control over key 
areas such as pricing and staffing decisions. This process
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can be illustrated by tracing the development of milk 
pricing policy in Kerala.
Prior to the formation of KCMMF, the pricing 
policy of the State run dairies was fixed by the Secretary 
to the Government in consultation with the concerned 
minister. This practice was continued even when all the 
government dairies were amalgamated into an autonomous 
public sector corporation - the KLDMMB.
The State's desire to control pricing decisions 
was primarily motivated by its desire to ensure that urban 
milk prices did not increase too rapidly. This is clear 
from the opposition of the government to a suggestion made 
by the Government of India that a committee should be 
appointed by the Kerala Government to recommend 
remunerative prices for milk producers. The Board of 
Directors of KLDMMB, consisting of government officials, 
rejected the suggestion on the ground that a committee 
would reflect producer interests and therefore prices would 
be fixed in an arbitrary m a n n e r . T h e  suggestion for an 
independent committee to advise the government on fixing 
producer prices was, therefore, rejected and government 
continued the practice of fixing the purchase and sales 
price of milk.
The formation of KCMMF however necessitated the 
withdrawal of the government from directly intervening in 
pricing decisions. The decision to increase prices in 1984 
and 1987 was taken by the Board of Directors of KCMMF with
Noting on the confidential files of KLDMMB. 27/1/1977.
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little interference by the government. The next price rise 
proposed in early 1989 was actually carried out only in 
September 1989, due to the opposition of the government. In 
1989, the government had used persuasion to delay the price 
rise; but by late 1990 more direct and coercive measures 
were being employed.
On 15/12/90, the Board of KCMMF decided that milk 
prices would be increased from 1/1/91. The government then 
summoned the Chairman and Managing Director of the Apex 
Federation for a discussion on the proposed price hike and 
attempted to dissuade them from increasing the price. 
Subsequent to that meeting, the government, though it had 
no authority to do so, stayed the decision of KCMMF to 
increase prices until such time as a committee constituted 
for the purpose would give its recommendations. Only when 
this committee, which consisted mainly of government 
officials, recommended an increase of Rs 0.50 was the 
KCMMF able to increase its purchase and sales prices.
This history of pricing policy in Kerala 
indicates that while during the early eighties the KCMMF 
had considerable autonomy in pricing decisions, by 1991 
pricing decisions were in effect being taken by the 
government. The proximate reason for this change in 
government policy appears to be the pressure exerted by the 
dominant urban groups. The price hike of 1987, was actually 
opposed by the groups based mainly in Trivandrum. However, 
the opposition was voiced only after the decision was taken
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and implemented.^^ In 1989, the dominant groups were aware 
of the intent to raise prices well in advance of the actual 
decision. Consequently, they had sufficient time to lobby 
the government, and though they were unable to prevent the 
price rise, they were able to postpone it by over six 
months.24 By 1991, however, with the government taking over 
pricing decisions, power had effectively been transferred 
from producer groups to dominant urban groups.
Analysis of consumption patterns indicate that 
the State's decision to control milk prices cannot be 
justified on any social welfare maximizing principle. Milk 
consumption in urban Kerala is restricted to upper income 
groups as Table VI.6 indicates.
The table indicates that the consumption of milk 
is directly correlated to income. Since milk, in contrast 
to cereals, constitutes only a small percentage of the 
expenditure of the lower income groups, price controls 
cannot be justified on grounds of maximising the interests 
of the majority of the population. Rather, as we have 
indicated previously, they are a response to the pressure 
exerted by well organised,dominant groups in the polity.
23 Interview with Managing Director of TRCMPU.25/5/91.
24 Several tactics are adopted by the consumer groups. The 
most effective was to get the mass media to write editorials 
condemning the prise rise. The price hikes of KCMMF, were usually 
accompanied by a spate of articles, condemning the inability of 
the organisation to keep down prices.
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TABLE VI.6
Analysis of Urban Expenditure Patterns in Kerala: 1986-87.
Ra/ per ■oath
Monthly Expenditure 
Clmmm
Cereals % Milk and Milk 
Products
% Total Pood
50 - 60 16.65 48.8 0.97 2.8 34.13
6 0 - 7 0 19.61 49.1 2.99 7.5 39.93
70 - 85 24.69 46.6 2.77 5.3 53.00
85 - 100 20.49 37.3 5.20 9.5 54.98
100 - 125 28.01 40.7 5.43 7.9 68.85
125 - 150 32.03 34.9 7.40 8.1 91.85
150 - 200 36.91 33.8 11.12 10.2 109.25
200 - 250 38.29 30.1 12.13 9.5 127.41
250 - 300 41.08 27.5 26.21 17.5 149.41
300 6 above 40.04 25.4 32.45 17.9 181.43
All Classes 34.57 — 14.07 — 109.33
Note : Percentage represents the share of the commodity in 
total food expenditure.
Source : Sarvekshana, April- June 1989. Results of NSS 42 
Round ( 1986-87). Department of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Government of India.
The foregoing analysis indicates that a programme 
which had set out to protect farmer incomes through a 
producer dominated institutional framework, had by the end
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of the decade succumbed to the dominant interest groups in 
Kerala.
Loss of Autonomy:The Reasons.
The erosion in the organisations' capacity for 
autonomous decision making is due to a complex set of 
factors operating simultaneously. We shall attempt to 
identify some of these factors.
(1) Intra Organisational Problems.
Internecine conflicts within the organisation 
eroded its ability to withstand external pressure. The most 
significant of these conflicts was between the apex 
federation and regional unions. Chapter III showed that the 
institutional framework of OF institutions was so designed 
as to weaken the apex federation. The federation, in the 
NDDB's scheme was expected to wither away after organising 
the regional unions and establishing the processing plants. 
However, neither the Chairman nor the executives of the 
federation were willing to accept the marginal role 
allotted to them by the NDDB. The result was a series of 
skirmishes between the the federation and the unions over 
a whole range of issues: from personnel policy to marketing 
strategies. Union-federation disagreement over personnel 
policy came to a head over the appointment of the Managing 
Director of ERCMPU, to which we had referred in Chapter IV. 
The inability of the NDDB to prevent what they regarded as 
an illegal appointment, brought about a major realignment
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of forces in the KCMMF Board. The NDDB now began to work in 
tandem with the federation and government to prevent the 
unions from making fundamental changes in the 
organisational structure of the programme in Kerala.
As a result of this realignment, the State now 
had greater freedom to intervene in the affairs of the 
union and the federation. When the government stayed the 
decision of the ERCMPU Board to recruit personnel, the NDDB 
did not raise any objection, though such an order patently 
violated the conditionality of non- intervention in the 
personnel policy of the organisation. A significant
illustration of the new understanding between the NDDB and 
the government is seen in the appointment of an IAS officer 
as the Managing Director of MRCMPU, the newly formed 
regional union in Malabar. Up to that time, only 
technocrats had been appointed to such posts in Kerala. But 
the government, mindful of the ERCMPU experience wanted to 
exercise greater control over the affairs of the new union. 
So it posted an IAS officer who would be answerable
primarily to the government and not to the Board of MRCMPU. 
Given the NDDB's vociferous opposition to bureaucrats
heading co-operative institutions, acquiescence in this 
decision is an eloquent statement of the new understanding 
between the government and the NDDB.
A more recent illustration of the active
collaboration between the government and the NDDB was over 
the attempt of the co-operative elites to increase the life 
of the Board. In 1990, the TRCMPU board, decided to enhance
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the life of the Board from three to five years. The senior 
executives of the apex federation, as well as the NDDB, 
were against this decision. As the NDDB had no legal 
powers, they approached the government, and the government 
on the advice of the NDDB refused permission.
Intra group conflicts between the co-operative 
elites also strengthened the position of the government. We 
have referred previously to the conflicts between the co­
operative leaders of Malabar and those in south Kerala. 
With rival groups invoking the power of the State in 
jockeying for power and influence, the State was able to 
play one group off against the other, enhancing its 
relative power in the process. The appointment of the first 
board of MRCMPU illustrates our argument. All the board 
members were political appointees,few of whom had any 
intimate knowledge of the dairy industry. More 
significantly, none of the leaders of pre-OF co-operative 
institutions in Malabar was appointed to the board. Thus, 
the conflict between the various actors within the 
organisation enabled the government to appropriate more 
powers.
(2) The Decline of the NDDB
The erosion in the relative power capability of 
the NDDB is one of the major reasons for the decline in the 
autonomy of OF institutions in Kerala. The NDDB's strategy, 
while designing the project, was to interpose itself as a 
buffer between the government and the co-operatives. Over
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the years, the ability of the NDDB to continue to play the 
role of the shock-absorber has declined owing to a variety 
of factors. First,the OF progrsunine is drawing to a close in 
Kerala. The existing projects are in the final stages of 
execution. Consequently, the NDDB can no longer use the 
threat of stopping the inflow of finance to bring 
recalcitrant unions into line. Second,OF III was negotiated 
by the NDDB with the World Bank after a great deal of 
difficulty. The Bank had insisted upon more stringent tests 
of financial viability before new projects could be 
sanctioned. Therefore, unlike in the past, the NDDB's 
ability to sanction new projects, was severely 
circumscribed.
The difficulties faced by KCMMF in obtaining 
sanction for a new milk powder plant best illustrates the 
gradual erosion of NDDB's relative power position. Unlike 
other provinces, Kerala did not have a powder plant that 
would enable the organisation to conserve excess milk 
during the flush months. Project proposals submitted to the 
NDDB were rejected on the ground that they were 
economically unviable.^* Faced with the NDDB's refusal, the 
federation approached the government, who provided a token 
provision of Rupees one million in the 1989-90 budget. 
Then, in September 1989, the NDDB agreed to sanction the
In OF- I & II, the NDDB had considerable autonomy in 
making investment decisions. In OF-III, considerable pressure was 
brought to bear on the NDDB by the World Bank, to make more 
stringent the conditions under which new projects were 
sanctioned.
Confidential Records of the KCMMF.1991.
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powder plant with the proviso that any losses made by the 
plant would be met by the Government of Kerala.
The conflicts over the powder plant eroded the 
credibility of the NDDB in Kerala. Both the co-operative 
elites and government officials ceime to believe that the 
NDDB was either unwilling or unable to sanction new 
projects. This enhanced the the governments' profile within 
the organisation.
Third, the dependence of the NDDB on the Kerala 
government for collection of repayment dues from the unions 
further undermined the NDDB's position. In late 1989, the 
Kerala government, following a request by the NDDB, 
initiated a series of discussion with the KCMMF on 
repayment obligations to the NDDB. These discussions were 
used by the government to establish first review and 
subsequently operational control over the functioning of 
the union and federation.
Fourth, the 1989 crisis of excess production (See 
Chapter IV), further strengthened the relative power 
position of the government. The NDDB's claim to provide 
stable markets for dairy farmers was undermined by their 
failure to help the OF institutions to dispose off their 
excess milk. The NDDB's failure enabled the government to 
intervene and issue operational directions to the 
federation to deal with the crisis. 1989 was, thus, a 
watershed in State-NDDB relations and constituted the first
ibid.
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significant step in the eventual subordination of the 
entire programme to the larger interests of the State.
Fifth, exogenous policy changes at the national 
level weakened the NDDB. In 1988, the Government of India 
launched the Technology Mission for Dairy Development. The 
underlying rationale for OF had been to wrest decision 
making powers from the State and entrust them to producer 
owned/technocrat controlled institutions. To that end, OF 
duplicated many programmes, including Animal Health Care, 
Artificial Insemination and distribution of inputs, 
performed by State agencies. The Technology Mission 
insisted that such duplication of resources was wasteful 
and recommended that the NDDB should dovetail its policies 
with the ongoing programmes of government agencies.^® This 
meant that in future, the NDDB had to work with rather than 
in isolation from State agencies.
The proposed management structure for the 
Technology Mission in the various provinces is especially 
pertinent for this analysis.The implementation of the 
various programmes under the Technology Mission was to be 
coordinated and monitored by a committee headed by the 
Chief Secretary." The composition of the committee and its
®^ See: "Technology Mission for Dairy Development". NDDB.
Anand. 1988.
ibid. The Co-ordination committee in the provinces is to 
consist of the following persons: (1) Secretaries to Government 
in the departments of Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development, Rural 
Development, Agriculture and Co-operation.(2) Vice Chancellor of 
the Agricultural University. (3) Animal Husbandry Commissioner, 
Government of India. (4) Mission Director- an NDDB representative. 
(5) The Chairman and Managing Director of the apex federation.
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broad terms of reference clearly indicate that,the 
Government (both federal and state), which in the seventies 
and early eighties, had delegated most of its policy making 
authority to the NDDB, was making a major comeback.^ These 
policy changes at the national level, had an impact in 
Kerala and further weakened the bargaining position of the 
NDDB.
(3) The Subordination of the Co-operative elites.
The erosion in the NDDB's power was paralleled by 
a growth in the power of the co-operative elites. OF 
institutions in Kerala were more democratic than their 
sister institutions in the rest of the country. Elections 
were held regularly in Kerala and the office bearers of the 
organisations were elected and not appointed.^ Many of the 
decision making bodies in the OF structures such as the
Apart from review and co-ordination,the State committee 
will also have the responsibility for advising the national co­
ordination committee on fixing national targets. The departure 
from OF practices, in which the NDDB finalises the project and 
then discusses it with government officials, is obvious.
Several observers have noted that the NDDB, over the 
years, had been vested with a degree of authority over policy 
making that properly belongs to the government.Consequently, it 
is alleged that the NDDB had become " an additional layer of 
government". See Doornbos M et al. 1990. o p  cit.
If this analysis is accurate, then, through the Technology 
Mission, the State is attempting to wrest back some of the policy 
initiatives, which it had delegated to the NDDB over the years. 
Also, it may not be entirely coincidental that for the first 
time, a full secretary was posted in the Department of Dairy, in 
Government of India in 1991.
In contrast, in Tamilnadu, elections to the co-operatives 
were not held for over sixteen years.The Chairman of the 
federation and the unions were appointed by the government . OF 
institutions in Tamilnadu,therefore, were more like public sector 
corporations than co-operative institutions.
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Programme Committee of the Federation and Personnel 
Committees of the unions came to be dominated by the co­
operative elites. These democratic traditions of OF 
institutions in Kerala and the strategic positions occupied 
by the co-operative elites should have guaranteed greater 
autonomy to OF institutions in Kerala. Their failure to do 
so, therefore, needs to be explained.
A partial explanation could be the non­
representative nature of the co-operative leadership in the 
primary societies. We have noted in Chapter IV that one of 
the major objectives of OF, was to empower dairy farmers 
through an organisation that would be owned and operated by 
farmer members. To prevent non-farmer interests from taking 
over the organisation, the APCOS bye-laws provided that 
only farmers who were regularly supplying milk to the 
society would be allowed to take part in the decision­
making process.
Analysis of data collected through our field 
surveys indicate that this proviso has had limited success 
in ensuring that only genuine farmers are elected to 
decision-making forums. Resourceful individuals get around 
this proviso in a variety of ways. One favourite ploy is 
that potential candidates start to pour large quantities of 
milk in the weeks immediately prior to the election. We 
also observed a sudden increase in the number of pouring 
members in the weeks immediately prior to an election. The 
implications of this manoeuvre is that individuals, who 
otherwise have little connection with the dairy industry,
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become associated with the society purely for electoral 
purposes.”
A regional analysis of the personal background of 
the presidents of twenty sample societies was conducted to 
test this hypothesis. The analysis revealed the following 
pattern:
TABLE VI.7
Personal Background of Primary Society Presidents in 
Kerala. ”
Region Buaineaa Professionals Politician Farmer Total
Trivandrum 2 1 1 1 5
Ernakulam — 2 2 1 5
Malappurum 1 — — 4 5
Kozhikode — — 1 2 2 5
All 3 4 5 8 20
Source: Field Survey. June-July. 1991.
Only 40% of the Presidents gave their main 
occupation as farmers. In Trivandrum and Ernakulam, the two 
regions where OF has been in operation for over ten years, 
only two out of the ten presidents are full time farmers. 
In Malappurum, on the other hand, four out of five 
presidents are farmers.
Discussion with society presidents. Field Visit. June- 
July.1991.
Admittedly, the seunple is too small to make any 
generalisation about the personal backgrounds of the leaders who 
run the primary societies. But interviews with a cross section 
of individuals associated with the programme confirm that the 
pattern analyzed in this table is not too dissimilar to the 
situation existing all over Kerala.
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A further point is that as the number of 
eligible voters is usually a small proportion of the total 
membership, resourceful individuals are able to manipulate 
electoral outcomes.^* However, such practices tend to de- 
legitimise institutions and this in turn alienates farmers.
To assess the degree of alienation we analyzed 
the extent to which farmers participate in decision making 
at the society level. Since the Annual General Body is the 
only forum in which ordinary members are able to take part 
in the decision-making process freely, participation rates 
in these bodies are significant. The results are furnished 
in Table VI.8.
Societies have been categorised into two: those
directly started as APCOS and traditional societies 
converted into APCOS. Proponents of OF had always argued 
that participation rates would be higher in directly 
started APCOS, as they excluded non dairy farmers. However 
as Table VI.8 below indicates, participation rates even in 
societies such as A/1, A/2 and A/3, show a declining trend. 
Further, a closer analysis of the data with respect to the 
converted societies indicates that, participation rates go 
up immediately after its conversion to APCOS. However, over 
time the rate tends to decline, indicating that conversion
We analyzed the electoral process in seventeen societies 
for which data was available. We found that during the period 
1990-91, out of a total nominal membership of 8742 members, only 
1997 members(21%) were eligible to vote. Society presidents are 
thus usually elected by an extremely small percentage of the 
total nominal membership.
301
to APCOS has not strengthened the representative nature of 
decision-making in the societies.
TABLE VI.8
Participation Rates in General Body Meetings of Sample 
Societies: Members Present as a Percentage of Total
Membership: 1987-91.
1987 t 1989 % 1991 t
CATEGORY A* 
Society A/1 10/82) 16 11 13
Society A/2 3/82) 14 No GB 10
Society A/3 5/87) NA 33 14
CATEGORY B* 
Society B/1 1/91) No GB No GB 37
Society B/2 4/89) 3 6 3
Society B/3 9/88) No GB 3 5
Society B/4 12/82) 19 16 16
Society B/5 11/82) No GB No GB No GB
Society B/6 10/89) 33 8 12
Society B/7 11/88) 2 3 2
Society B/8 11/87) 12 2 2
Society B/9 4/87) 10 9 7
Society B/10 (4/87) 6 6 6
Society B/11 (4/87) 8 6 5
Society B/12 (4/87) 8 11 11
Note: Data relates to fifteen societies only.
* Society A= Societies directly started as APCOs; Society 
B= Societies converted to Apcos from traditional societies. 
Figures in brackets denote the month and year in which the 
society was started in the case of Category A societies and 
the conversion date in the case of Category B societies. 
Source: Field Survey. June-July. 1991.
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Participation trends can also be assessed by 
analysing the degree to which fanners are aware and 
identify with various OF institutions in Kerala. We found 
that only 69% of the respondents were able to identify 
their local dairy society president. However, when asked 
about the office bearers of the regional unions, 87% of 
respondents could not name a single member of the director 
board of the regional union. To test the familiarity of 
farmers with the functioning of the various OF structures, 
we asked the respondents to comment on the following 
statement:" The society/regional union leadership is honest 
in its dealings." Only 55% of the respondents stated that 
they found the leadership (President and directors) of the 
society always honest in its dealings. In respect of the 
leadership of the regional union 92% of the respondents 
recorded "don't know" answers.
These answers suggest that while a majority of 
farmers were familiar with the identity of the local 
leadership, a significant minority(nearly 45%) were either 
unfamiliar or did not fully approve of the society's 
functioning. In the case of the regional union, it appears 
that the vast majority of the farmers were either 
unfamiliar with the leadership and its functioning or were 
unwilling to answer the question. Intriguingly, the 
majority of the farmers appeared to make little distinction 
between OF institutions, which theoretically are owned and 
controlled by them, and a government department.Only 40% of
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the respondents disagreed with the proposition that" 
Milma^® is a co-operative only in néone. Actually it is a 
government department", while 30% agreed with the statement 
and the remainder recorded "don't know" answers. In 
Trivandrum district, where the programme has been in 
operation for over ten years, and consequently where the 
identification with OF institutions should have been 
greater, 47% of the respondents identified the organisation 
as a government department.
The participation rates and the responses to key 
questions analyzed above, clearly indicate that a 
significant section of the farmers who supply milk to OF 
institutions in Kerala, have only a tenuous commitment to 
the organisation. This lack of commitment, obviously 
facilitates the State's task of controlling dairy co­
operatives in the province.
Another significant factor that enabled the State 
to erode the autonomy of OF institutions in Kerala is the 
emergence of party politics in the dairy sector. In the 
early days of OF, elections to primary societies were 
relatively non-politicised.^ Presidents were elected 
uncontested or the contest was on non-party lines; but 
there is increasing evidences that elections to dairy co­
operatives are beginning to resemble set electoral battles
"Milma" is the brand name of the milk that KCMMF markets. 
In course of time, the organisation has come to be popularly 
known as "milma".
Discussion with society presidents. Field Visit. June- 
July 1991.
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between opposing political parties.In recent years, both 
the CPM and the Congress party k * c o m e  to regard the dairy 
sector as a potentially rich source for generating 
political capital. Consequently, the process of selecting 
candidates for both the primary society and the regional 
unions closely resembles the process used to identify 
potential candidates to the legislative assembly.
In the case of the Congress party, the panel for 
the Director Board of a primary society is decided by the 
Mandalam Committee; and in the case of the CPM, the local 
committee selects the panel. The selection process for the 
regional union board is a more elaborate affair. While 
selecting the panel for TRCMPÜ, the District Presidents of 
the Congress party, in the four districts falling under the 
jurisdiction of TRCMPU, together prepared a tentative list 
of potential candidates. While preparing the list, 
considerations such as caste,religion and region were taken 
into account.(The potential candidate's credentials as a 
successful dairy farmer or as a dairy expert were 
irrelevant to the selection process.) This list was then 
forwarded to the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC), 
the supreme decision-making authority of the Congress in 
Kerala. The KPCC initiated a series of discussions with 
various groups within the Congress. Once representation is 
given to the various groups, the final panel is adopted as 
the official panel of the Congress Party. Circulars are 
then issued calling upon all Congressmen in the societies 
to vote for the official panel of the party. The CPM
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follows a similar procedure, though in its case, the 
selection process is usually finalised at the district 
level.
The above analysis clearly indicates that OF 
institutions in Kerala are dominated by professional 
politicians, who have perceived the potential of these 
institutions for generating political resources. 
Organisational resources are deployed in variety of ways to 
generate political capital.
Since the decision to start new primary 
societies is taken by the Union Board, the sanctioning of 
societies can be used to reward supporters and punish 
opponents. Societies, thus, would be started only in areas 
where the political complexion of the farmers is favourable 
to the party in control of the board.
Second,organisational resources are expended to 
reward key political supporters. To test this hypothesis, 
we made an analysis of the quantity of subsidized feed that 
was received by societies in which key supporters of the 
KCMMF's political leadership were in power. This was then 
matched with a list of randomly selected societies. The 
results are given in Table VI.9.
The table shows that the average ratio of feed 
received to milk despatched in the key societies is far 
higher than in the randomly selected societies.Thus, the 
key societies received on average 8.03 KG for every litre
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of milk despatched to the d a i r y . T h e  ordinary societies 
on the other hand received on average, only 3.8 KG for 
every litre of milk despatched to the dairy. In other 
words, presidents of key societies are rewarded for their 
support by the generous supply of subsidized feed. Apart 
from feed, other incentives (which cannot be documented for 
obvious reasons), such as jobs for the dependents of key 
allies, are often used to ensure continued support.
TABLE VI.9
Comparative Analysis of Milk Despatched to Dairy and Feed 
Received in Key and Ordinary Societies:1989.
Milk in Litres; Feed in Tonnes
Key Societies Ordinary Societies
Society Milk Feed Society Milk Feed
Society 1 75,750 494 Society 1 72,052 624
Society 2 339,952 2400 Society 2 229,483 473
Society 3 95,818 1023 Society 3 39,441 174
Society 4 115,146 535 Society 4 102,730 489
Society 5 21,349 754 Society 5 39,134 80
Total 648,015 5206 Total 482,840 1840
The presidents of the key societies are all allies of the 
political leadership of KCMMF.
Source: Confidential Records of the KCMMF.1991.
The case of Society 5 is especially significant.This 
society has received on an average 35.32 KG for every litre of 
milk sent to the dairy. The president of the society is one of 
the most politically powerful individuals in TRCMPU and is known 
to have powerful patrons in the Congress party. There were 
persistent complaints that this society was using its political 
clout with the KCMMF leadership to acquire more feed than it 
could sell to its members. This would suggest that the society 
was selling the subsidized feed in the open market to take 
advantage of the huge difference between open market prices and 
the price at which KCMMF was selling to its member societies.
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Dairy co-operative are important to political 
parties, because they become the nucleus around which 
parties can build an organisational structure in the area. 
These structures prove invaluable for mobilising resources- 
both financial and personnel-,during general elections to 
the legislative assembly. A circular link is thus built up- 
political parties expend resources to capture dairy co­
operatives, the resources of which are then deployed to 
generate further resources for the political parties. In 
the process, political conflicts outside the organisation 
become part of intra- organisation conflicts.
We argue that the import of partisan party 
politics into OF institutions in Kerala was a major factor 
in the State's attempt to assume control. The Congress 
party had exercised control over KCMMF since the inception 
of the organisation in the early eighties. In Chapter IV we 
had noted that the opportunities for upward mobility that 
the OF institutions offered, attracted a large number of 
politicians into the programme. The Left Democratic 
Front (LDF), was not as quick as the Congress party in 
realising the potential of the dairy sector. However, the 
formation of an LDF government in 1987, was an opportunity 
to break what the government regarded as a monopoly of the 
Congress party. First, the coercive powers vested with the 
Registrar of co-operatives were subtly used to ensure that 
societies were started in areas more sympathetic to the
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LDF.^® Second, the government began to exercise greater 
operational control over the organisation so as to ensure 
that organisational resources were not deployed to benefit 
the Congress party alone. The LDF government's own 
political compulsions, thus, dictated its treatment of OF 
institutions in Kerala in the late eighties.
Summary
In this chapter, we have attempted to analyze the 
extent to which OF had benefited the farmers of Kerala. 
Since dairying was of marginal importance to the average 
farmer in Kerala, it is extremely difficult to view the 
programme in isolation. However, the movements of relative 
prices were unfavourable to the farmers throughout the 
eighties. The cost of inputs such as paddy straw increased 
rapidly, while milk prices declined in real terms. Farmers 
generally perceived that the programme had had little 
impact in improving their income, and a number of studies 
confirmed the increasing unprofitability of the dairy 
sector in Kerala.”
The proximate remedy to reverse the 
unprofitability of the dairy sector is to increase milk 
prices; but both the structure of the dairy markets in
In Malabar especially, there were complaints that more 
societies were being registered in Communist strongholds. 
Discussion with society presidents. Field Visit. June-July. 1991.
See : 1 ) "Dairy Development in Quilon District: An Ex Post 
Evaluation Study". 1987. o p  cit. 2) George P.S and Nair K.N. op 
cit 1990 and 3) "Report of the Committee on Milk Pricing".1991.
OP cit.
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Kerala and organisational weaknesses stood in the way of 
higher milk prices. Milk prices in Kerala were already 
among the highest in India and further increases would 
constrain the ability of KCMMF to participate in external 
markets (See Table 6.5). The single most significant factor 
standing in the way of higher milk prices in Kerala is the 
vulnerability of KCMMF to State pressure.
OF institutions had considerable autonomy in 
fixing procurement and sales purchases in the initial years 
of the programme. Up to the mid eighties, the government 
did not generally intervene in pricing and investment
decisions. However, this autonomy was gradually eroded 
until by 1991, the State was in effect controlling pricing 
decisions. This loss of autonomy was a consequence of three 
factors:1) conflicts between the various actors within the 
organisation enabled the government to exercise greater 
control.The dispute over the appointment of the Managing 
Director of ERCMPU led to the NDDB supporting the 
government in its efforts to discipline the leadership of 
ERCMPU. Similarly, the alienation of a number of co­
operative leaders in Malabar enabled the government to 
divide the ranks of co-operative elites. 2) The NDDB was no 
longer able to act as a buffer between the government and 
OF institutions. Policy changes by the Government of India 
and the dependence of the NDDB on the Kerala government to 
collect overdue loan repayments diluted the ability of the 
NDDB to safeguard the autonomy of OF institutions. 3 )
Political rivalry within OF institutions and the perception
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by the LDF government that the Congress party was deploying 
organisational resources to further its partisan aims, 
encouraged the government to assume greater operational 
control over the decision-making process. Since, as we saw 
in Chapter II, governments in Kerala generally promote 
consumer interests in the case of wage goods, the 
assumption of greater State control meant stagnant or 
declining procurement prices for milk.
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Operation Flood as a Role Model
Operation Flood produced sub optimal results in 
Kerala. The progreunme^ however, has been in operation in 
different parts of India for over two decades. Moreover, 
new programmes based on the same institutional framework 
have been launched to intervene in a range of commodity 
markets including fruits, vegetables, oilseeds and fish. In 
this chapter, we first assess the performance of OF at the 
all-India level.The Kerala Government's attempts to extend 
the institutional format of OF to the coconut and fisheries 
sectors are then examined.^
SECTION I
Operation Flood in India.
In this section, we examine whether OF has 
succeeded in achieving its targets at an all-India level. 
Success or failure is evaluated in terms of three criteria:
1. Has the programme contributed to substantially increased 
milk production in the country?. 2. Has the programme been 
able to ensure higher remunerative prices for dairy
 ^ In the eighties, two apex co-operative federations were 
set up by the Kerala government to intervene in the coconut and 
fisheries sectors. In 1984, the Kerala State Co-operative 
Federation for Fisheries Development (MATSYAFED) was created to 
promote development in the fisheries sector. The Kerala Kera 
Karshaka Shakarana Federation (KERAFED) was set up in 1987 to 
implement an integrated coconut development project. Both 
projects were based on the OF model.
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fanners? and 3. Are OF institutions financially viable 
organisations capable of self-sustained growth?.
In Table VII.1, we summarise the progress of OF 
II and the proposed targets under OF III.
TABLE VII.1
Achievements and Targets of OF II and OF III in 
India:1980-95
1980-81 1986-87 1990-91 1994-95
(Proposed)
Ho:o£ states 12 23 23 23
No: of unions 39 170 174 190
No:of APCOS 13,270 49,077 63,121 67,000
Members 1,747,400 5,096,919 7,477,128 NA
Milk Procured 
MKG/day*
2.56 7.85 9.70 13.30
* MKG= Million Kilograms
Source: Records of the NDDB. Anand. 1991 and Staff
Appraisal Report World Bank.1987.IBRD.Washington.
The above table shows that the expansion of 
the programme during the eighties has been massive and 
rapid. The entire country is now effectively under the 
programme. Even in areas which are not officially under the 
programme, such as Malabar, the APCO model has been adopted 
as the only model of dairy development.
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1) OF and Milk Production in India.
Paucity of reliable data makes it difficult to 
quantify the contribution made by OF to the growth of milk 
production in India.  ^ However, an attempt is made below to 
examine whether there is any connection between growth of 
milk production and OF.
Estimates indicate that while total production 
increased by 10.6% from 20.35 million tonnes (MT) in 1961 
to 22.50 in 1972 when OF was launched, it increased by 
52.4% to 34.30 MT by 1981-82 and again by 50% to 51.40 MT 
by 1989-90.3 These growth trends have been cited by 
admirers of the programme as proof that OF has contributed 
significantly to the enhancement of milk production in the 
country. The EEC's evaluation team,thus, came to the
3 A number of observers have commented on the difficulties 
of analysing milk production trends . The Quinquennial livestock 
census provides data on productivity only from the late sixties. 
Further, estimates of milk production are based on rough 
approximations rather than on statistical surveys.
In 1975-76, an attempt was made by the Government of 
India to rectify the statistical lacunae through a comprehensive 
annual integrated milk production survey. But, only 14 states 
participated in the survey. Consequently, the data on milk 
production is based partly on field surveys and partly on the 
basis of some inspired guess work.
See 1. Nair. K.N. 1985. op cit. 2. "Report of the 
Evaluation Committee on OF II". 1985. op cit and 3. Parthasarathy 
G: "White Revolution, Dairy Co-operatives and Weaker Sections". 
Economic and Political Weeklv. Review of Agriculture. Vol: XXVI. 
No: 52. 1991.
3 The figures for 1972 are taken from Nair K.N (1985) op 
cit; those relating to 1981-82 and 1989-90 are obtained from two 
sources :
1. "Reports of the Sub committee of the Technical Committee of 
Direction for Improvement of Animal Husbandry and Dairying 
Statistics". Department of Animal Husbandrv. Ministrv of 
Agriculture. Government of India. Various Issues.
2. "Economic Survey". Ministrv of Finance. Government of India. 
Various Issues.
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conclusion that" Operation Flood's activities have 
substantially increased the supply of good quality milk "in 
India.*
However, a disaggregated analysis reveals that OF 
had a differential impact in the various regions of the 
country. Table VII.2 gives a comparative analysis of milk 
production and procurement trends in India.
TABLE VII.2
Region Wise Production and Procurement Trends in 
India:1981-82 & 1989-90.
Region 1981-82 1989-90
Prod:* 
000* MT
1 Proct * 
000* KG
t Prod: 
000* MT
t Proc: 
000* KG
%
North* 16,129 47.4 413.9 14.9 22,484 44.0 1340.0 13.7
Eaet* 4,761 14.0 31.5 1.1 7,092 13.9 217.1 2.2
West* 6,527 19.2 1684.9 60.5 11,117 21.8 5124.3 52.2
South* 6,585 19.4 654.2 23.5 10,331 20.3 3132.4 31.9
All 34,002 100 2784.4 100 51,024 100 9813.8 100
Note: * Prod= Total milk produced in India.
* Proc= Milk procured by OF institutions.
* North = Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
* East = Assam, Bihar, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, 
Orissa, Sikkim, Tripura and West Bengal.
* West = Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.
* South = Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamilnadu 
Source: Production Figures : 1. Reports of the sub committee 
of the Technical Committee of Direction for Improvement of 
Animal Husbandry and Dairying Statistics. Various Issues.op 
cit.2. Economic Survey. Ministry of Finance. Various 
Issues, op cit. Procurement Figures: Records of NDDB.
* See the European Economic Commission's report to the EEC. 
Quoted in Bardhan P.C. No Date, op cit.
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The above Table indicates that the impact of the programme 
has been regionally concentrated. The West and the South 
account for 84% of the milk procured under the progrsimme at 
both time points. The North, despite accounting for 44% of 
the total milk produced in 1989-90, accounts for only 14% 
of the milk procured under the OF programme. It can be 
argued that the lower procurement in the North and East is 
due to the lower rate of commercialisation of the dairy 
economy in these regions. A recent survey indicated that 
while the marketable surplus is as high as 75% in the 
South, it is only 54% in the North.® The lower marketable 
surplus would naturally be reflected in lower procurement 
figures.
The lower rate of commercialisation in the dairy 
economy alone, cannot explain the lower procurement figures 
in the North. An equally important factor is lower 
investment in the North and East. Analysis of funds 
disbursed under OF shows that of the Rs 5.325 billion 
disbursed under the various progreunmes, about 3.421 billion 
(64%) went to the South and the West, while only Rs 1.904 
billion (36%) went to the North and the East.* The higher 
procurement figures in the South and West may be a 
reflection of the higher investment by OF in these regions. 
These figures, thus, indicate that while OF has contributed
® See "Base Line Survey of Operation Flood Areas: 1988-89". 
1991. op cit.
* Confidential records of NDDB. Anand.1991.
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to increased milk production in the country, its impact has 
been regionally specific.
This is confirmed by a number of regional 
studies. Alderman found that the project has contributed 
substantially to milk production in the co-operative 
villages of Karnataka.? Mergor and Slade reached a similar 
conclusion in respect of Madhya Pradesh.® A.C Dhas, while 
specifically rebutting the claim to increased milk 
production in Tamilnadu, nevertheless admits that the 
technical inputs provided under the programme and the 
increased marketing opportunities created by the dairy co­
operatives, gave a stimulus to milk production.® These 
studies indicate that in some regions in the country, OF 
has given a stimulus to the dairy economy.
II Operation Flood and Milk Prices
The seasonality of milk production and its 
perishability mean that in the absence of an organised 
marketing system, prices can and do fluctuate violently. 
Farmers often receive substantially lower prices from 
intermediaries during the flush season. The Jha committee 
found that prices declined by 40 to 50% during the flush
^See: Alderman H.: "Co-operative Dairy Development in
Karnataka-India: An Assessment". Research Report No;64.
International Food Policv Research Institute. Washington. D.C. 
1987.
® See: Mergos G and Slade R . : "Dairy Development and Milk 
Co-operatives :The Effects of a Dairy Project in India". 
Washington D.C: World Bank Discussion Paper No: 15. 1986.
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® Dhas A.C. 1990. o p  cit.
season when the fanners had no marketing outlets other than 
traders."" OF is designed to rectify these market 
imperfections while at the same time providing the farmer 
with a remunerative price. In this section, we exaunine the 
extent to which OF has been able to achieve this objective.
The determination of milk prices is a function 
of supply and demand. Supply factors such as the level of 
the production technology employed (for example, the 
percentage of high yielding cross-bred cattle in the milch 
herd), availability of feed and the existence of marketing 
outlets, significantly influence price behaviour. Demand 
factors such as the state of the economy and the movement 
of relative prices in the case of milk substitutes, have a 
bearing on the prices that farmers can command in the 
market. Since these factors differ enormously for a 
decentralised production system such as dairying in India, 
aggregate data on milk prices have to be used with a great 
deal of caution. Bearing these reservations in mind, we now 
examine how dairy farmers have fared in respect of milk 
prices during the OF period.
The Jha Committee argues that Maharashtra, 
Gujarat and the southern states are able to procure greater 
quantities of milk because they pay their producers well, 
while the " dairies in the north... cannot meet consumer 
demands without getting supplies from outside because...
" "Report of the Evaluation Committee on OF II". 1985. o p
cit.
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they tend to pay low prices to producers"." There is some 
merit in the argument that lower prices in the north lead 
to lower supplies. However, a great deal of caution has to 
be exercised when we make straightforward comparisons on 
prices across provinces. The Jha committee's argument is 
contradicted by data supplied by the committee itself. In 
the appendix to the report, the Committee furnishes the 
average prices received by the farmers in various regions. 
Information pertaining to the relevant regions is 
reproduced below.
TABLE VII.3
Average Producer Price in Various Regions in India
Period :1984-85. Rs/ litre 7% fat, 9.5% SNF*
South North West East
AP 2.99 UP 3.56 MR 4.10 Assam 2.59
TN 2.75 Punjab 3.19 Gujarat 3.57 Orissa 2.49
KTK 2.70 Haryana 3.32 HP 3.18 West Bengal 2.59
Rajasthan 2.31
* SNF= Solid Non Fat
AP=Andhra Pradesh; TN=Tamilnadu; KTK=Karnataka; UP=Uttar 
Pradesh; MR=Maharashtra; MP=Madhya Pradesh.
Source:"Report of the Evaluation Committee on Operation 
Flood". 1985. op cit.
11 ibid.P: 39.
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Apart from Maharashtra, none of the other
provinces in the West, paid very high prices.
Significantly, all the Northern provinces, except
Rajasthan, paid far higher prices than the southern 
provinces•
The above analysis by itself does not invalidate 
the claim that prices and procurement are positively 
correlated. It does however,point to the dangers involved 
in making generalisations about the country as a whole. 
Input prices and demand vary vastly across regions. 
Therefore, a simple comparison between milk prices 
prevailing in various regions will not further our 
understanding of the economics of milk production and
marketing in India.
A more rewarding approach would be to first 
compare the prices paid by different market agents within 
a region and then go on to analyze the cost of production 
and prices received by farmers in that region. A tentative 
attempt in this direction is made below:
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TABLE VII.4 
Prices Paid by Selected Market Agents
(Period: April-June 1988 and December-February 1989.)
Rs/litre
Region Co-operatives Household in 
village*
Others in 
village*
Urban All
Bihar 4.42 4.89 4.60 4.82 4.51
Punjab 3.89 4.43 3.46 4.16 3.83
W.UP* 3.97 4.00 4.21 3.00 4.12
Gujarat 4.60 4.58 4.71 5.50 NA
Coastal AP* 3.84 3.98 3.88 5.00 3.89
S.I.Karnataka* 3.07 3.70 3.33 — 3.15
Kerala 3.55 4.03 4.13 4.60 3.95
Tamilnadu 3.01 3.45 3.33 3.61 3.12
All India 3.72 4.11 4.10 4.39 3.85
* Households = Prices paid by consuming households 
directly to farmers. * Others = Traders within the 
village.
W.UP*= Western Uttar Pradesh; AP* =Andhra Pradesh; S.I 
Karnataka*= South Interior Karnataka.
Source: "Base Line Survey of Operation Flood Areas-
1988-89". 1991. op cit.
The above table indicates that in all the states, 
except Gujarat and Punjab,the average price paid by the co­
operative is less than that paid by the other agencies. The 
difference between the prices paid by the co-operative and 
the traders is especially significant. The latter would 
benefit most by the relatively lower price paid by the co­
operatives.
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We now examine whether the average prices 
received by dairy farmers cover their cost of production. 
We give below a region wise analysis of net revenue earned 
from dairying.
TABLE VII.5
Net Revenue From Dairying in Various Regions
(Period: Same as for Table VII.4) Rs/per litre
Zone Paid out cost Price Received Wet Revenue per 
household
East 1.25 1.69 4.15 4.12 12.60 8.74
South 1.33 1.93 3.30 3.55 7.90 5.50
North 1.31 1.16 3.96 4.06 7.82 12.64
West 1.87 1.90 4.46 4.46 6.45 9.54
All 1.45 1.67 3.85 4.02 7.53 8.66
Source : "Base Line survey of Operation Flood Areas : 1988- 
89". 1991. op cit.
The above data indicate that the net return to 
dairying ranges from Rs 5.50 per household per day in the 
south zone to Rs 12.64 in the east zone. This may appear to 
prove the assertion that the economics of dairying is 
positive in most regions of the country. But the problem 
with this data is that it does not include a number of 
variables while computing production costs. Not all imputed 
costs, including depreciation, interest on working capital 
and family labour are included in the above estimate. Since
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for most small and marginal farmers, the acquisition and 
maintenance of productive assets often involve the outlay 
of considerable time and resources, estimates which do not 
take them into consideration will present a distorted 
picture. If these costs are added to the production costs, 
the net return to the household will be considerably lower 
than the estimates provided above.
The foregoing discussion indicates that in all 
the regions, the prices paid by the co-operatives are 
substantially lower than those paid by other market agents. 
Further, when imputed costs are added to production costs, 
the economics of dairying do not appear very positive. 
These conclusions are, however, still based on broad
“ The CDS,Trivandrum, made an analysis of the feed intake 
of milch stock belonging to different categories of farmers. The 
average feed intake of a cross-bred cow in milk, owned by a 
farmer with less than 10 cents of land was seen to be as follows:
Cultivated grass 
Collected grass 
Purchased grass 
Crop residue 
Paddy straw 
Concentrates 
Compounded feed 
Minerals
KG/per day/animal
0.00
12.60
0.35
0.29
3.52
2.12
1.49
0.004
The study observed that owing to the absence of a market for 
items such as cultivated and collected grass and crop residue, 
these items were left out, while making the cost of production 
calculations. Since these items constitute a significant 
percentage of the feed intake, their removal from the valuation 
process will make a major difference in determining whether the 
economics of milk production are positive or negative.If in 
addition, other imputed costs are also not added, it is clear 
that estimates which take into account only out of pocket 
expenses will not present a true picture of the viability of 
dairying. See George P S and Nair K N. 1990. o p  cit.
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aggregate data,but appear to be confirmed by three micro­
level studies conducted by the NDDB in four different 
regions in India.
Following the decline in OF procurement between 
1989-90 and 1990-91, the NDDB undertook a series of region- 
wise "quick" evaluation studies to pinpoint the causes of 
the decline. In the south, Tamilnadu and Karnataka were 
studied.The study team found that milk procurement by co­
operatives had dropped sharply in both states, when 
compared to the corresponding periods of the previous 
year The diversion of milk to private traders was 
identified as the main reason for the poor procurement of 
the co-operative sector. In the district of Salem for 
instance, private trades reported that their procurement 
increased by over 50%.
The proximate reason for the decline in 
procurement, was the inability of co-operatives to maintain 
milk prices at par with production costs. Milk procurement 
prices had remained stagnant in Tamilnadu at Rs 2.80 per KG 
of cow milk since 1988 and in Mysore (Karnataka) at Rs 3.80 
since February 1989. The study team concluded that the 
inability of co-operatives to increase milk prices in the 
face of rising input costs, increased the alienation of 
farmers from the sector.
"A Rapid Survey of Declining Milk Production in the 
South". 1991. OP cit.
ibid.
ibid.
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The second study- " A Rapid Study of Milk 
Procurement in Bulandshar Union"-, found that in the 
northern region, milk procurement by the co-operative 
sector had declined by about 12% in the 1990 October- 
December period, as compared to the corresponding period in 
the previous year.^* The most significant factor appears to 
have been diversion from co-operative to the private trade. 
The study team found that while the Bulandshar Union's 
total procurement dropped by 70% in 1990-91, procurement by 
private traders had doubled. In a seimple survey conducted 
by the team, more than half of the farmers and over 90% of 
the "opinion leaders" questioned, stated that the price 
offered by the society was less than that offered by 
private traders.” So, during the 1990 flush, while the co­
operatives were offering Rs 4.50 per litre, the traders 
were offering RS 6.00. The study team concluded that " the 
single most important reason to explain the fall in 
procurement is the price factor".^®
In the state of Madhya Pradesh, four milk unions 
were selected for study - Bhopal, Gwaliar, Indore and 
Ujjain. The decline in the procurement of all these unions 
is attributed to the farmer's dissatisfaction with the co­
operatives :"Irregular payment by the co-operatives and 
inadequate pricing to cover increased production costs have
"A Rapid Study of Milk Procurement in Bulandshar Union". 
1991. OP cit.
ibid.
” ibid
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made the producer shift away from the co-operative to the 
private sector for selling milk"." Payments were delayed 
for nearly 100 days in Indore, 70 days in Ujjain and 50 
days in Gwaliar and Bhopal. Further, while the price of cow 
milk increased by only 6% between 1989 and 1991, the cost 
of ground nut oil cake is reported to have risen by 70% 
Stagnant prices in the face of escalating production costs, 
coupled with irregular payments contributed to the 
disenchantment with the co-operative system.
The aggregate data at the national level and the 
micro level field studies, indicate that the prices offered 
by the co-operatives do not provide an adequate return to 
the farmer. This is not to deny the considerable benefits 
farmers derive from the presence of the co-operatives in 
the market. Their very existence provides an alternative 
and thereby enhances the bargaining power of the farmer in 
the market. APCOS, however, were not designed for this 
limited role. They were expected to be the price setters, 
offering the most competitive prices for milk.^^ In this 
respect, OF seems to have had only limited success.
Financial Viability of OF institutions
The overall objective of OF is the creation of an 
institutional framework within which millions of dairy
" " A Quick Survey of Declining Milk Procurement in Madhya 
Pradesh".1991. op cit.
ibid.
Interview with V.S Hebber. Senior Executive, NDDB, 
Bangalore. 18/4/1991.
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fanners can build a viable, self sustaining dairy industry. 
It is therefore axiomatic that the prosperity of the 
farmers would be critically dependent on the viability of 
these institutions.
The 1987 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, 
indicates that nearly 50% of the OF institutions in the 
country were earning a profit, while the other 50% were 
either earning cash profits only or were making losses. 
Our discussions with officials of the NDDB reveal that 
around two thirds of the unions were reportedly making 
losses during 1989-90.^* The two sets of figures point to 
the difficulty in collecting precise data about the 
profitability of OF institutions in India. The primary 
difficulty appears to be the lack of uniformity in 
accounting practices. Some institutions report their 
operating figures without taking depreciation and interest 
on capital, while others include them. We observed markedly 
different accounting practices even within a federation.^" 
Analysis of the accumulated losses of OF 
institutions indicates that in 1989-90,of the 139 unions 
(out of a total of 174), for which information is
Cash profits were calculated by leaving out depreciation 
and a portion of the interest ( ie "interest accrued but not 
due") See: Staff Appraisal Report. World Bank. 1987. op cit.
Discussion with NDDB officials at Bangalore. 18/4/91.
In Kerala, the TRCMPU and the ERCMPU until recently used 
different accounting practices, with the result that ERCMPU's 
performance was enhanced considerably more than the facts 
warranted. One year, the NDDB sent a letter of commendation to 
ERCMPU for its excellent financial results, while it was actually 
incurring losses.
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available, 119 unions (86%) had accumulated losses of 
varying degrees/" The accumulated losses of all the unions 
and federations in India totalled Rs 2107.80 million in
1989-90."
The financial health of many OF institutions is 
very suspect.This financial fragility adversely affects the 
farmers in a number of ways. First, as we have observed 
earlier in the case of the four unions in Madhya Pradesh, 
milk value payments are held up for several weeks or even 
months. This imposes great hardship on farmers who are
often dependent on immediate payment for the purchase of 
inputs and for meeting their daily consumption needs.
Second, faced with mounting losses, co-operatives 
often attempt to reduce losses by keeping procurement 
prices stagnant.Third, the production of cattle feed and 
other inputs are hampered due to the lack of working
capital. Dislocations in input supplies disturb the feeding 
pattern of the milch stock contributing to their lower 
productivity. Institutional failure, thus, imposes 
considerable costs on the farmers.
The indifferent financial performance of OF
institutions can be attributed to a variety of factors. 
First, it is often argued that the losses are due to
inadequate throughput. The Jha committee estimated that the 
average capacity utilisation of rural milk processing
The losses ranged from Rs 34,000 in Moradabad Union 
(Uttar Pradesh) to Rs 118.50 million in Indore Union (Madhya 
Pradesh). Confidential records furnished by NDDB, Anand. 1991.
ibid.
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cit
plants in India was 62% in 1983-84. However, the dairies 
belonging to 14 federations had a capacity utilisation less 
than the national average, one as low as 5%. While this 
argument has some merit in explaining the losses of 
federations with low capacity utilisation,it does not 
explain how federations such as Tamilnadu with 90% or 
Karnataka with 76% capacity utilisation continue to make 
huge losses annually. These losses can, in part be 
explained by the use of organisational resources for 
political ends(See below).
Second, a major factor seldom highlighted, is the 
capital intensity of many of the projects under OF, which 
makes it difficult for federations to service their 
d e b t s . F u r t h e r ,  Project reports are based on financial 
criteria which assume that organisational policy would be 
so oriented as to maximise profitability. However, our 
discussion in previous chapters indicates that the interest 
group process within OF institutions ensures that policies 
are seldom fashioned to optimise financial viability. We
27 IfReport of the Evaluation Committee on OF II". 1985. op
The success of "Amul" owes not a little to the fact that 
its projects in the early years, were largely financed on very 
favourable terms. Between 1949 and 1956, the Bombay government 
gave Amul Rs 2.4 million in grants and 0.29 million in loans. 
Thus, only 12% of the funds received from the Bombay government 
during this period had to be paid back. See Singh S P and Kelly 
P L, quoted in Patel S.(1990). o p  cit.
As against this financing pattern, the current lending 
conditionalities of OF, prescribe that the bulk of the resources 
will be furnished on a 70:30 ratio- 70% loans and 30% grants. The 
difference in financing pattern would make a significant 
difference to the success or failure of an institution in its 
very early phase.
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have, for instance, referred to the policy of pricing 
cattle feed below its production cost. Such a policy, while 
optimising the political interests of the co-operative 
elites, impose considerable financial burdens on the 
organisation. Similar is the situation in many dairy 
plants. These capital intensive plants had been set up on 
the assumption that they would require limited manpower. 
However these dairies had to absorb all the excess staff of 
the former State-owned plants.In the process, many of the 
financial assumptions on which these plants were built were 
undermined. OF institutions, having borrowed heavily to 
finance their construction, now find it difficult even to 
service their debts.
Third, a significant portion of the accumulated 
losses of OF institutions are inherited. We have no precise 
information as to the extent of these prior losses at the 
All India level. But judging from the Kerala experience, 
these could be considerable. In Kerala, the accumulated 
losses of the 5 dairies and one cattle feed plant operated 
directly by the government came to Rs 3.30 million when the 
federation took them over.^’ In addition, the federation 
was forced to take over insolvent unions such as the 
Kottayam dairy. Further, as we indicated in Chapter IV, all 
these units were heavily overstaffed. Consequently, the 
same pattern of expenditure which contributed to the 
accumulated losses was carried over to the new institution. 
The Jha committee reports that the experience of other
Confidential records of KCMMF. 1991.
330
federations was similar. It remarks There were also 
instances where excess staff and accumulated financial 
liabilities of the erstwhile state owned corporations had 
been passed on to the newly constituted state co-operative 
federations resulting in severe handicaps to them".”
Government policy also has a negative impact on 
the finances of most federations. Two aspects of this 
policy can be distinguished. First, state governments in 
India are reluctant to raise consumer prices. Attempts are 
often made to keep both producer and consumer prices down. 
However, occasionally, when farmer agitations threaten to 
impose unacceptable political costs, organisational 
resources are diverted to reconcile the demands of opposing 
interest groups. In Tamilnadu, for instance, the farmers 
launched a major agitation in 1988 for higher milk prices. 
The government then agreed to higher procurement prices. 
However, as an equally large price increase was not 
countenanced in consumer prices, the Tamilnadu dairy 
federation suffered a loss of 10 to 15 paise on every litre 
of milk it marketed.
OF institutions are often compelled by state 
governments to extend dairy development activities into
3° "Report of the Evaluation Committee on Operation Flood 
II". 1985. OP cit. P: 21.
31 The General Manager of "Avin", the Tamilnadu Federation, 
informed the author that in April 1991, milk purchased at RS 4.20 
was sold at only RS 5.00 per litre, leaving very little to meet 
procurement, processing and marketing costs. He further claimed 
that due to the government's interference in pricing policy, the 
federation has lost about Rs 100 million during the last several 
years.
Interview with the General Manager," Avin". Madras. 3/4/91.
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marginal regions, which cannot sustain a viable dairy 
industry. In Kerala for example, co-operatives have been 
started in a number of coastal panchayats where there is 
little scope for keeping cattle.^ The costs of this 
extension activity has to be borne by the federation or by 
the farmer through lower prices. In the former case, 
resources earmarked for trading or investment are diverted 
to finance activities that properly belong to the 
government.
Our analysis indicates that of the three criteria 
- growth in milk production, remunerative price to farmers
Coastal areas have several disadvantages in sustaining a 
profitable dairy industry. Human population densities are high 
and the cropping pattern is often not biased in favour of cattle 
friendly crops. The profile of two villages studied by a joint 
Indo-Swiss team is revealing:
Kuttimakool Village P a t t a n c h e r y
Village
(Cannanore District) (Palghat District)
coastal midland
50/hectare 5/hectare
semi-urban rural
Predominant Cropping tapioca,banana.
Pattern : vegetables Paddy
Topography 
Population Density 
Core-Periphery status
The study team found that paddy straw had to be imported in large 
quantities into Kuttimakool, as little paddy was produced 
locally. Paddy straw prices reflected its limited availability 
in the village. A bundle of straw (1.5 kg) cost Rs 4.50 in 
Kuttimakool as against only Re 1.00 in Pattanchery.
See iGincy G et al: " Farm-Level Case Study." The GUIZ (
Department of Geography, Zurich University) and the Kerala 
Livestock Development Board. Zurich and Trivandrum. 1988.
The Jha Committee recognised the necessity for 
governments to create conditions in which OF institutions can 
function effectively. It argues that it is not the role of the 
federation to conduct extension activities. That is the 
responsibility of the government. See: "Report of the Evaluation 
Committee on Operation Flood II". 1985. op cit.
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and financial viability-, only in milk production has the 
programme produced positive benefits. The factors discussed 
in Chapter I -the paucity of feed resources, the distorting 
influence of a capital intensive model of dairy development 
and the inherent difficulties of replicating the Anand 
model in vastly diverse regions- would, in varying degrees, 
affect the performance of the programme. But they are 
incomplete explanations, in as much as they focus entirely 
on the role of the NDDB and ignore the very visible 
presence of the State in implementing the programme.
The role of the State is crucial to the outcome 
of the programme. The NDDB, though it visualised OF and 
planned its operational details, nevertheless has no 
effective mechanism to translate these plans into action 
programmes. A smaller and more phased - out project could 
have been implemented by the NDDB alone, by gradually 
building up its own agencies in the concerned regions. The 
ambitious targets and the tight time fraune meant that NDDB 
was forced to depend on the various government departments 
to launch the programme and even to monitor its 
implementation. This meant that governments now had the 
opportunity to set the agenda for the programme and exploit 
the new opportunities offered by it.
From the very beginning there were conflicts 
between the various state governments and the NDDB over the 
autonomy of the proposed OF institutions in such areas as
333
pricing, staffing and investment d e c i s i o n s . The Jha 
committee reported that state governments were generally 
not willing to surrender their authority over what they 
regarded as their legitimate area of interest. They finally 
agreed to the progreunme because of the large quantities of 
resources promised by the NDDB.^®
The stage was thus set from the very beginning 
for a confrontation between the state governments and the 
NDDB. The nature of the intervention, top-down with 
quantitative targets, meant that government departments had 
an increasing role in the implementation of OF. In many 
states, dairy corporations were set up to organise the 
Anand pattern co-operatives. These corporations were in 
theory supposed to organise the co-operative institutions 
and then gracefully fade away. It did not happen quite that 
way. The names of course changed. In Kerala, the Kerala 
Livestock Development and Milk Marketing Board became the 
Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation; the 
Karnataka Dairy Development Corporation, overnight became 
the Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producer's Federation and
ibid. Conflicts over policy delayed the programme 
considerably. Though OF II was scheduled to begin in 1978 and end 
in 1985, negotiations went on till 1984 in the case of some 
governments.
Many states benefited hugely from the programme. During 
the period 1981-1990, Andhra Pradesh, for instance, received 
annually over Rs 70 million from the OF programme as compared to 
the Rs 10 million that government spent directly in 1978-79 on 
dairy development. Tamilnadu received over Rs 47 million 
annually, compared to the Rs 5.54 that the government spent in 
1978-79. These examples could be multiplied.
Source: Data collected from the Dairy Division, Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India and the NDDB.
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the Rajasthan State Dairy Development Corporation, became 
the Rajasthan Co-operative Federation. The change in name 
did not mean that the organisation had changed in any 
meaningful way. The staff were the same, the Chief 
Executives continued to be civil servants and the Chairman 
is invariably a professional politician nominated by the 
government.
Government priorities thus came to dominate the 
agenda of the newly formed OF institutions. These 
priorities include the maintenance of urban supplies at 
below market prices and the use of organisational resources 
for furthering the political interests of State elites. 
There is sufficient evidence from all over India to 
indicate that dairy plants are run primarily to meet 
consumer demand and only secondly as an instrument for 
increasing rural incomes. The National Commission on 
Agriculture found that the fluid milk plants run by the 
public sector are " to a great extent consumer oriented" 
and are not in a position to pay milk producers market 
prices.
Currently, only the federations of Kerala, Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh and Punjab have elected Chairmen. All the other 
18 federations are headed by Chairmen nominated by the 
government. A few years ago, the minister in charge of dairy 
development in Tamilnadu was the Chairman of the Tamilnadu 
federation for a short period.It is also significant to note that 
the Chief Executives of 12 federations are IAS officers. The 
combination of inherited staff, IAS Chief Executive and nominated 
Chairman, makes the typical milk federation in India, a public 
sector corporation rather than a co-operative.
See: "The Report of the National Commission on
Agriculture". 1976. o p  cit.
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Data from Karnataka, Tamilnadu and elsewhere 
indicate that the policies of the new federations are still 
oriented towards the urban consumer rather than the rural 
producer. In Karnataka, despite assurances to the World 
Bank that it would not dictate the price of milk, the state 
government is yet to give the federation the power to set 
producer and consumer prices. Similarly, in Tamilnadu, the 
federation has to gain the prior permission of the state 
government before it can raise prices^®. The situation is 
not dissimilar in other states. The result of these 
policies is, as we have seen in the previous section, 
stagnant producer prices and increasing disillusionment 
with the co-operative sector.
In the absence of detailed institution-wise 
information, the use of organisational resources for 
aggregating political interests is difficult to establish. 
However, our analysis of the situation in Kerala and the 
limited information from Karnataka and Tamilnadu indicate 
that a similar pattern could be prevalent in other states 
leading to similar outcomes.^®
The programme's sub optimal results, therefore, 
cannot be attributed solely to the mistakes of NDDB in
®^ Discussion with officials of the NDDB and the Tamilnadu 
dairy federation. Also see Mascarenhas R C. 1988. o p  cit.
Mascarenhas reports that there is intense competition 
between the Janatha party and the Congress party in Karnataka 
over the elections to the various OF institutions, beginning from 
the primary co-operative. Such competition implies that political 
leaders are well aware of the potential of these institutions 
and are willing to compete so as to get control over them. See: 
Mascarenhas R C. 1988. o p  cit.
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designing the project. True, design flaws such as 
underestimation of the difficulties in replicating Anand, 
over-ambition in respect of its coverage and the pace of 
implementation are contributory factors. But that said, we 
must admit that the role of the various provincial 
governments have been extremely questionable. They have 
emasculated the autonomy of OF institutions at birth, 
converting them instead into instruments of State policy. 
In the process, a programme which was envisaged as 
mechanism for empowering dairy farmers, instead became a 
conduit for the extraction of resources.
The veracity of these observations can be further 
confirmed by an analysis of the policies initiated by the 
State to extend the institutional format of OF to other 
agricultural commodities.
Operation Flood As A Role Model
"Operation Flood", observes the World Bank " is 
now considered the main instrument for future national 
dairy development and a lead model for co-operative based 
initiatives in other rural sub sectors"/" The proof of
The Jha committee found that while the governments of 
some provinces extended assistance to the programme, there were 
conflicts between the governments and the OF institutions on a 
number of issues. Governments were reluctant to transfer 
government owned facilities to the co-operatives and were 
unwilling to delegate the necessary autonomy in pricing, staffing 
and investment decisions. Further, they were saddled with the 
accumulated losses and excess staff of the erstwhile government 
owned dairy corporations. See: " Report of the Evaluation
Committee on Operation Flood II". 1985. o p  cit.
41 Staff Appraisal Report. World Bank. 1987. op cit. P:ll
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this observation is the extension of the OF strategy to the 
marketing of a number of other products. The NDDB is 
directly involved in the marketing of oil seeds and fruits, 
while state federations have been set up to market oil 
seeds, fruits and fish. The high profile of OF, the 
relatively easy access to multilateral financing 
institutions and the large volumes of finance available 
makes the OF model extremely attractive to policy makers. 
In Kerala, during the eighties, programmes based on the OF 
model were launched to promote the development of two 
commodities- coconuts and fish. In this section we briefly 
examine the nature of these programmes.
Even social scientists have been starry eyed about the 
possibility of extending the OF strategy to other agricultural 
products. Thus, Achaya and Huria writes" Milk is only a media 
like any other agricultural commodity; but it has been the means 
of revealing a basic policy for all agricultural development in 
the country through single commodity co-operatives. First milk, 
then oil seeds, fruits and vegetable, forestry, fisheries, 
pulses, sugar cane. What next?. The co-operatives would be linked 
with a new market concept that would revolutionise marketing.
There would be no exploitation by middlemen------  For the rural
poor it will be a dream come true". Achaya K.T and Huria V.K: 
"Rural Poverty and Operation Flood". Economic and Political 
Weekly. VolrXXI. No:37. 1986.
These projects were not financed by the NDDB,but by the 
National Co-operative Development Corporation.(NCDC). But the 
thrust of the basic strategy is closely modeled on Operation 
Flood.
The Government of Kerala had in fact approached the NDDB with 
a project for financing an integrated coconut development 
project. But the NDDB offered to finance only a pilot project. 
As this was not acceptable, the government approached the NCDC, 
who agreed to finance the project in association with the EEC.
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Coconuts
Coconut, which covers the largest cultivated 
area in Kerala, is vital to the economy of the state.** 
Nearly 3 million small and marginal farmers are dependent 
on the crop.*® Further, more than 380,000 workers are 
employed in processing coir fibre, a by-product of the 
crop.** The Kerala Kera Karshaka Shakarana Federation 
(KERAFED) was set up in 1987 as an apex co-operative 
organisation to implement an integrated coconut development 
project. The genesis of the project is traced by prograunme 
planners to the crisis of the early eighties, when the 
prices of coconuts fluctuated violently.*? The absence of 
a procurement, processing and marketing system was 
identified as the major factor responsible. It was further 
argued that earlier market interventions by the government 
were too limited to have had any impact. Therefore, the new 
project visualised the creation of a coconut growers' 
federation which would coordinate all the developmental
** With more than 875,000 hectares under coconuts, the crop 
covers around 32% of the area cultivated in Kerala. "Economic 
Review". 1990. o p  cit.
*® "Draft Project Report". KERAFED. 1985.
** "Economic Review". 1990. o p  cit.
*^ The cost of 100 nuts which was Rs 130.23 in 1981, went 
down to Rs 119.28 in 1982, rose to Rs 315.06 in 1984, before 
declining again to Rs 195.40 in 1985. Confidential Records of 
KERAFED.
Officials argue that uncertainty over prices led farmers to 
under invest in their farms, with resultant loss of productivity.
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activities and play a direct role in processing copra and 
marketing the oil.*®
The project aims to cover all the coconut growers 
in Kerala numbering around 2.9 million, by organising them 
into some 900 co-operatives. These co-operatives are 
expected to purchase all the coconut/ copra offered by the 
farmers and forward the same to the integrated processing 
units of the federation.** The project plans to build 
enough processing capacity to ensure that it is able to 
procure at least 50% of the total copra produced in the 
state. The project is estimated to cost about Rs 934.00 
million.®® Of this, 76% will be provided by the EEC and the 
balance by the NCDC and the Government of Kerala."
Currently, the project is in its very early 
phase. Therefore, no definite conclusion can be reached 
about its future viability. The overall design of the 
project and the history of similar interventions in the 
past, allow us to offer some tentative observations.
The first question is over the sheer scale of the 
project. KERAFED, eventually aims to have enough capacity
*® See "Report of the Appraisal Mission on Integrated 
Coconut Development Project". College of Agriculture Banking, 
Reserve Bank of India. No date. Page:63.
** "Draft Project Report". KERAFED. 1985.
ibid. The project was originally estimated to cost 58.6 
million Ecu. The depreciation of the Rupee has pushed up the cost 
in Rupee terms.
The EEC's role was limited to the grant of 44.20 million 
Ecu, partly as commodity aid and the balance as cash, to the 
Government of India. The latter would transfer the money to the 
National Cooperative Development Corporation, who will finance 
the project. Confidential Records of KERAFED. 1991.
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to process about 180,000 tonnes of copra a n n u a l l y T h i s  
is more than half the total quantity of approximately 
350,000 tonnes of copra produced in the state. The 
federation itself estimates that already, there exists an 
installed processing capacity of 146,000 tonnes. This would 
mean that with the new capacity being created by the 
federation, total processing capacity in the province will 
be almost equal to the total production of copra in 
Kerala.54 Currently more than 50 % of the production is 
exported to markets outside the province, mainly to 
Bombay.55 There is little evidence to suggest that KERAFED 
will be able to procure, in any significant quantity, the 
copra that is currently being exported outside Kerala. 
Consequently, gross under-utilisation of capacity is a very 
real possibility. Further, as the expeller units of the 
federation break even only at 62% capacity utilisation,5* 
the long term viability of the organisation is seriously in 
doubt.
52 "Draft Project Report". KERAFED. 1985. op cit.
5^ The figures of total production was furnished by KERAFED 
officials. July, 1991.
54in 1976, the Coconut Development Board estimated that the 
state had a total installed capacity of 340,000 tonnes. 
Subsequently in 1979 and 1983, the Coconut Development 
Corporation added a further capacity of 36,000 tonnes, taking the 
total processing capacity to over 400,000 tonnes. KERAFED 
officials argue, that a large number of the smaller processing 
units had shut down during the eighties. Consequently, it is 
contended that there will not be any excess capacity. Source: 
Documents furnished by KERAFED. 1991.
55 Records of KERAFED. 1991.
55 "Draft Project Report". KERAFED.1985. op cit.
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The project aims not merely to supplement market 
agents, but to actually supplant them. KERAFED plans to 
procure nuts directly from the farmers through their co­
operatives and eliminate the traders who traditionally 
service the farmers. However, currently only about 1.5% of 
the marketable surplus is sold to co-operatives; further, 
about 80% of the sales take place within the village 
i t s e l f . T h i s  profile implies that market agents operate 
in small localised markets proximate to the production 
centres. The attempt of a centralised marketing agency to 
duplicate the activities of thousands of small traders in 
such a segmented market, would lead almost certainly to 
high overhead costs. As the troubled history of the Coconut 
Development Corporation indicates (see below), high 
overhead costs will eventually lead the organisation to 
offer below market prices for the produce of the farmers.
The Kerala State Coconut Development 
Corporation's objectives and strategies were similar to 
that of the KERAFED.®® The Director's report of 1979 argues 
that " to stabilise the price of coconuts, copra and 
coconut oil, and to ensure a reasonable price to the 
cultivators, it is essential that the corporation enter the 
field of processing coconut and copra and marketing of
See: "Kerala Agricultural Project:Project Report". 
Project Preparation and Monitoring Cell. Government of Kerala. 
Trivandrum. 1985.
®® The corporation was set up in 1975, with the objective of 
promoting the integrated development of the sector. Records of 
the Kerala State Coconut Development Corporation. Trivandrum. 
1991.
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coconut products".s* Accordingly, the corporation set up 
processing plants capable of processing 36,000 tonnes of 
copra annually. However, capacity utilisation averaged only 
about 30% during the first half of the eighties. Throughout 
the mid eighties, capacity utilisation fell until it was as 
low as 7%. ‘^ Currently, the corporation is not processing 
any copra. In 1990-91 it had an accumulated loss of around 
Rs 70 million (as against its paid up capital of 12.5 
million)," and all its activities including the purchase 
of coconuts from farmers are at a standstill.
The Coconut Development Corporation's history has 
grave implications for the KERAFED project. The 
corporation's history of losses is "instructive". The 
creation of excess capacity led to low capacity utilisation 
and consequent losses. We have seen that KERAFED is also 
building up a huge capacity, with probably similar results. 
Second, the organisation is heavily overstaffed. Between 
1982-83 and 1986-87, at a time when the organisation was 
facing considerable difficulties, the staff strength was 
raised from 200 to 530." Third, the government instructed
"Director's Report". The Kerala State Coconut Development 
Corporation. Trivandrum. 1979. P: 11.
Records of the Kerala State Coconut Development 
Corporation. Trivandrum. Various Years.
ibid.
" A Review of Public Enterprises in Kerala: 1980-81".
Bureau of Public Enterprises. Government of Kerala. 
Trivandrum.1982.
The proximate reason for the increase in staff strength 
was the commissioning of the new processing plant in 1984. Casual 
workers, thus, increased from 210 in 1984 to 376 in 1985. Records
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the corporation to buy nuts at artificially high prices so 
as to shore up the support price of coconut.** The coconuts 
purchased had to be sold at reduced prices resulting in 
huge losses to the organisation. The financial fragility of 
the corporation severely constrained its ability to offer 
higher prices to the farmers. In fact, corporation 
officials admitted to the author that they could only 
afford to quote below market prices. A corporation set up 
to offer higher prices to farmers ended up by offering 
prices lower than the market.
The probability of KERAFED falling a victim to 
the Scime circumstances is high. Excess capacity and market 
intervention to shore up coconut prices are liable to lead 
to losses. It is also very likely that the Coconut 
Development Corporation will be wound up and its staff 
absorbed in KERAFED. This would mean that, as in the case 
of OF institutions, KERAFED would be burdened with excess 
staff from its very inception.
The future prospects of KERAFED are very much in 
doubt. Its ability to serve its farmers is crucially 
dependent on its financial viability. This is impaired by 
the decisions already taken. Further, patterns of State- 
federation relations indicate that as in the case of the
of the Kerala State Coconut Development Corporation. Trivandrum. 
Various years.
** The government was forced to do this because coconut 
prices had fallen dramatically in the early eighties. The Kerala 
Congress started a virulent campaign, which included the blocking 
of roads and trains. As the party was a member of the ruling 
coalition, the government had to act even if it meant imposing 
considerable costs on the organisation.
344
corporation, State elites, to safeguard their interests 
will impose very high costs on the federation.
The Fisheries Sector
With nearly a million people ( out of a 
population of 29 million)" engaged in fishing, fisheries 
is a major sector in the Kerala economy.** The economic 
condition of the fishermen, however, is poor with the 
majority of them living in appalling living conditions." 
The government has made repeated attempts in the past to 
promote the development of this sector. The institutional 
forms chosen included both public sector corporations and 
co-operatives. The Kerala State Co-operative Federation for 
Fisheries Development(MATSYAFED) is the latest of these 
attempts.
MATSYAFED was started in 1984 with a view to 
initiating an integrated development of the fisheries 
sector. Attributing the lack of growth in the sector to 
institutional deficiencies, the project has aimed to 
organise fishermen into primary co-operatives called 
"Fishermen Development Welfare Co-operative Societies". 
These societies are federated to MATSYAFED.
65 Census of India. 1991. op cit.
** The government estimates that there are around 929,000 
active fishermen in Kerala today. See: "Economic Review". 1990. 
OP cit.
*^  It is estimated that 48% of the households are only 
thatched huts; and only 10% of the houses possess minimum 
sanitary facilities. See "Economic Review". 1987. o p  cit.
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The objectives of MATSYAFED have been identified 
as : ( 1 ) the creation of an institutional framework through 
which fishermen can exercise greater control over their 
resources;(2) the supply of inputs such as mechanised 
crafts and better quality nets so as to augment the
productive capacity of the sector and (3) creating an
effective system to market the produce of the fishermen.
To operationalise these objectives, the project 
called for the organisation of over 80 primary co­
operatives during the first phase of the project. Technical 
inputs are supplied by MATSYAFED through these societies. 
The project also envisaged the construction of storage 
plants, common shrimp peeling sheds and ice plants.
MATSYAFED has also plans to operate about 1000 retail 
outlets, using which, it hopes to intervene in the market. 
The entire project has a total outlay of about Rs 550.00 
million.** It is financed mainly through loans advanced by 
the National Co-operative Development Corporation.
The brief outline of the project sketched above, 
indicates that the State has adopted the basic premise of 
the OF strategy for modernising the fisheries sector in 
Kerala ; an apex federation charged with the responsibility 
of organising primary co-operatives, procurement of massive 
financial resources to build and operate infrastructure 
facilities and a mechanism for engaging directly in 
marketing. The efficacy of this strategy can in part be 
judged by the experience of similar attempts in the past.
** " Review of Activities". MATSYAFED. Trivandrum.1991.
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This is not the first time that the government 
has attempted to implement an integrated fisheries 
development project. The Fourth Plan(1969-74) document 
identified the fishermen's ineffectual control over their 
produce as the primary factor responsible for their
poverty: " The lacunae of a well knit co-operative
organisation covering the entire fisher folk, especially in 
the field of marketing, is responsible for the poor 
economic conditions for the fishermen".*’ An integrated 
master plan was drawn up in the Fourth Plan to modernise 
this sector. The scheme emphasised mechanical fishing, the 
construction of infrastructure facilities and market
intervention to stabilise the price of fish.
The above objectives were to be realised through 
two institutional devices: Co-operatives and the Kerala
Fisheries Development Corporation (KFC). The government 
encouraged the formation of co-operatives in the
sector.Between 1960-61 and 1970-71, the number of co­
operatives rose from 280 to 1002 and membership increased 
from 38,590 to 1 1 3 , 9 0 4 . The co-operatives were primarily 
engaged in the supply of inputs such as mechanised fishing 
vessels,nets and other inputs necessary for fishing. The 
KFC, on the other hand was engaged directly in fishing with 
a fleet of mechanised boats. It also operated a boat
*’ "Fourth Five Year Plan Document 1969-74". State Planning 
Board. Government of Kerala. 1968.P: 83.
"Statistics for Planning". Bureau of Economics and 
Statistics. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 1982.
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building yard, several cold stores and engaged in the 
marketing of fish in both foreign and domestic markets.
By the late seventies, the integrated fisheries 
project was considered a failure even by official bodies. 
The number of co-operatives had declined to 492 by 1978-79, 
and of these, only about 154 were actually engaged in 
fishing. The government itself concluded that "the 
fishermen producers' co-operatives have proved to be 
ineffective to promote the socio-economic welfare of the 
fishermen of the S t a t e T h e  KFC did not fare any better. 
The accumulated losses of the corporation had by 1978-79, 
mounted to Rs 62.1 million, which is about four times its 
paid up capital of Rs 14.90 m i l l i o n . T h e  net worth of the 
company was negative and it was unable to finance even its 
current activities. It was subsequently wound up and its 
assets transferred to MATSYAFED.
We can offer here, only some tentative
observations to account for the indifferent performance of
both these institutional formats-the primary co-operative
and the public sector corporation. First,a number of the
co-operatives were really front organisations for powerful
individuals to wrest resources from the State. An official
Government of Kerala committee found that " the failures in 
the operation of the scheme for distribution of mechanised 
boats were due to the fact that the fishermen co-operatives 
to whom or through whom the boats were issued were all 
benami (ie under false name) co-operatives almost without
71 ••Economic Review". 1979. o p  cit. P:49.
"A Review of Public Enterprises in Kerala 1980-82". 
Bureau of Public Enterprises. Government of Kerala. 1982.
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exception. The rich and the influential among fishermen 
sponsored and controlled the co-operatives".^*
A second major problem was that over-investment 
in fisheries sector was leading to excessive exploitation 
of Kerala's fisheries resources. An expert committee 
appointed by the government remarked that investment in 
Kerala's coastal waters was far above desired optimum 
levels.^ The negative consequence of this over 
exploitation was declining catches and resultant fall in 
the income of fishermen.
Third, the KFC's failure was primarily an 
organisational failure. It was overmanned and under- 
managed. The organisation had taken over the institutions 
run directly by the Fisheries department and its 
organisational culture did not change even after it became 
a commercial corporation. This was most apparent in its 
market intervention efforts in which it consistently lost 
money.
The failure of these two institutional forms - 
the primary co-operative and the public sector corporation- 
raises a question mark over the long term viability of 
MATSYAFED. There are already indications that it is
See Krishnakumar S "Strategy and Action Programmes for a 
Massive Thrust to Fisheries Development and Fishermen's Programme 
in Kerala State (1978-83) ". Government of Kerala.1981. Quoted 
in Kurien J and Achari T R. in " On Ruining the Commons and the 
Commoner. The Political Economy of Overfishing". Working Paper 
No: 232. Centre for Development Studies.Trivandrum. 1989. P:15 
& 16.
See Kalwar A. G et al :"Report of the Expert Committee 
on Fisheries in Kerala". Bombay. 1985.
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repeating the mistakes of its predecessors. First,an
analysis of MATSYAFED*s expenditure pattern reveals that of
the Rs 50.58 million expended during 1990-91, Rs 40.60
million was spent on inputs such as outboard engines,
crafts and nets.’® We indicated that there is already
excess capacity in the fisheries sector.’* Consequently,
the additional supply of equipment, led to heightened
competition for a diminishing pool of fish stock. The
result, as MATSYAFED itself admits is that ” in all the 
districts except Trichur and Malappuram, the catch per 
fishing operation declined with an increase in the number 
of operations... the effort has over reached the optimum 
level and any increase in effort will not bring about an 
increase in quantity".”
Second, the market intervention scheme to
stabilise prices is questioned by officials of MATSYAFED 
itself. They fear that as in the case of the RFC, market 
intervention would leave them with unsold stocks, which can 
be liquidated only at great financial loss. But the funding 
agency, NCDC, and the government are pressing the 
organisation to open retail outlets and engage directly in 
marketing. As in the case of other marketing federations in 
Kerala, MATSYAFED will eventually adopt the agenda of the
’® "Review of Activities ". MATSYAFED. 1991.
’* Kurien and Achari attempted to quantify the extent of 
excess capacity in the fisheries sector, in the mid eighties, by 
comparing the recommendations of the expert committee with the 
actual number of crafts in Kerala. They came to the conclusion 
that there was 59% over capacity in the case of trawlers, 61 % 
in motorised crafts and 100% in the case of purseiners. See 
Kurien J and Achari T R. 1985. o p  cit.
” "Review of Activities". MATSYAFED. 1991.P:9.
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State; in which case, the results of this intervention 
would be no different from the earlier interventions.
The foregoing indicates that the history of past 
interventions do not offer encouraging prospects for the 
new institutions. This is hardly surprising given that the 
allegedly new organisational formats are merely the 
repackaged progeny of failed institutions. In all the three 
sectors discussed, the nature of the current intervention 
is indistinguishable from earlier attempts. To illustrate, 
we summarise below a comparative analysis of the salient 
features of past and present interventions by the State.
I Dairy Sector
A) Institutional Form;
Past: Public Sector Corporation and primary cooperatives.
Present: Apex federation. Regional Unions and primary co­
operatives .
B) Objective:
Past: Maintenance of urban milk supplies and increasing 
farm incomes.
Present: Identical
C) Content of Programme:
Recent press reports indicate that MATSYAFED is in deep 
financial trouble. It is reported to have spent Rs 110.14 million 
as against a budget provision of only Rs 31.91 million for 1992- 
93. This would imply that the organisation has already withdrawn 
from the financing institution resources that were envisaged to 
be spent only in the subsequent years of the programme.
There are also allegations that outboard motors in 
excess of requirement have been imported from abroad. Due to lack 
of resources for clearing them promptly from the Cochin port, 
MATSYAFED is reported to have paid demurrage charges amounting 
to Rs 1.70 million. The Malavala Manorama. 3/1/1993.
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Past; Procuring, processing and marketing of milk; input 
supply.
Present:Organisation of societies, procuring, processing 
and marketing of milk; input supply.
D) Management Team:
Past: Chairman: Secretary to Government. Managing Director: 
IAS. Senior Managers: Government Officials.
Present: Chairman: Political Leader. MD: IAS. Senior 
Managers: In 1989-90, all the three chief executives of the 
regional unions and three out of the four senior mangers at 
the head office, were officers inherited from the 
predecessor organisation.
E) Degree of Autonomy:
Past: Pricing and staffing decisions taken by the
government.
Present: Pricing and staffing decisions increasingly being 
taken by the government.
II Coconuts:
A) Institutional Form.
Past: Public sector corporation.
Present: Apex federation and primary co-operatives.
B) Objective:
Past: To stabilise the price of the commodity, by directly
engaging in procurement, processing and marketing.
Present: Identical.
C) Content of Programme:
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Past: Establish integrated copra processing plants; procure 
copra from traders and societies; extract oil and by­
products and market the saune under own brand name.
Present. Identical. The only additional function is the 
organisation of primary co-operatives.
D) Management Team:
Past : Chairman: Initially the Chief Secretary,
subsequently, a nominated political leader. MD: Government 
official (Non-IAS).
Present: Chairman: Secretary to Government (Agricultural 
Production Commissioner). MD: IAS
E) Degree of Autonomy:
Past: All policy decisions taken by the Government. 
Present: Identical.
Ill Fisheries Sector:
A) Institutional Form:
Past: Public sector corporation and primary societies. 
Present: Apex federation and primary societies.
B) Objective:
Past: The creation of an institutional framework for
augmenting fish production and to raise the incomes of 
fishermen. This is to be achieved through the 
implementation of an integrated fisheries development 
project.
Present: Identical
C) Content of Progreunme :
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Past: Establish and operate, cold stores, ice plants and 
boat building yards. Input supply through co-operatives. 
Directly engage in fishing; operate retail outlets to 
market fish.
Present: Organise co-operatives. Supply of inputs through 
them. Establish and operate cold stores, kerosene depots, 
boat building yards and other infrastructure facilities. 
Plans to directly market fish.
D) Management Team:
Past: Chairman: Secretary to Government.MD: Government
Official (Fisheries Department. Non-IAS).
Present: Chairman: Secretary to Government. MD: IAS.
E) Degree of Autonomy:
Past: All policy decisions taken by the government. 
Present: Identical.
The comparative analysis summarised above 
indicates that in all the five categories, there is
remarkable similarity between past and present
interventions. This may appear odd given the failure of
past interventions. Its rationality becomes apparent, when 
we observe that the nature and scope of state intervention 
is dictated by the priorities of the dominant interest 
groups that we have analyzed previously. All three groups- 
political leaders, bureaucrats and trade unions require 
that new organisations are created and maintained to
safeguard their interests (See below). In all the three 
sectors, the old institutions- the Kerala Livestock
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Development and Milk Marketing Board, the Kerala State 
Coconut Development Corporation and the Kerala Fisheries 
Corporation, were about to collapse under the weight of 
accumulated losses. The budget constraints of the 
government that we have analyzed in Chapter II, prevented 
the government from directly pumping in more resources to 
these institutions; hence, the search for institutional 
forms that could extract resources from other sources.
In all the three sectors, the new institutions 
offered fresh opportunities. In Chapters III, IV and V we 
had analyzed in detail the benefits that Operation Flood 
offered political leaders, co-operative elites, government 
officials and workers. In the case of the coconut sector, 
we noted that the political campaign orchestrated by a 
party of the ruling coalition was a factor in the 
government's decision to intervene in the sector. The 
political benefits that accrue to individual leaders were 
an added i n c e n t i v e . B o t h  senior and junior bureaucrats 
are also benefitted, as the new institution offered 
enhanced opportunities for upward m o b i l i t y . W e  have also 
observed that negotiations are going on for the absorption
The location of one of KERAFED's processing plants was 
shifted from its planned location in Trivandrum to a village in 
Quilon district purely on political considerations. KERAFED 
officials estimate that as a result of this decision, the cost 
of the land development alone has gone up from Rs 3.6 million to 
Rs 6.00 million.
It is not accidental that in all the three institutions- 
KCMMF, KERAFED and MATSYAFED- the chief executives are IAS 
officers and the senior managers are officers deputed or 
transferred permanently from the parent administrative 
department.
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of all the 530 workers of the Coconut Development 
Corporation into KERAFED. Given the history of such 
negotiations in Kerala, it is almost certain that all the 
workers will be absorbed in to the organisation.
In the fisheries sector, a major factor 
responsible for the intervention through MATSYAFED is the 
conflict between traditional fishermen and mechanised boat 
owners over dwindling fish stocks. The former wants a ban 
on monsoon trawling so as to allow fish stocks to be 
replenished, while the latter wants unrestricted access 
rights. Since both groups are politically important, 
successive governments have been adopting the twin strategy 
of buying off traditional fishermen through a generous 
supply of subsidised inputs while imposing only a very 
limited ban on trawling so as not to alienate the boat 
owners." However, to buy the loyalty of the fishermen, 
resources are necessary. Hence the importance of MATSYAFED 
and its input supply programme. MATSYAFED is also necessary 
to maintain the jobs of workers and officials when the old
See Kurien J and Achari T. R. 1989. op cit. for a
discussion on the conflict between traditional fishermen and the 
boat owners. Both the LDF and the UDF governments had problems 
with reconciling the competing claims of the two groups. The 
president of the boat owners' association is a prominent leader 
of the Kerala congress; and a member of the 1987-91 LDF 
government is a prominent seafood exporter. On the other hand, 
the traditional fishermen are electorally important in several 
coastal constituencies.
One way of reconciling these conflicts, was for the
government to buy off the traditional fishermen. Kurien and
Achari observes:" The Government warned against militant
unionisation and divided the ranks of fishermen by placating 
those under its political influence with direct financial 
assistance -subsidies and loans-as well as access to intermediate 
technology". Page:34.
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institutions collapsed. The KFC, the Fishermen Welfare 
Corporation and Inland Fisheries Development Corporation 
were all merged with MATSYAFED and all their staff absorbed 
into the new federation.
The above analysis indicates that in all the
three sectors, fresh resources were required to maintain
the interests of the dominant groups. The apex federation
became a logical choice as this form enjoyed considerable 
prestige both with indigenous and international funding 
agencies. The Government's bid for resources was therefore 
tailored to reflect the current fascination with co­
operative institutions." The institutional form is 
exogenously determined by funding requirements, rather than 
by any belief in its intrinsic superiority.
Summary
In this Chapter, we first examined the
achievements of OF in various regions. We observed that in
This is evident most blatantly in the fisheries sector. 
A perusal of the MATSYAFED project report, reveals that the 
government originally did not plan to set up an apex federation. 
But paucity of funds with the government " suggested an 
altogether different approach which included the actual 
involvement of the fishermen and the mobilisation of funds 
through institutional credit, rather than dependence of the 
State's meagre funds". "Review of Activities", o d  cit. P:2
Having no resources of its own, the government 
approached the (National Co-operative Development Corporation) 
NCDC, which agreed to finance the project subject to the 
condition that it would lend only to co-operatives. Hence 
MATSYAFED.
The EEC's and World Banks's current policy is to 
promote agricultural development through co-operatives rather 
than through public sector corporations. Hence, it is not 
entirely coincidental that KERAFED is and apex co-operative and 
not a public sector corporation.
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specific regions of the country, OF has substantially 
contributed to increased milk production • Analysis of 
pricing decisions, however, revealed that in all regions 
the price offered by the co-operatives was less than that 
offered by other market agents. As a result, farmers were 
becoming disillusioned with the co-operative system. An 
examination of the financial viability of OF institutions 
indicated that over 80% of these units are in a precarious 
financial condition . The inability of the co-operatives to 
pay higher prices to farmers and the delay in settling milk 
value payments appear to be a reflection of the financial 
fragility of these institutions.
The indifferent performance of OF institutions 
cannot be attributed solely to design flaws in the projects 
prepared by the NDDB. Government policy has a significant 
bearing on the outcome of the programme. In almost all the 
provinces, this policy has been inimical to the interests 
of both farmers and the institutions themselves. 
Governments have sought to shield urban consumers from high 
milk prices by keeping down producer prices. When this 
proved impossible on occasion due to agitation by 
farmers,governments have forced the organisations to bear 
the cost.In the process, their fragile financial health has 
been impaired permanently. OF institutions are,therefore, 
regarded by governments, primarily, as instruments for the 
extraction of resources to implement their own agenda, 
rather than as effective vehicles for the aggregation of 
peasant interests.
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In the last section, the validity of this 
observation was analyzed by examining the rationale of the 
choice of the apex co-operative as the instrument for State 
intervention in the coconut and fisheries sectors in 
Kerala. Compulsions other than the protection of peasant 
interests are responsible for the emergence of these new 
institutional forms in the eighties. The nature, scope and 
the form of State intervention in agricultural product 
markets appear to be determined by the choices made by the 
dominant groups within the polity.
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CONCLUSION
State intervention in the Indian economy is both 
massive and pervasive. The impact of this intervention in 
trade and industry has been extensively debated.^ There 
are, however, comparatively few regionally specific studies 
that explore the nature of State intervention in 
agricultural markets. We have analyzed one such 
intervention in Kerala and offered an explanation for the 
conspicuous failures that often accompany State 
intervention in the Kerala economy.
This thesis suggests that the interest group 
process, both within the organisations created by the State 
and in the larger polity, crucially determine programme 
outcomes. Access to State power is the key variable 
determining group competition within organisations. State 
and co-operative elites, trade unions and government 
officials have benefitted from the programme, while dairy 
farmers derived sub optimal returns from the programme.
We have adopted a political economy approach to 
analyze the nature of State intervention in the Kerala 
economy. The State in Kerala promotes policies that enhance 
the relative economic position of well organised groups. 
Farmers are negatively or positively affected depending
 ^ See Bhagwati N J and Desai P. 1970 and Bhagwati N J and 
Srinivasan T N. 1975 and Krueger A 0 1974.
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upon whether the goods they produce are required for the 
consumption of the dominant groups. We also argued that the 
State continues to intervene , despite past failures, due 
to the demand for fresh resources from the dominant groups. 
Agricultural policies, though initiated in the neune of 
farmers, were often observed to be mere instruments for the 
extraction of resources.
These arguments were illustrated by a study of 
dairy markets in Kerala. Comparative analyses of rubber, 
paddy, cashew, coconut and fisheries sectors were also made 
to examine the validity of these assumptions. The dairy 
industry in Kerala is dominated by a large number of 
marginal producers with low marketable surpluses. Market 
exchanges are mediated primarily through petty traders with 
little investible surpluses.
This market profile has negative implications for 
the dairy economy. Milk being a bulky, perishable 
commodity, requires an elaborate procurement, processing 
and marketing system to manage seasonal variations in 
supply and demand. However, in an economy dominated by 
numerous small producers, problems associated with 
collective action are liable to prevent the spontaneous 
emergence of institutions capable of such investment.
In the 1960's and 1970's, the State in Kerala 
attempted to play the role of the dynamic entrepreneur. It 
intervened in dairy markets both directly by setting up 
dairy plants and indirectly by sponsoring dairy co-
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operatives. In the eighties a new institutional mechanism 
was adopted- the Anand Pattern Co-operative system 
popularised through Operation Flood. Based on the 
successful co-operatives of Gujarat, the new strategy aimed 
to empower farmers through the replication of APCOS.
We examined the efficacy of State intervention in 
the dairy sector in terms of four criteria: 1) Has the
intervention led to increased milk production and has it 
strengthened the organised sector. 2) Has it resulted in 
the effective management of seasonal variations in Kerala. 
3) Are the institutions created by the intervention self- 
sustaining, profitable organisations and 4) Has the 
intervention ensured remunerative product prices for 
farmers.
Analysis of production trends confirmed that milk 
production both in Kerala and in the country as a whole, 
had increased substantially in the seventies and eighties. 
In Kerala, the increased production is attributed to both 
demand and supply factors. Price trends indicated that for 
most of the period under study, the price of milk 
substitutes, such as meat and fish, was accelerating faster 
than that of milk. The consequent higher demand for milk 
may have stimulated milk production in Kerala. Supply 
factors such as changes in the composition of the milch 
herd and the movement of relative prices have also 
contributed to the increased production of milk. Owing to 
a variety of factors, including the fragmentation of 
holdings and the conversion of paddy lands to garden lands,
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fanners found it more economical to hold milch cattle 
rather than work cattle. In the seventies, feed prices were 
also increasing slower than milk prices. This conjunction 
of favourable demand and supply factors contributed to the 
dynamism exhibited by the animal husbandry sector.
However, the single most significant factor 
responsible for increased milk production in Kerala,is the 
high productivity of milch cattle. This is a function of 
the State's imaginative cross-breeding policies such as the 
Indo-Swiss Project and the massive Artificial Insemination 
programme launched in the early seventies. These progrsunmes 
enabled the average milk yield of a cow to treble during 
the last two decades. These programmes, however,pre-dated 
OF.
OF's contribution is,in fact, marginal to the 
increased production of milk in Kerala. The pattern of 
resource allocation in the programme is skewed in favour of 
processing and marketing facilities, rather than in 
projects that directly enhance productivity. While the 
availability of increased marketing outlets have an impact 
on the supply responses of farmers, it is difficult to 
quantify the contribution made by OF to increased milk 
production in Kerala. This is especially so, as OF 
institutions in Kerala still handle less t h ^  10% of the nrj 
total marketable surplus in Kerala.
At the all India level, OF's claim to have 
increased milk production has provoked a great deal of
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debate.2 Pointing to the limited coverage of OF and its 
skewed investment pattern, critics have argued that 
increased milk production in the country is due to market 
forces rather than OF. However, regionally specific studies 
have indicated that in southern and western India, OF has 
had a positive impact on milk production.^
The second criterion is how far State 
intervention had overcome the perennial problem of seasonal 
imbalances in supply and demand. Producers faced with 
falling demand and excess production during the flush 
season, are often forced to dispose their milk at very low 
prices to traders and tea shops. These market imperfections 
could be corrected by investing in feeder balancing dairies 
and milk powder plants; but as already mentioned, a 
segmented market dominated by marginal producers is 
unlikely to generate the surpluses for such investment- 
hence one rationale for State intervention.
State intervention in the pre-OF period did not, 
however, succeed in correcting these distortions. Despite 
the State investing in a number of dairy processing plants, 
the market's ability to manage lean/flush variations 
remained very limited. Trivandrum, Calicut and other urban 
centres in Kerala continued to experience severe shortages 
during the lean period and excess supply during the monsoon 
when production is at its peak.
 ^ See George S. 1985 and Doornbos M and Nair K.N. 1990.
 ^See Alderman H . 1987. o p  cit. and Merges G and Slade R. 
1986. OP cit.
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A partial explanation for this is that investment 
by the State was not keeping pace with the increases in 
milk production. As late as 1980, Kerala did not have a 
single feeder balancing dairy or milk powder plant. The 
State's inability to substantially increase its direct 
investment in the sector could be traced to the crisis in 
the State's finances that was manifest from the mid 
seventies.*
In these circumstances, OF with its vast 
investible resources was seen as a panacea for correcting 
the distortions in the dairy markets. Between 1982 and 
1991, the programme pumped nearly Rs 223 million into the 
dairy economy of Kerala; 88% of which was invested in 
processing and marketing facilities.® An elaborate network 
of primary co-operatives, chilling centres and processing 
plants was set up in the province.
The impact of the programme was dramatic in terms 
of augmenting the organised sector's milk-handling 
capacity. Milk processed in the co-operative sector 
increased from 67,000 LPD in 1983 to 286,000 LPD in 1991.* 
OF institutions had a commanding share of the market in a
* We had observed in Chapter II, that since the mid 
Seventies, the revenue account of the government was in surplus 
in five years only. Further, the bulk of the government's revenue 
income is spent on social services. In 1989-90, for instance, 60% 
of the development expenditure was on education and health. In 
contrast, expenditure on agriculture, animal husbandry and rural 
development, together accounted for only 8.2%. See: "Kerala 
Budget in Brief 1991-92". 1991. o d  cit.
® Confidential records of KCMMF. 1991.
* ibid.
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number of urban centres in Kerala. Further, through its 
institutional ties with the NDDB and sister federations in 
other provinces, the KCMMF was better able to tackle 
seasonal variations. The NDDB provided cheap, donated 
commodities for recombination during the lean months, while 
neighbouring federations in Karnataka and Tamilnadu were 
persuaded to take the excess milk of the Kerala federation 
during the flush season. The massive investment made by the 
programme and the ability of OF institutions to forge 
lateral linkages with other institutions outside the 
province, provided some stability to dairy markets in 
Kerala.
There were however major negative developments 
towards the close of the 1980's and the beginning of the 
1990*s. OF institutions in Kerala were unable to handle the 
excess production of 1989. The inability of neighbouring 
federations( who had their own problems of excess 
production) to absorb the excess production of Kerala 
resulted in excess milk being poured into city drains. This 
throw-back to the instabilities of the pre- OF days damaged 
the reputation of OF institutions.? There were indications 
that producers negatively affected by the inability of the
 ^ Both the NDDB and co-operative leaders in Kerala had 
assured dairy farmers that with the introduction of OF, they 
would have assured marketing outlets. However, in the course of 
the field visit, many of the dairy society presidents informed 
the author that the organisation's failure to lift all the milk 
during the flush season of 1989, had alienated them from the 
organisation.
Field Visit: June-July. 1991.
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organisation to offer assured marketing outlets were opting 
out of the dairy sector.
The second development was that, beginning from 
mid 1990, OF institutions in Kerala began to experience a 
steady fall in procurement. While increased rural demand 
was a factor in the reduced inflow into the co-operative 
sector, detailed analysis revealed a more complex picture. 
Field interviews with society presidents confirmed that the 
crisis of excess production in 1989 and the inability of OF 
institutions to manage it, eroded the faith of farmers in 
the organisation. They were now hedging their bets, by 
exploring alternative marketing channels or in some case 
opting out of dairying altogether. Second, the ability of 
OF institutions to sustain the initial momentum was 
contingent on the availability of feed and fodder. Kerala, 
being chronically deficient in both these resources, could 
have reached the limits of the programme.
Third, policy choices made by the co-operative 
elites, such as the reliance on subsidized inputs rather 
than on high product prices, encouraged free-riding by 
farmers. Only a minority of farmers received subsidized 
inputs, the cost of which was then recovered by levying a 
flat rate on all milk suppliers. In this system it was more 
rational for each farmer to minimise his supplies while 
enjoying the maximum benefits. The fourth and most potent 
factor responsible for the reduced inflow to the co­
operative sector was the letter's inability to offer 
remunerative prices to farmers. This inability is a product
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of the financial fragility of most OF institutions coupled 
with the strategic choices made by State elites.
Analysis of the financial performance of 
institutions in the pre- OF period indicated that nearly 
all the State sponsored institutions were facing grave 
financial problems. The KLDMMB, the public sector 
corporation responsible for operating the State dairies as 
well as all the State- sponsored urban milk supply schemes, 
had accumulated losses running into millions of rupees. 
Eight out of the ten district milk supply unions and 51% of 
the primary societies were also operating at a loss in 
1979-80.® Pre- OF dairy institutions in Kerala were 
financially fragile organisations wholly dependent on the 
State budget for both routine functions and investment. 
This dependence constrained their ability to offer 
producers prices higher than that mandated by the State.
OF sought to overcome the financial dependence on 
the State through the creation of a viable self-sustaining 
dairy industry. The institutional framework selected for 
this was the three-tiered co-operative structure in which 
farmer-owners delegated operational control to technocrats. 
It was assumed that the NDDB, by insulating these 
institutions from societal and State pressures, could 
overcome the weaknesses of earlier interventions in the 
dairy sector.
® "Administrative Reports". Various Issues. Department of
Dairy Development, op cit.
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The experience of the past ten years does not 
validate this optimism. Of the 139 milk unions for which 
information is available, 86% had accumulated losses of 
varying degrees.* In Kerala, the apex federation(KCMMF) is 
currently operating at a loss. Of the three regional milk 
producers' unions (TRCMPU, ERCMPU and MRCMPU), only the 
TRCMPU is making profits.
A number of factors are responsible for the poor 
financial performance of OF institutions. First, OF 
institutions inherited the accumulated losses of the 
institutions created by prior interventions. The Government 
of Kerala, while handing over the dairies and chilling 
centres to KCMMF, required the latter to take over 
liabilities amounting to Rs 3.3 million."" Federations all 
over India had to take over similar liabilities of varying 
magnitude. No less damaging was the requirement that all 
the excess staff in the pre-OF institutions should be 
absorbed by the newly created OF institutions. Against a 
staff strength of 35 required to operate a 60,000 LPD 
dairy, pre- OF institutions such as the Kottayam dairy had 
96 employees processing an average of 1200 LPD." Such 
gross overstaffing was observed in all other pre-OF 
institutions. The absorption of all this excess staff into 
OF institutions, undermined the financial stability of 
these fledgling organisations. In MRCMPU, the newly created
* Confidential records of the NDDB.1991. 
Confidential Records of KCMMF.1991. 
ibid.
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regional union in Malabar, the absorption of excess staff 
increased its wage bill from RS 69.12 million to Rs 144.00 
million per annum and in the process, a small profit was 
converted into a huge loss."
Inability to keep down staff costs was a major 
contributory factor to the poor financial performance of OF 
institutions. Managerial pay increases in some categories 
Were as high as 18% per annum during the period 1986-1991. 
Such increases were correlated neither to individual 
performance nor the profitability of the organisation as a 
whole. Rather, they were a product of the ability of well 
organised groups to channel more of the organisation's 
resources to themselves. The use of organisational 
resources for developing a political constituency was 
another contributory factor. The sale of cattle feed at 
prices below the cost of production was the major factor 
responsible for the losses of the cattle feed plants.
State pressure also materially helped to weaken 
the financial health of OF institutions. By requiring them 
to organise societies and operate milk routes in areas that 
could not sustain a viable dairy industry, OF institutions 
were in fact asked to take on the developmental role of the 
State. The organisation's viability was further undermined 
by the State refusing to permit the organisation to raise 
the consumer price of milk in line with the rate of 
inflation.
Confidential Records of MRCMPU.1991.
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As a result of the factors summarised above, the 
finances of most OF institutions in the country are in a 
perilous state (See Chapter VII). Their poor financial 
status has impaired their ability to provide assured 
markets and remunerative prices to dairy farmers. Reports 
from different parts of India indicate that dairy farmers 
are turning away from the co-operative sector due to poor 
prices and delayed payments."
This takes us to the consideration of the last 
criterion: Has State intervention resulted in higher
product prices for dairy farmers?. The failure of markets 
to offer a remunerative price is an oft made claim to 
rationalise State intervention. The history of State 
intervention in the pre-OF period clearly indicates that 
intervention became an instrument for keeping down the 
producer price rather than increasing it. In Trivandrum 
dairy, the purchase price of milk was virtually frozen in 
the late sixties and early seventies. The farmers in 
Trivandrum district had on several occasions withheld 
supplies to the dairy until the government increased milk 
prices.
Analyzing the politics of milk pricing, we noted 
that prior to OF, decisions on milk pricing were taken at 
the highest levels of the Government of Kerala. A 
suggestion by the Government of India to delegate pricing
" See for example: 1) " A  Rapid Survey of Declining Milk 
Production in the South”.1991. o d  cit. 2) " A  Rapid Study of Milk 
Procurement in Bulandsha^ Union". 1991. op cit and 4) " A  Quick 
Survey of Declining Milk Procurement in Madhya Pradesh". 1991. 
OP cit.
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decisions to an independent committee was rejected on the 
grounds that such a committee would reflect producer 
interest and thereby harm the interests of the consumers.
OF was launched with the avowed aim of 
establishing an institutional framework in which dairy 
farmers will have control over their own resources. In the 
initial years of the programme in Kerala, OF institutions 
had considerable autonomy in fixing producer and consumer 
prices. This autonomy was gradually weakened, until by the 
beginning of the nineties,pricing decisions were once again 
being taken by the government. The reassertion of State 
control manifested itself in a reluctance to raise prices 
even as farm incomes were being eroded by high input costs. 
Data from other parts of the country also indicate that the 
prices offered by OF institutions were well below market 
prices."^ Producers were becoming disillusioned with the 
co-operative system and were exploring alternative 
marketing channels.
This summary indicates that while State 
intervention had some success in increasing milk production 
and stabilising markets, it failed to establish a 
financially viable, producer-friendly, dairy industry.
This patchy record can be interpreted in several 
ways. Most critics of OF have argued that design flaws in
Noting on the confidential files of the KLDMMB. 
Trivandrum. 27/1/1977.
The quick evaluation studies undertaken by the NDDB in 
1991, clearly indicated that milk prices offered by the co­
operatives were lower than market prices. (See footnote: 12)
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the conception of OF have pre- determined the o u t c o m e . I t  
has been argued that the AFCO model which evolved in a 
specific historical and geographical context was unlikely 
to succeed when transplanted elsewhere. It was also 
contended that the adoption of a western oriented, capital 
intensive system was bound to fail in the Indian context. 
While we recognise the force of these arguments, design 
flaws alone cannot account for the mixed outcomes that we 
have identified above: Milk production has increased in the 
country, while OF institutions have become weak and unable 
to respond to producer interests.
Another hypothesis would be to view the 
indifferent outcome as an organisational failure. In 
Africa, observes S. Quick, co-operative programmes are 
often imbued with the grand vision of transforming 
society.!* Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda used the
agricultural co-operatives to popularise his ideology of 
"humanism", which emphasised the equality and brotherhood 
of man. These co-operatives were expected to achieve a 
variety of goals including: promote a sense of national 
identity, increase political participation, ensure equality 
in the distribution of income and produce collective goods
!*See George S.1985, Doornbos M et al.1990 and Doornbos M 
and Nair K.N .1990.
ibid.
!* See Quick S: " The Paradox of Popularity: Ideological 
Programme Implementation in Zambia", in Grindle M.S ed: Politics
and Policv Implementation in the Third World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1980.
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for the rural population." In Tanzania, President Julius 
Nyerere attempted to bring about social and economic 
transformation through the concept of the "Ujamaa" co­
operatives, a system by which politically committed farmers 
would live and work in communal f a r m s F o r  Nyerere, the 
real driving force behind the co-operative movement was the 
spread of socialist p r i n c i p l e s . These "ideological 
programmes", as Quick describes them, are characterised by 
"multiple objectives, ambiguous and non measurable 
goals"." These programmes are likely to produce sub 
optimal results since the decision making process within 
the organisation is adversely affected by goal confusion. 
Quick argues that agencies which implement programmes with 
vaguely defined multiple goals are unable to " produce 
technically rational solutions to the problems of 
implementation"
OF has multiple goals. It sought to increase milk 
production in the country, remove rural poverty, ensure 
urban milk supplies and maximise farm incomes. However, 
attributing failure to goal confusion denies the central 
actors' capacity for autonomous choice. Why are only some
" ibid.
See Coulson A ; Tanzania: A Political Economy . Oxford: 
Clarendon. 1982.
See Saul J.S :" Marketing Co-operatives in a Developing 
Country: The Tanzanian Case", in Worsley P ed: Two Blades of
Grass :Rural Co-operatives in Agricultural Modernization . 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1971.
See Quick S. 1980. o p  cit. 
ibid.
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goals realised and not others?. This approach tends to 
underplay the explanatory vigour of power as a central 
variable in determining programme outcomes.
In this thesis, we have adopted a framework of 
analysis in which the dispersal of power between competing 
groups crucially determines outcomes. Two levels of 
analysis were identified: one concentrating on the interest 
group process within the organisation and the other on the 
larger polity outside it. Programme outcomes in this 
framework are dependent on the results of group competition 
over the allocation of resources.
Five key groups were involved in the programme : 
the national technocracy as exemplified by the NDDB; Co­
operative elites; officials of the dairy bureaucracy; 
organised labour and State elites. They had conflicting 
objectives. The NDDB itself had concluded that Kerala had 
a very poor resource base for mounting an êimbitious dairy 
development programme.^ In this context, the NDDB's 
decision to finance the project in Kerala cannot be 
explained as a disinterested attempt to maximise farm 
incomes. The conditionalities attached to the programme 
clearly indicated that NDDB's hidden agenda was to wrest 
policy making power from the S t a t e . D a i r y  policy in the
Interview with V.Kurien, Chairman NDDB, at Anand on 
22/7/91 and discussions with senior executives of the NDDB at 
Madras on 3/4/91 and at Bangalore on 18/4/91.
"Agreement Between the Government of Kerala and the 
Indian Dairy Corporation". See: Letter dated 6/4/79 from the 
Special Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of 
Kerala to the Chairman NDDB. (Note: The Indian Dairy Corporation 
and the NDDB had a common Chairman in V Kurien. Following the
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future would be determined by a new techno-managerial 
class, who would act on behalf of the dairy farmers. The 
design of the decision making structures in OF institutions 
reveal that there was a conscious attempt to minimise the 
role of the State/"
This objective was defeated as a consequence of 
the NDDB's attempt to replicate the APCO model all over the 
country. Having no machinery of its own to operationalise 
its ambitious plans, the NDDB was forced to depend on State 
agencies including the dairy bureaucracy. State help was 
required by the NDDB to launch the progrsunme, to monitor it 
and to guarantee the loans that it extended to OF 
institutions. Such dependence, naturally increased the 
relative power of the State elites within the organisation. 
As the programme matured, and the various projects were 
completed, the quantum of financial inflows into OF 
institutions from the NDDB diminished. The power to deny or 
grant project finance was a major source of the NDDB's 
power vis a vis the State. The diminution of this power 
considerably weakened the ability of the NDDB to act as a 
buffer between the State and the organisation.
Co-operative elites constitute another major 
group within the organisation. By co-operative elites, we 
mean that group of co-operative leaders who are either
recommendations of the Jha Committee in 1985, both the 
organisations were merged into one.)
See : Bye-laws of the Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing 
Federation and Bye-laws of the Trivandrum Regional Co-operative 
Milk Producers' Union.
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elected/nominated decision-makers within the organisation 
and key political allies and opponents of such decision 
makers. Co-operative elites in Kerala achieve elective 
office within the organisation through political processes 
that are largely determined exogenously. In the regional 
union elections, the rival panels are selected by the 
Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee and the Communist Party 
of India(Marxist). OF institutions in Kerala, thus came to 
be dominated by professional politicians who were only 
nominally dairy farmers. An analysis of the background of 
the 24 elected board members of the Trivandrum and 
Ernakulam regional unions indicates that only seven members 
are farmers in any real sense of the term.^^ The majority 
are either professional politicians or teachers and 
advocates with close ties to political parties.
This under-representation of farmers in an 
organisation supposedly organised to aggregate farmer 
interests, is likely to skew the allocation of resources 
away from farmers. We have indicated above, that inability 
to keep staff costs down was a major factor in the 
organisation's financial crisis. Political decision-makers 
were prepared to trade higher management pay in return for 
operational control over the organisation. Politicians also 
came to dominate such technical committees as the Programme 
Committee and the Purchase Committee, which in the NDDB 
design were to be run by technocrats answerable to the full 
Board. Control over these committees created avenues for
Field survey. June-July 1991.
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"rents" which were then deployed for creating a political 
constituency. Key allies, for instance, were rewarded with 
large volumes of subsidized feed, which could be resold at 
open-market rates. In this process^however^the viability of 
the feed plants was impaired.
Unlike the sugar co-operatives of Maharashtra, 
political competition in the OF institutions of Kerala has 
not resulted in optimum solutions.2* in part this may be 
due to the fact that the board members of the sugar co­
operatives, though politicians, are nevertheless sugar 
farmers. Their personal economic interests are bound up 
with the success of the co-operative as a viable financial 
entity. There is no such congruity in the economic and 
political interests of the co-operative elites of 
Kerala.Generally, being dairy farmers only in name, their 
interests are best maximised by policies that heighten 
their political profile and help to create a rural 
political constituency. These policies include the 
initiation of high profile, resource-demanding projects, 
selective incentives such as subsidized feed and a staffing 
pattern which tolerates high levels of feather-bedding.
Apart from the financial costs imposed by the 
political use of organisational resources, it also imports 
exogenous conflicts into the organisation. The Left 
Democratic Government's perception that the Congress- 
dominated leadership of the KCMMF was deploying the
See Baviskar B S: The Politics of Development; Sugar Co­
operatives in Rural Maharashtra . Delhi: OUP. 1980.
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organisation's resources towards partisan ends, was an 
important factor in the State's decision to assume 
increasing control over KCMMF. Given the State's monopoly 
over "coercive" power through statutory institutions such 
as the Registrar of Societies, co-operative elites had to 
come to an accommodation with the State. This accommodation 
often manifested itself as submission to the State's 
directives in pricing, staffing and investment decisions.
The dairy bureaucracy had at first welcomed the 
programme in the belief that resources would be channelled 
through it; but the NDDB's attempts to diminish the role of 
the dairy bureaucracy created tensions between OF 
institutions and State agencies. The Dairy Development 
Department had considerable statutory powers of inspection 
over the co-operatives. It also operated various State 
subsidy programmes. Department officials used a combination 
of financial inducements and legal threats to create 
division among the dairy co-operatives. In the process, the 
dairy bureaucracy was able to win back some of the control 
they had lost when OF was first launched.
Organised labour was a major beneficiary of the 
programme. We had observed that all the urban milk supply 
schemes were running at a loss during the pre-OF period. 
The absorption of all the personnel in these plants into OF 
institutions not only ensured security of employment, but 
also a substantial increase in wages. The absorption of 
excess staff and the subsequent wage increases were 
secured primarily due to the strong political links that
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the union leaders had with co-operative and State elites. 
Elected officials of the co-operative were often 
subordinate to the trade union leaders in the party 
hierarchy. This necessarily reduced their ability to combat 
the demands made by union leaders. As professional 
politicians, "acting rationally", co-operative elites would 
prefer to seek an accommodation with trade union leaders 
rather than precipitate a conflict that might damage their 
political interests. Such accommodation would often involve 
a rather "relaxed" view of the use of organisational 
resources.
State elites constitute the most powerful group 
in OF institutions. By State elites, we mean the elected 
political leaders and senior civil servants including 
Secretaries to Government. The source of their power within 
the organisation is four fold: legal, organisational,
financial and political.
Co-operative institutions in India are, in law, 
supervised by the Registrar of Societies. He has the power 
to deny registration to a society, issue directions to it 
on routine affairs, amend its bye-laws and dismiss its 
elected officials. The Registrar is a transferable civil 
servant and as such is subordinate to the elected political 
officials in the government. The threat to use the coercive 
power vested in the Registrar is sufficient to bring even 
the most independent minded co-operator into line.
Organisational power is derived from the presence 
of State elites in the boards of OF institutions. The
380
Managing Director of the KCMMF is usually an IAS officer. 
Of the remaining thirteen directors, a further three are 
government officials.They are : the Secretary to Government 
(Department of Animal Husbandry), the Registrar of 
Societies and an official from the Department of Finance. 
Since the Secretary and the Registrar are usually IAS 
officers, along with the MD, they may well act as a group 
within the board.
Though heavily outnumbered in the board. State 
elites are able to exercise disproportionate power, because 
of the strategic positions they occupy. Thus the MD is the 
chief executive officer of the organisation; and we have 
already referred to the powers of the Registrar. The 
Secretary to Government is the head of the State Dairy and 
Animal Husbandry bureaucracy and is vested with a great 
deal of statutory and financial authority. Moreover, he is 
the representative of the minister in the board and as such 
projects the minister's statutory and political power into 
the decision-making process.
The financial power is derived from the
guarantees that the State extended to the NDDB for the 
loans secured by OF institutions. The NDDB applies to the 
government whenever an OF institution defaults on its 
repayment obligations. This offers State elites
opportunities to intervene even in routine decision­
making. Further, the State directly operates a number of 
programmes through the dairy and animal husbandry
departments. Pliant co-operatives can be rewarded and
381
recalcitrant societies punished by the judicious use of 
selective incentives and disincentives.
Elected officials of OF institutions in Kerala 
are professional politicians. While some of them may have 
chosen to become involved in the co-operative sector 
through notions of the public interest, these institutions 
are often a stepping stone to positions of power and 
prestige outside the organisation. Co-operative elites are 
often serious contenders for nominations as party 
candidates in legislative and parliamentary elections. 
Party leaders and ministers with powers to dispense such 
favours, therefore,exercise a great deal of influence over 
co-operative elites.
The above summary of the relative power potential 
of competing groups indicates that the nominal 
representatives of dairy farmers are often unable to 
safeguard the interests of farmers. Conflicts over the 
allocation of resources are decided in favour of groups 
that are politically powerful. Trade unions are able to 
ensure the absorption of excess staff and higher emoluments 
because of their access to political leaders who outrank 
the co-operative elites. Key political allies are permitted 
to siphon off organisational resources for dispensing 
political patronage. Diversion of resources to these groups 
constrain the ability of the organisation to offer higher 
prices to dairy farmers.
Meanwhile the autonomy of the organisation was 
being steadily eroded. The NDDB had positioned itself as a
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protector of farm interests against the State. Despite its 
techno-bureaucratic structure, it had acted as a buffer in 
the initial years of the programme. But the technocracy 
underestimated the power of the State. All over India, the 
elaborate checks and balances which the NDDB had 
incorporated into the APCO bye-laws to keep the State at 
bay, were diluted. In Gujarat, the reputations of Amul and 
Kurien were sufficient safeguards. In other provinces where 
OF institutions were created through deliberate State 
action and where the co-operative elites were in effect the 
junior partners of State elites, the programme became an 
instrument of the State.
State elites have multiple, complex goals. 
Programmes such as OF and the integrated coconut and 
fisheries projects are justified on the grounds that they 
maximise social welfare. Market imperfections may require 
the State in Kerala to play the role of the dynaunic 
entrepreneur in dairy markets; but the choices made by the 
State crucially determine the outcome of such 
interventions. While such State interventions have helped 
to increase milk production and stabilise dairy markets, 
they have failed to create a financially viable 
institutional framework within which dairy farmers could 
maximise their incomes. Our analysis of State intervention 
in the paddy, coconut and fisheries sectors, confirmed the 
co-existence of two sets of apparently contradictory 
policies. One set designed to boost production through 
specific projects, the other apparently inhibiting the
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realisation of such goals through monopoly procurement, 
price controls and other ruinous policies.
The explanation for such paradox becomes 
apparent, when we view these programmes in the context of 
the larger distributional conflict in Kerala. Governments 
can be viewed both as agencies that seek to promote the 
interests of organised groups and as agencies that seek to 
retain power.
In the first view, the State in Kerala is seen to 
promote policies designed to ensure the availability of 
cheap agricultural commodities required for the consumption 
of the dominant groups. The Kerala Rice and Paddy 
(Procurement by Levy) Order of 1966, which coerced farmers 
to sell their produce to the State at below market rates 
and the Kerala Land Utilisation Order of 1967, which banned 
the conversion of paddy lands to garden lands were designed 
to ensure the availability of cheap rice. The Kerala Raw 
Cashew Nut(Procurement and Distribution) Act of 1981, which 
required the farmers to sell their raw nuts to the State at 
State determined prices was designed to ensure that the 
State-owned cashew factories would not be starved of raw 
material. State controls over the price of milk both in the 
pre-OF and OF periods, while simultaneously proceeding with 
productivity enhancement schemes are further illustrations 
of the State's efforts to maximise supplies at below market 
rates (See Chapter II and III).
Farmers experience positive or negative policies 
depending on their location within the political economy of
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Kerala. Rubber growers, for instance, produce goods not 
required for the consumption of the dominant groups in 
Kerala. Moreover, the specific characteristics of the 
sector (such as its geographical concentration and the 
presence of a large estate sector), enable rubber producers 
to overcome the problems of collective action to some 
extent. Paddy and dairy farmers,on the other hand, being 
dispersed and marginal producers of consumption goods 
required by the dominant groups, are unable to optimise 
their returns through collective action.
As agencies that seek to retain power, 
governments require resources for building a political 
constituency and for ensuring the loyalty and cooperation 
of key subordinates and allies. Programmes such as OF and 
the integrated coconut and fisheries development projects 
offer opportunities for aggregating the political and 
personal interests of State elites. Elected political 
officials, such as members of legislative assemblies and 
ministers,find in these programmes, avenues for creating a 
political constituency through the dispensation of 
political patronage. Civil servants maximise their career 
opportunities, while trade union leaders are able to ensure 
for their followers job security with enhanced emoluments.
Institutions such as KCMMF, KERAFED and 
MATSYAFED, which were designed to aggregate the interests 
of vulnerable peasants, instead become mechanisms for the 
extraction of resource for the consumption of State elites.
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New programmes and new institutions are needed as the 
viability of existing institutions are weakened.
The history of State intervention in Kerala 
indicates that the vast majority of the institutions, 
whether State-sponsored co-operatives or public sector 
corporations, are financially fragile structures. Only 28 
out of the 124 non dairy marketing co-operatives in Kerala 
are currently working at a profit/" Similarly only 34 out 
of the 96 State owned institutions made a profit in 1989- 
90." Despite such poor performance/ new institutions 
continue to be created in Kerala. This is explicable only 
if we view them, not as economically rational solutions to 
developmental problems, but as political responses to the 
demand for fresh resources.
State intervention, thus, has a differential 
impact on various groups in the polity. The nature of the 
political process in Kerala endows well organised interest 
groups with disproportionate access to policy formulation. 
Organised labour, with its symbiotic relationship with 
political leaders and government officials/with their power 
to trade State funds in return for policies that enhance 
their relative position in the economy, are both benefited. 
Dispersed, marginal producers of food crops, on the other 
hand,are adversely affected. Distributional conflicts are
Records of the Department of Co-operatives. Government of 
Kerala.1991.
" A Review of Public Enterprises in Kerala 1989-90". 
Bureau of Public Enterprises. Government of Kerala. Trivandrum. 
1991.
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thus settled in favour of groups that have access to State 
power•
Our analysis of agrarian policies in Kerala thus 
incorporates elements of both the Public Choice critique of 
the expanding State sector and Bates' analysis of agrarian 
policies in Africa. While we recognize that State elites 
may be motivated by notions of the public good, the 
indifferent outcomes of so many State sponsored programmes, 
raise doubts about the validity of a welfare maximizing 
interpretation of State behaviour. Our study indicates that 
the sub optimal results of public policies can be explained 
by the political and economic benefits that such policies 
confer on State elites. Co-operative organisations, for 
instance, offer State and co-operative elites, the 
opportunity for enjoying policy generated rents. Some of it 
they consume themselves; the rest are deployed for creating 
a political constituency. This political utility of rents 
and the pressure exerted by organised groups allied to 
State elites provide the rationale for State intervention 
in the economy. Economically inefficient programmes, thus, 
far from being the unanticipated outcomes of public 
policies, are in fact, the product of the autonomous 
choices of State elites.
Epilogue
Our analysis of the political economy of State 
intervention in Kerala, leads to a depressing conclusion 
about the results of public policy. There appears to be no
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reappraisal of the efficacy of current policies while State 
elites are apparently convinced about the necessity for 
further massive intervention in the economy.
We, however, believe that the objective
conditions in Kerala, can no longer sustain this pattern of 
intervention. Financial and economic crises may force State 
elites to re-evaluate some of the basic assumptions on 
which public policy has hitherto been formulated. Grindle 
and Thomas, point out that a crisis presents a "moment" or 
opportunity for bringing about major changes in public 
p o l i c y . T h e  State can break free from organised pressure 
groups or even from the rent-seeking behaviour of its own 
agents and promote policies that advance national 
interests. The manifest failure of the existing policy to 
satisfy even the narrow interests of the dominant groups 
may discredit this framework. This creates the necessary 
political space for State elites to initiate policies that 
differ markedly from the existing system. They may also 
conclude that to legitimise their own positions it may be 
necessary to distance themselves from the old discredited 
system.
In the Kerala context,two types of crises can be 
distinguished:economic and fiscal. The economic crisis, we 
noted in chapter II, manifested itself as stagnation in the 
commodity producing sectors of the economy. Per capita 
income declined in the mid eighties and unemployment had
31 See Grindle M. S and Thomas J. W : Public Choices and 
Policv Change : The Political Economy of Reform in Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1991.
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s o a r e d . A n  estimate by Oommen indicates that of the 14 
major provinces in India, Kerala had the lowest growth of 
employment in the registered manufacturing sector in the 
period 1970-71 to 1980-81.^^ Unemployment is a major 
emotive issue in Kerala. Political parties had hitherto 
responded to the problem by demanding the creation of jobs 
in the State sector. The fiscal crisis of the government 
makes direct intervention increasingly difficult.
The fiscal crisis is manifested in two ways. 
First, the government is unable to mobilise adequate 
resources to invest in the economy. Oommen estimates that 
the per capita plan outlay of Kerala has been well below 
the all India average since the Fourth Plan (1969-74). 
Whereas in the Fourth Plan the per capita outlay of the 
state was Rs 156, as against the All-India average of Rs 
142, in the Eighth Plan (1985-90) the figures were Rs 727 
and Rs 1026 respectively.Second, there is evidence that 
some of the impressive achievements in the social indices 
of development could be threatened due to lack of resources 
to maintain public assets. Universal health care, for
Per capita annual income (in 1980 prices) decreased from 
Rs 1462 in 1981-82 to Rs 1400 in 1987-88. The number of work 
seekers in the live registers of the Employment Exchanges 
increased from 1.58 million in 1980 to 3.07 million in 1989. 
"Economic Review". Various Issues, o p  cit
See Oommen M A "  Development Experience, Development 
Priorities and Fiscal Resources of Kerala". People and 
Development. Supplement. No: 3. April- May 1992.
ibid.
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instance, becomes problematic when government hospitals 
lack the resources to purchase adequate medicines and 
equipment.^
A greater source of embarrassment is the recent 
dislocations in the functioning of the treasury due to 
inadequate funds with the government. Payments to 
government contractors have been held up and there are also 
reports that the disbursement of salaries of government 
staff and public sector employees had been delayed.3* The 
inability to meet even the needs of the dominant groups is 
bound to raise serious doubts about the validity of the 
existing policy framework. Political officials, to
establish their own legitimacy, may be forced to rethink
the nature and content of future public policies.
In this process, external pressure may be the
decisive factor. India is currently implementing a
Structural Adjustment Programme sponsored by the IMF and 
the World Bank.In a letter to the President of the World 
Bank, Manmohan Singh, the Finance Minister of India, 
pledged to reduce the overall public deficit by imposing
Many of the medical institutions in Kerala, including 
hospitals attached to medical colleges face very serious resource 
constraints. Very often, the hospitals have to ask patients to 
buy drugs on their own as the institutions do not have enough 
resources to meet all the requirements.
The government's difficulties in meeting its commitments 
on staff salaries can be understood, when we observe that in 
1989-90 as against a total tax revenue of Rs 12,040 million, the 
total salary and pension payments of government employees 
including government teachers, came to Rs 13,250 million. See 
Oommen M.A 1992. op cit.
Presumably, the shortfall is filled, as we indicated in Chapter 
II, by dipping into the government's capital funds.
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fiscal discipline on the central and provincial 
governments.^ One method of enforcing this discipline is 
the reduction in the generous overdraft facilities which 
provincial governments have with the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI). The dislocation in the functioning of the treasury 
to which we have referred earlier is a product of the 
tighter fiscal policies initiated by the Government of 
India. The Malayala Manorama, one of Kerala's leading 
newspaper, reported that in January 1993, the RBI 
instructed commercial banks not to honour treasury cheques 
as the government had not cleared its overdraft with the 
RBI.The paper also reported that during the financial year 
1992-93, the government had defaulted several times on its 
repayment to the RBI.^® The letter's instructions not to 
honour government cheques were apparently a device to 
discipline the government.
The inability of the State to maintain the 
existing pattern of resource allocation is likely to 
alienate the dominant groups in the polity. While they will 
resist any policy initiative that reduces their relative 
position in the economy, the fiscal crisis of the State 
coupled with external pressure, may force State elites to 
initiate policies that promote economic efficiency.
We admit that these are optimistic assumptions. 
It may well be that societal pressures or traditional
Letter dated 11/11/91 from Manmohan Singh, Finance 
Minister, Government of India to L T Preston, President of the 
World Bank. Quoted in the Hindustan Times, New Delhi. 27/2/92.
The Malavala Manorama. 31/1/93.
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patterns of rent- seeking behaviour are too strong for the 
initiation of any meaningful reform programme. However, we 
believe that among a small but significant section of State 
elites, the necessity for a fundamental reappraisal of 
current policies is being increasingly felt.^* The collapse 
of the command economies of the former Soviet Union and 
other East European countries have raised questions about 
the efficacy of continuing the present policy framework. 
Moreover, the economic boom in the People's Republic of 
China has enhanced the appeal of free-market policies even 
among the members of the Communist parties. Whether this 
intellectual appreciation will be translated into a 
concrete reform programme is, of course, a matter of 
speculation.
Young MLAs belonging to the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), have admitted to the author they do not fully share 
the world view of their party leaders. Ministers in the previous 
Left Democratic Government have also informed the author that the 
priority of the Government in future should not be towards 
redistributive policies; rather policies should be devised to 
enhance the productivity of the economy.
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APPENDIX I
List of Societies Selected for Intense Study
I TRIVANDRUM DISTRICT
1 Uchakkada Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society,
2 Kuzhiamvila Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
3 Vettinad Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
4 Palode Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
5 Chembakamangalam Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative
Society.
II ERNAKULAM DISTRICT
1 Vengola Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
2 Puthenvelikkara Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative
Society.
3 Puliyanam Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
4 Arikuza Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
5 Needapara Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
III MALAPPURUM DISTRICT
1 Pullenchery Ksheerolpadaka Sahakarana Sangam.
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2 Palemad Ksheerolpadaka Sahakarana Sangam.
3 Nilambur Town Ksheerolpadaka Sahakarana Sangam.
4 Karulai Ksheerolpadaka Sahakarana Sangam.
5 Kappil Karad Ksheerolpadaka Sahakarana Sangam.
IV KOZHIKODE DISTRICT
1 Palazi Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
2 Cheruvannor Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
3 Kuppayakode Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
4 Mathra Ksheera Ulpadaka Co-operative Society.
5 Vattoli Bazar Ksheera Vyavasaya Sahakarana Sangam.
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APPENDIX II
QUESTIONNAIRE
(Translation from Malayaleun)
Ncune of Society 
Panchayat
I Basic Information
1.Name and address
2.Sex: a.M; b.F
3 .Age:
4.Education: A.illiterate; b.completed primary
education; c.completed secondary 
education; d.completed high 
school; e.studied in college
a.mainly from agriculture; b.from 
other sources
a.agriculture; b.agricultural 
labourer; c. manual labourer;
d.trade; e.organised sector; 
f.others
7.Milch animals owned a.animals in milk; b.dry animals;
c.calves
5.Main source of 
income :
6 .Occupation:
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8 .Period engaged in 
dairying:
9.Why did you 
start/carry on 
dairying?
a.less than a year; b.l to 2 
years; c.2.1 to 5 years; d.more 
than 5 years
a.to get milk for household 
purposes; b.to get additional 
income; c.as a source of 
livelihood; d.others
10.Are you a member of a.yes; b.no 
the milk society?
11.If yes, why did you a.good price; b.surplus disposal;
become a member?
12.How long have you 
been a member?
13.Who persuaded you 
to become a member?
14.If not a member, 
reasons for not 
joining:
c.no other marketing outlet;
d.supply of subsidised inputs;
e.to get a loan; f.others
a.less than a year; b.1-2 years;
c.2.1 to 5 years; d.don't know
a.neighbour/friend;b.family 
member; c.political leader;
d.public man; e.milma/co-operative 
official; f.bank manager
a.difference of opinion with the 
society leadership; b.cannot 
supply milk as per the bye-laws of 
the society; c.society rejected 
application; d.no benefits from 
joining; e.others
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15.If your application a.political reasons; b.unable to 
has been rejected, the supply milk as per bye-laws; 
reasons: c.others
II Production and Sale 
of Milk
1.Total quantity of 
milk produced today 
(litres):
2.Disposal pattern 
(litres):
a.neighbours; b.tea shop; 
c.vendor; d.society; e.others
3.1s the above pattern a.yes; b.no 
your usual one?
4.If not, the usual 
pattern:
5.How often do you 
give milk to the 
society?
a.neighbours; b.tea shop; 
c.vendor; d.society; e.others
a.every day; b.occasionally;
c.when there are no other outlets
6.Has the society ever a.yes; b.no
refused to take your
milk?
7.If yes, the reasons: a.poor quality of milk; b.society
unable to handle excess milk;
c.bandhs and public holidays;
d.others
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8.How many times 
during the last 2 
years, has the society 
refused to take milk?
9.When compared to 
last year, are you 
giving the society 
more or less milk?
10.If more, the 
reasons :
11.If less, the 
reasons :
12.Have you received 
cattle feed from 
Milma?
13.Is the supply of 
cattle feed regular or 
irregular?
14.Have you received 
any other inputs from 
the society?
a.more; b.less; c .same; d.don't 
know
a.better price; b.more inputs from 
the society; c.increased 
production; d.less local demand;
e.greater pressure from society 
officials; g.others
a.poor price; b.poor supply of 
inputs; c.reduced production;
d.increased local demand; e.others
a.yes; b.no
a.regular; b.irregular
a.yes; b.no
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a.yes; b.no
a.very good; b.satisfactory; 
c •poor
a.satisfactory; b.unsatisfactory
15.Have you received 
any veterinary 
assistance from the 
society/union?
16.What is your 
opinion of the 
veterinary care of the 
union?
Ill Economics of Milk 
Production
1. When compared to 
the prevailing prices 
in the area, the price 
given by the society 
is :
2.When compared to 
production cost, the 
price given by the 
society is:
3.If price received is a.no other marketing outlet; 
unsatisfactory, why do b.surplus disposal; c.inputs; 
you still give milk to d.soft loans; e.others 
the society?
a.satisfactory; b.unsatisfactory
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4.Are you optimistic 
about the future of 
dairying?
5.By joining the 
society have you 
earned any additional 
income?
6.do you expect to 
earn more money 
through the activities 
of the society?
IV Farmers'
Perceptions about the 
Programme
1.Can you name the 
President of your 
society?
2.Can you name the 
Chairman and the 
Directors of your 
regional union?
3.The society' 
leadership is honest 
in its dealings.
a.yes; b.no
a.yes; b.no; c.don't know
a.yes; b.no; d.don't know
a.yes; b.no
a.more than one name; b.one neune; 
c.unable to name any
a.always; b.most of the time; 
c.occasionally; d.never; e.don't 
know
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4.The regional union's a.always; b. most of the time; c 
leadership is honest occasionally; d.never; e.don't
knowin its dealings.
5.Compared to last 
year, the society is 
functioning better 
this year.
6.Compared to last 
year, the regional 
union is functioning 
better this year.
7.Has the society 
given you all the 
services that you 
expected?
8.Which services have 
you not received?
9."Milma" officials 
are more accessible 
and willing to solve 
your problems than 
government officials.
a.yes; b.no; c.don't know
a.yes; b.no; c.don't know
a.yes; b.some of them;c.no; 
d.don't know
a.good price; b.inputs; c.stable 
markets; d.others
a.agree; b.disagree; c.don't know
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is a co- a.agree; b.disagree; c.don't know
operative in name 
only;actually it is a 
government department.
11.How many times have a.always; b.occasionally; c.don't 
you gone for a society know
meeting?
12.The co-operative a.agree; b.disagree; c.don't know 
movement in the dairy
sector is over­
politicised.
y
13.Elections to the a.agree; b.disagree; c.don't know 
societies and regional
unions should not be 
on the basis of party 
politics
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List of
APPENDIX III 
Individuals Interviewed
I Presidents of
Primary Societies
Name Society Date
1•Sreedharan Palode 1/6/91
2.Vettinad Sasi Vettinad 1/6/91
3 .Rajendran Uchakkada 2/6/91
4•Sundaran Nadar Kuzhiamvila 2/6/91
5 .Muraleedharan Nair Chembakamangalam 2/6/91
6 .C•Cherooty Mathra 10/6/91
7 .Chathukutty Kuppayakode 11/6/91
8.K.K.Gangadharan Vattoli Bazar 11/6/91
9.T.N George Palemad 13/6/91
10.Abraham Varghese Kappil Karad 13/6/91
11.Esc John Pullenchery 14/6/91
12.T.P Thankachan Karulai 14/6/91
13.T.G Mathew Nilambur Town 14/6/91
14.M.All Cheruvannor 15/6/91
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15.E.V.Narayanan
16.P.C George
17.T.M Domnic
18.Gopinathan Nair
19.V.K Dharman
Vengola
Needappara
Arikuza
Puliyanam
Puthenvelikkara
17/6/91
18/6/91
18/6/91
19/6/91
19/6/91
II REGIONAL UNIONS
Name
l.Nanniode Rajan
2.Karuinadi Murali
3.K •Sashidharan
4.K.P.P Kurup
5.Dr.Jayachandran
6.Jayakrishnan Nair
7.Kunju Kunju
Designation
Chairman,TRCMPU
Director,TRCMPU
Director,TRCMPU
M.D, TRCMPU
Assistant 
Manager,TRCMPU
Marketing 
Officer,TRCMPU
Director,ERCMPU
8 .Parmeswaran Pillai Director,ERCMPU
9.N.N Mangalam
10.A.M Poulose
Director,ERCMPU
Director,ERCMPU
Date
27/5/91
27/5/91
25/5/91
25/5/91
25/5/91
25/5/91
20/6/61
20/6/91
20/6/91
20/6/91
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11.p.K Joseph
12.P.M George
13.M.Chathu
14.P.S Abraham
15.K.P Raman Nair
16.E.N Kidavu
III MISCELLANEOUS
l.T.T Jacob
2.Adimoolam
3.V .Ramachandran
4.N.V Navithan
5 .Chellappa
Former Director, CMS 25/4/91 
Union
Former Director,CMS 25/4/91 
Union
Former President, CMS 24/4/91 
Union
Former President, CMS 24/4/91 
Union
Former President,CMS 24/4/91
Union
Former Secretary, CMS 24/4/91 
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APPENDIX IV
EXCHANGE RATES: 1980-93 
Rs.per U.S Dollar
Tear Rate
1980 7.89
1981 7.93
1982 9.63
1983 10.31
1984 11.89
1985 12.24
1986 12.79
1987 12.97
1988 14.48
1989 16.66
1990 17.27
1991 19.63
1992 29.07
1993 31.16
Source:1. 1980-1989: "Indian Petroleum & Natural Gas
Statistics: 1909-91". Ministry of Petroleum & Natural
Gas.Government of India. New Delhi.1991.
2. 1990-1993: Bank of Baroda. U.K
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